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Résumé 
Depuis plusieurs années, les États membres de l’Union européenne (UE) se soumettent à 
des politiques restrictives, en matière d’asile, qui les contraignent à respecter leur 
engagement de protéger les personnes qui fuient la persécution. 
 
Plusieurs politiques de dissuasion de l’UE sont controversées. Certaines ont d’abord été 
élaborées dans différents États, avant que l’UE ne mette en place une politique 
commune en matière d’asile. Certaines des ces politiques migratoires ont été copiées, et 
ont un effet négatif sur la transformation des procédures d’asile et du droit des réfugiés 
dans d’autres pays, tel le Canada. 
 
En raison des normes minimales imposées par la législation de l’UE, les États membres 
adoptent des politiques et instaurent des pratiques, qui sont mises en doute et sont 
critiquées par l’UNHCR et les ONG, quant au respect des obligations internationales à 
l'égard des droits de la personne. 
 
Parmi les politiques et les pratiques les plus critiquées certaines touchent le secteur du 
contrôle frontalier. En tentant de remédier à l’abolition des frontières internes, les États 
membres imposent aux demandeurs d’asile des barrières migratoires quasi impossibles à 
surmonter. Les forçant ainsi à s’entasser dans des centres de migration, au nord de 
l’Afrique, à rebrousser chemin ou encore à mourir en haute mer.  
 
 
 
Mots-clés : Asile – Union européenne – Contrôle frontalier – Protection internationale – 
Base de données – Mécanismes de conformité de l’UE  
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Abstract 
For many years, EU member states have imposed strict controls on asylum and have 
often failed to respect their commitment to provide protection to persons fleeing 
persecution. Many of the controversial EU policies of deterrence have been developed 
by different member states and implemented on an EU level. Some of those policies 
have been copied and brought negative changes to the refugee law system in other 
countries, such as Canada. Under the minimal standards imposed by the EU legislation, 
the states are adopting and putting in place policies and practices whose compliance with 
the international human rights obligations is questionable and criticized by the UNHCR 
and NGOs.  
 
Some of the most controversial policies and practices put in place are in the area of 
border control. Aiming to compensate for the abolishment of internal borders, EU 
member states are imposing nearly insurmountable barriers to asylum seekers who find 
themselves suffocating in migration centres in North Africa, turned back or left to die at 
high sea.  
 
 
Keywords: Asylum – European Union – Border control – International protection – 
Databases – EU compliance mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Table of contents 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 
Global Regression in the Commitment to Protect Asylum-seekers and Refugees.................................... 1 
EU: More Restrictions to Access to Asylum ............................................................................................ 5 
Aim of the Research ................................................................................................................................. 8 
Theoretical framework ............................................................................................................................ 11 
CHAPTER I: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS RELATED TO THE 
RIGHT TO ASYLUM ................................................................................................................. 20 
SECTION 1: Content of the Refugee Convention .................................................................................. 20 
SECTION 2: The Scope of the Right to Asylum within the International Law ...................................... 21 
SECTION 3: Non-refoulement: Inherent Part of the Right to Asylum ................................................... 23 
SECTION 4: International Human Rights Law and the Right to Asylum .............................................. 26 
SECTION 5: EU Human Rights Framework and its Relevance to the Access to Asylum ..................... 34 
A. Protection Standards Set by the ECHR and the ECtHR ................................................................ 35 
1) Applicability of ECHR to Asylum Cases .................................................................................. 36 
2) Scope of art.3 ECHR ................................................................................................................. 37 
3) State Responsibility under art.3 ................................................................................................. 39 
4) ECtHR: Limitations of the Procedure ........................................................................................ 40 
B. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union: Impact on Rights 
of Asylum-Seekers ............................................................................................................................. 42 
1) Scope of the Charter .................................................................................................................. 43 
2) Scope of the Right to Asylum in EU Charter ............................................................................. 45 
3) ECJ and the Relevant Jurisprudence .......................................................................................... 47 
CHAPTER II: ACCESS TO ASYLUM IN EU: QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBSERVANCE OR POLITICAL PRIORITIES ..................................................................... 49 
SECTION 1: Where is EU Heading? Main Trends in the EU Asylum Acquis ...................................... 49 
A. Historical Background ................................................................................................................... 50 
B. Overview of the EU Asylum Acquis ............................................................................................. 52 
1) Exilic Paradigm ......................................................................................................................... 52 
2) Source Country Paradigm .......................................................................................................... 53 
3) Security Paradigm ...................................................................................................................... 59 
CHAPTER III: BORDER CONTROL AND DATABASES: BARRIERS FOR 
ACCESS TO PROTECTION ..................................................................................................... 70 
SECTION 1: EU Border Management in a Snapshot ............................................................................. 73 
SECTION 2: The Cyber-fortress Europe ................................................................................................ 78 
A. Network of Databases Controlling Migrants’ Movement ............................................................. 81 
1) Schengen Information System ................................................................................................... 82 
2) Visa Information System ........................................................................................................... 86 
3) Eurodac ...................................................................................................................................... 88 
B. Interoperability by Design ............................................................................................................. 90 
C. Consequences to Access to Territory for Asylum seekers ............................................................ 91 
1) Non-discrimination .................................................................................................................... 92 
2) Purpose Limitation Principle ..................................................................................................... 94 
3) Implied Risk of Biometrics ........................................................................................................ 96 
iv 
 
4) Accountability.......................................................................................................................... 101 
CHAPTER IV: BORDER CONTROL ACTIVITIES: AVOIDING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL CONVENIENCE .................................................... 103 
SECTION 1: Frontex: Balancing Prevention of Irregular Migration with Protection of Human Rights of 
the Asylum seekers? ............................................................................................................................. 103 
A. How Frontex Operates ................................................................................................................. 105 
B. Joint Operations Conducted by Sea ............................................................................................. 107 
C. Responsibilities during Sea Operations: a Shaky Legal Ground? ................................................ 110 
D. Responsibilities to be Carried out by All Parties in Sea Operations ............................................ 113 
1) Framing International Responsibility within the context of EU complexities ......................... 113 
3) EU: Organization with International Legal Responsibilities ................................................... 114 
4) Joint Responsibility between Member States and EU ............................................................. 124 
E. Responsibilities Placed into Context ............................................................................................ 127 
F. Frontex:  the Way Forward .......................................................................................................... 131 
CHAPTER V: EXTRA-TERRITORIALIZATION OF EU BORDER CONTROL .......... 134 
SECTION 1: Brief Overview of the EU Externalization of Asylum .................................................... 134 
A. Readmission Agreements ............................................................................................................ 134 
B. Regional Protection Programs ..................................................................................................... 139 
C. Processing Centres for Asylum seekers outside EU .................................................................... 142 
D. Sea Operations in Territory of Third States ................................................................................ 144 
CHAPTER VI: MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH EU LAW ............................................................................................ 147 
SECTION 1: Existing Mechanisms ...................................................................................................... 148 
A. Art.258 (TFEU) ........................................................................................................................... 148 
B. Art.7 (TEU) .................................................................................................................................. 152 
C. Usefulness of the Existing Mechanisms: Need for Improvement ................................................ 153 
D. ECJ and the Preliminary Rulings Procedure: Multifaceted Solution ........................................... 155 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 159 
REFERENCE LIST ................................................................................................................... 167 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Abbreviations 
 
AFSJ  Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
ARSIWA Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
CEAS  Common European Asylum System 
DARIO Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations 
EASO  European Asylum Support Office  
EBF  External Borders Fund 
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
ECJ  Court of Justice of the European Union 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EDPS  European Data Protection Supervisor  
ETA  Electronic Travel Authorisation  
EU  European Union 
IBM  Integrated Border Management 
ICC  International Criminal Court  
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
ICJ   International Court of Justice  
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
IHRL  International Human Rights Law 
ILC  International Law Commission 
IRL  International Refugee Law 
RPP  Regional Protection Programmes  
SBC  Schengen Borders Code 
SIS  Schengen Information System  
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of European Union 
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
VIS  Visa Information System  
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It was in Europe that the institution of refugee protection was born, 
it is in Europe today that the adequacy of the system is being tested. 
 
(Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissoner for Refugees) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Global Regression in the Commitment to Protect Asylum-seekers and 
Refugees 
 
The international refugee regime is based on the idea of providing coherent protection 
and assistance to people fleeing persecution through cooperation and the sharing of 
responsibilities among states. However, core principles of the refugee regime are 
jeopardised by the growing inclination of governments worldwide to circumvent their 
international obligations towards asylum-seekers and refugees. Unilaterally, the 
industrialized states of Europe, North America and Australia are introducing particularly 
restrictive measures that are changing the nature of the refugee regime. The restrictions 
put in place by the states successfully deter asylum-seekers from leaving their countries 
and prevent those already on the move from reaching state shores and accessing refugee 
determination procedure. Encouraged by the reluctant behaviour of the North,1 the 
Southern states,2 traditionally tolerant to asylum-seekers and refugees3 are gradually 
                                                          
1 North refers to the industrialized countries of Europe, North America and Australia. 
2 Southern states refer to the developing countries.  
3 According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there were 43.7 million forcibly 
displaced people worldwide at the end of 2009, the highest number in 15 years. This number includes 15, 
4 million refugees, 27,5million IDPs, more than 837,500 asylum-seekers whose application for asylum 
have not been adjudicated by the end of the reporting period. UNHCR. Global trends 2010,Division of 
Programme Support and Management, 2011 [Online]  http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html [Acccesssed 
2 June 2011]; In terms of refugee distribution around the world, according to UNHCR developing 
countries hosted four-fifths of the world’s refugees. More than 4.4 million refugees, representing 42 per 
cent of the world’s refugees, resided in countries which GDP per capita was below USD 3,000. This 
number includes Pakistan which hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide (1.9 million), followed 
by the Islamic Republic of Iran (1.1 million) and the Syrian Arab Republic (1 million; Government 
estimate). In the context of asylum-seekers, South Africa was the world’s largest recipient of individual 
applications for asylum. Therefore, the least developed countries are sheltering the most displaced persons 
worldwide. This responsibility-sharing inequality is criticised by the UNHCR Commissioner, António 
Guterres, as follows: “What we’re seeing is worrying unfairness in the international protection paradigm. 
Fears about supposed floods of refugees in industrialized countries are being vastly overblown or 
mistakenly conflated with issues of migration. Meanwhile it’s poorer countries that are left having to pick 
up the burden”. Id. 
2 
 
adopting the same hard-line policies. Thus, asylum-seekers and refugees worldwide are 
routinely subjected to interception at the borders, arbitrary arrests, detention and denial 
of social and economic rights, contrasting the international refugee and human rights 
regime. What is more, fearing political and social instability, industrialized states are 
increasingly focusing on “avoiding refugee flows” by keeping them close to the source 
countries4. As a result, numerous people are confined to refugee camps for decades and 
compelled to marginalized existence.             
 
The regression in states’ commitment to protect asylum-seekers and refugees can be 
attributed to important geo- and socio-political developments5, which have significantly 
increased global migration. African decolonization, which resulted in prolonged armed 
conflicts, the fall of the Soviet bloc, and globalization, among other factors, has resulted 
in mass voluntary and involuntary displacements worldwide. Particularly, globalization 
has played a significant role in the change of global migration patterns6. Generally 
associated with the liberalization of international trade, globalization has brought 
prosperity to many societies around the world. The development of informational 
technologies and transportation networks has significantly facilitated the movements of 
people across the globe. However, the positive effects of globalization have been 
                                                          
4 Bill FRELICK, “Paradigm Shifts in the International Responses to Refugees” in James D. WHITE & 
Marsella J.ANTHONY (eds.) Fear of Persecution : Global Human Rights, International Law, and Human 
Well-being. Lanham, Lexington Books, 2007. 
5 In recent years, environmental changes are also a significant factor in forced displacement. 
6 Erika FELLER, “Asylum, Migration and Refugee Protection: Realities, Myths and the Promise of Things 
to Come”, (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 509, 510. 
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overshadowed by acute inequalities within and between the countries7. The unequal 
distribution of income and wealth among nations8 has pushed many people to cross 
international borders and seek better opportunities significantly increasing international 
migration towards developed countries. 
 
Potential fears of floods of migrants have prompted industrialized states to engage in 
extensive regularization and control over their borders. With fewer possibilities for 
regular entrance and settlement, many people have turned to irregular entry channels9 
and/or used an asylum channel in order to secure a better means of existence. This has 
oversaturated current asylum systems and blurred the distinction between people in need 
of protection and irregular migration for economic reasons. Entry control measures 
introduced by states to fight irregular migration are lacking safeguard mechanisms to 
make the important distinction between the different migrant groups. As rightly pointed 
out by Hathaway10, migrants, especially those coming from less developed part of the 
                                                          
7 According to the UN Report, ‘much of the world is trapped in an inequality predicament’ manifested in 
the ‘chasm between the formal and informal economies, the widening gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers, the growing disparities in health, education and opportunities for social, economic and political 
participation.’ The report concluded that the world is more unequal than it was 10 years ago. UNITED 
NATIONS, “United Nations 2005 Report on World Social Situation Finds Much of World Trapped n 
'Inequality Predicament' “ cited in E.FELLER, Op. Cit., note 6, p.510.    
8 Eighty per cent of the world’s gross domestic product belongs to the 1 billion people living in the 
developed world. The remaining twenty per cent is shared by the five billion people living in developing 
countries. UNITED NATIONS, The inequality predicament. Report on the world social situation 2005, New 
York United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affaires, [Online] 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2005/rwss05.pdf [Accessed 3 December 2011].  
9 It is estimated that fifty million people reside irregularly somewhere at present. This number may be 
higher because it is difficult to make an accurate estimation. Catherine DAUVERGNE, Making People 
Illegal : What Globalization Means for Migration and Law, New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2008, p,14. 
10 James C. HATHAWAY, “Harmonizing for Whom- the Devalvation of Refugee Protection in the Era of 
European Economic Integration”, (1993) 26 Cornell International Law Journal 719, 723. 
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world, are treated as “an undifferentiated evil: refugees, economic migrants, drug 
traffickers, and terrorists are officially categorized as presenting a unified threat and will 
all confront a common policy of deterrence”. Thus, asylum-seekers and refugees are 
treated as a sub-group of irregular migrants11, which undermines the protection owed to 
them by the state and leads to dangerous consequences such as refoulement to countries 
where there is a risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11 attacks) on the USA, followed by 
other significant terrorist activities in Europe12 placed the issue of national security high 
on the political agenda and accelerated the erosion of the refugee protection. Fears that 
terrorists may resort to asylum channels13 to enter state territory have resulted in even 
more restrictions, extensive border and background checks and wide state discretion in 
granting international protection. Some of those restrictive practices have been 
underway long before the 9/11 attacks happened. However, these tragic events were 
used by governments to justify the restrictive measures where emphasis was placed on 
security with little care for the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees.  
 
The ‘War on terror’ and the radical discourse used for political gain completely changed 
the common perception of asylum-seekers and refugees. Increasingly, asylum-seekers 
and refugees are perceived as potential security threats. Moreover, due to restriction on 
asylum processes many people in need of protection have resorted to use the ‘services’ 
                                                          
11 E. FELLER, Op. Cit., note 6, p.516. 
12 Madrid bombing in 2004 and the attack of the London subway in 2005. 
13 There is lack of evidence suggesting that terrorists may abuse asylum channels. Asylum procedures are 
rigid with extensive background checks, fingerprinting, etc., which make them very unattractive to 
terrorists. 
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of smugglers and traffickers. This has additionally intensified their association with 
criminals14 who abuse western generosity. The media has also played part in such 
association by additionally blurring the distinction between different categories of 
migrants. This has further intensified the anti-refugee discourse and xenophobia towards 
third country nationals. All of this has fertilized the ground for the rise of nationalistic 
movements, which have negatively influenced states’, policies on asylum.   
 
Asylum-seekers and refugees who manage to reach the shores of industrialize states find 
themselves with less rights and possibilities to have a fair and unbiased determination of 
their claim for protection. Treated as an irregular migration sub-group, they are 
penalized for the act of seeking asylum. For the sake of security, states are inclined to 
compromise their international obligations, thus endangering the existence of the 
international refugee regime. Undoubtedly, it is a great challenge for the states to uphold 
asylum in the context of mix migratory flows. However, border security for the well-
being of the country’s own population should not be done at the expense of refugee 
rights.  
     
EU: More Restrictions to Access to Asylum  
 
 
For many years, the EU member states have imposed strict controls on asylum and often 
fail to respect their commitment to provide protection to persons fleeing persecution. 
Controlling migration flows is one of the main priorities for EU and its member states.  
                                                          
14 Joan FITZPATRICK, “Flight from Asylum: Trends toward Temporary "Refuge" and Local Responses to 
Forced Migrations”, (1995) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 13, 29. 
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Thus, it can be stated that the common EU asylum policy is primarily focussed on 
keeping asylum-seekers and refugees away from European territory. Many of the 
controversial EU policies of deterrence such as ‘safe country of origin’ or ‘safe third 
country’15 have been developed by different member states and implemented on an EU 
level. Some of those policies have been copied and brought negative changes to the 
refugee law system in other countries such as Canada16. Under the minimal standards 
imposed by EU legislation, the states are adopting and putting policies and practices in 
place whose compliance with the international human rights obligations is questionable 
and criticized by the UNHCR and NGOs17. Moreover, as the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS)18 is still a work in progress, asylum-seekers and refugees are 
subjected to different treatment depending on the member state in which they happen to 
                                                          
15 “The ‘safe country of origin’ principle allows states to deny refugees access to the asylum system on the 
grounds that human rights are so well protected in their country of origin that persecution severe enough 
to cause people to flee never occurs. The principle is different (though not unrelated) to the ‘safe third 
country’ rule, under which refugees can be turned away at the EU’s external borders or sent back to ‘safe’ 
countries through which they have passed to make their asylum applications.” STATEWATCH, EU 
Divided Over List of “Safe Countries of Origin". Statewatch Calls for the List to be Scrapped, 2004 
[Online] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/sep/safe-countries.pdf [Accessed 2 July 2011].   
16 CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, Backgrounder — designated countries of origin, 2012 
[Online] http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/backgrounders/2012/2012-02-16i.asp [Accessed 
3 April 2012]. 
17 UNHCR & ECRE, Asylum in Europe: now is up to you. An information package of six factsheets and one 
leaflet on key European Union asylum issues, developments and legislation, 2009 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search%5C?page=&comid=4a9d19d86&cid=49aea9390&keywords=Asylum%20Europe%2
0Factsheets&sort=title [Accessed 3 December 2011]; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Refugee and Human 
Rights Organisations Across Europe Call on EU to Scrap Key Asylum Proposal, 2004 [Online] 
http://www.amnesty.eu/en/documents/asylum-and-migration/%28%2819%29%29/  [Accessed 3 
December 2011]. 
18 The Common European Asylum System consists of measures encompassing several issues in regards to 
asylum such as reception of asylum seekers, criteria for granting refugee status or subsidiary protection 
status, asylum procedures, responsibility-sharing among EU states for an asylum case, granting a 
temporary protection, family reunification. The aim of those legislative measures is to harmonize the 
common minimum standards for asylum among EU member states. CEAS finds its legal base in art.63 of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.   
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land (as there are still huge differences between national asylum systems of the EU 
member states19). 
 
Some of the most controversial policies and practices put in place by EU member states 
are in the area of border control. Aiming to compensate for the abolishment of internal 
borders, EU member states are imposing nearly insurmountable barriers to asylum-
seekers who find themselves suffocating in migration centres in North Africa, turned 
back, or left to die at sea.  New polices and systems for border control are being debated 
and developed without sufficient knowledge and thorough research on their efficiency 
and impact on persons subjected to them. Databases to regulate the movement of 
migrants have been developed at a fast pace with few safeguards for the respect of 
fundamental rights, such as privacy and non-discrimination among others.  
 
Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders, is operating without a clear mandate, lacking any fundamental rights 
framework. Member states, on the other hand, are using some lacunas within the 
international law to intercept people at high sea and turn them back to the port of 
departure. What is worse is that attempts have been made to externalize border control 
and transfer the responsibility for protection of asylum-seekers to third countries. Thus, 
instead of championing the rights of asylum-seekers and upholding the international 
                                                          
19 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Improving the Quality and Consistency of Asylum Decisions in the Council 
of Europe Member States, 2009 [Online]  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11990.pdf [Accessed 2 April 2011]. 
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obligations, the EU has become a “Fortress” hostile to people in need of international 
protection.   
 
Aim of the Research 
 
The main objective of the research is to explore how the access of asylum-seekers to EU 
territory is impeded by some of the EU policies on asylum. We will concentrate mainly 
on the border control policies because this is the area in which our observations can most 
easily be demonstrated.  Since EU laws and policies tackling asylum issues is impossible 
to be subjected to an in-depth analysis, due to volume constrains, we have selected only 
few aspects of the latter to shed light on the hostile treatment of asylum-seekers even 
before they have entered the territory of the member states.  
 
The present research does not carry the ambition to invent new approaches in treating 
asylum-seekers at EU shores according to international human rights standards. Our aim 
is to explore current EU practices in the area of cross-border movements and their 
compliance with international and EU law for protection of asylum-seekers. We are 
particularly interested in exploring the effectiveness of mechanisms within EU asylum 
policies to assure access of asylum-seekers to refugee determination procedures, on one 
hand, and to hold member states and EU institution responsible for violations of 
protection obligations, on the other hand. The availability of efficient mechanisms for 
protection is of utmost importance given the leading role of the EU on the international 
scene and its influence in advancing protection of asylum-seekers. Based on the results 
of our analysis we will attempt to suggest improvements of already existing policies to 
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assure higher standards of treatment of asylum-seekers. Finally, our hope is to advance 
the argument of prominent scholars and other human rights activists that the states’ 
interests such as border security can be completely protected only if the basic human 
rights of the citizens and third country nationals are respected. Therefore, there is no 
need border security to be achieved at the expense of the rights of asylum-seekers and 
refugees.    
 
To that end, our attention will be focused on the international obligations arising from 
the various international legislative acts and their (miss)interpretation by states, 
including those of the EU, that want to avoid their responsibilities of protecting asylum-
seekers. Thus, the analysis will be situated within the context of the compatibility of the 
selected EU asylum policies with the international law, including international refugee 
law and human rights law. In addition, the research will explore the scope of the access 
to asylum in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR)20 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU 
Charter)21 and the ability of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) to establish enforceable 
standards allowing the unimpeded access of asylum-seekers to EU territory.    
 
The first part of the paper will introduce the scope of the right to asylum in international 
law. The EU as a legal entity and its member states as sovereign countries have 
                                                          
20 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS 
5, [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [Accessed 30 November 2011] 
21 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18 December 2000, O.J (2000/C 
364/01), [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b70.html [accessed 29 June 2012]  
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obligations under international law to secure access to their territory for asylum-seekers. 
Moreover, regional instruments such as the ECHR have emerged as a complementary 
and effective tool for the protection of asylum seekers and refugees in Europe. The EU 
Charter, that now has binding force, has introduced the right to asylum into the EU law, 
thus obliging not only the EU institutions but also the member states, at least when 
implementing EU legislation. In the second part, we will explore the main trends in the 
development of the EU asylum acquis over the years to understand better the current 
restrictive policies towards asylum-seekers. The third part aims to discuss the various 
databases put in place for border control and the role they play in imposing barriers to 
asylum in EU. Here, we will demonstrate the impact of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS) and Eurodac and their operation as tools 
for controlling migration and for imposing additional barriers to asylum. The fourth part 
of the paper will examine how member states and Frontex conduct the border control in 
the Mediterranean region. The joint operations in high sea are particularly demonstrative 
for the reluctance of member states to live up to their obligations towards asylum-
seekers. The fifth part will discuss the extra-territorialisation of EU asylum policy and 
the way member states are subcontracting their international protection responsibilities 
to third states. Lastly, the paper will examine the existing mechanism to initiate 
enforcement procedures against member states that do not comply with EU law and 
discuss the efficacy of these provisions.        
 
Throughout the paper, we will attempt to answer the following questions: 1) is the EU 
asylum policy designed in a way to deprive asylum seekers from accessing the EU 
territory and exercise their right to asylum. 2) If yes, what is the logic behind that and 
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does it require denial of the right to asylum? In other words, can a better balance be 
achieved between complying with human rights obligations and various state interests, 
such as keeping EU territory secure?  Our intention is to demonstrate that the main 
objective of the common EU policy on asylum is not to comply with international 
human rights law and standards but to control who is entering the EU territory and 
prevent potential asylum-seekers from exercising their right to asylum. 
 
Theoretical framework 
The perception of borders is constantly changing depending on the politico-social 
climate of given time. This reflects upon the way states are controlling their borders. 
However, it was not until the nineteenth century when the doctrine of national 
sovereignty became widely accepted, implying the right and the legitimate authority of 
the state to have exclusive control within its territory and across its borders22. 
Controlling movement across frontiers became a priority of the western liberal states. 
New approaches and methods for border control to counter some of the current 
challenges, such as international terrorism and increased migration, resulted in shifting 
the borders away from the physical geographical demarcations.  Sophisticated 
technologies and databases for border control are being constantly developed and put to 
use. Such rapid shift in border control has negatively affected the migration of people. 
However, persons in need of international protection were affected the most.  
 
                                                          
22 Malcolm ANDERSON, “The Transformation of Border Controls: a European Precedent”, in 
ANDREAS, P. & SNYDER, T. (eds.), The Wall Around the West : State Borders and Immigration 
Controls in North America and Europe, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p.18. 
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For the purposes of our research, the right of free movement across borders of each 
individual will be defended as the only alternative to the prevalent control over state 
borders. The right will be analyzed within some concepts developed by libertarian 
doctrine, reflected through the natural law, which is defending the universality of the 
individual rights.  Such framework will assist us to have better understanding of EU 
border control and other asylum policies and the way they interact with the free 
movement of people, most specifically with the access of asylum-seekers to the EU 
territory. The understanding that the right of free movement is a basic human right will 
set the goal for higher standard of treatment of these populations by EU and its member 
states.  
 
The mainstream view in terms of migration adopted by the liberal democratic states is 
that state, owing to its sovereignty, is at liberty to decide who can enter its territory and 
to whom such privilege should be denied. And while states have the liberty to be 
generous in granting entry to foreigners, they are under no obligation to do so23.  One of 
the most prominent defenders of such an approach among the theorists is Michael 
Walzer. Defending the communitarian view, Walzer argues that individuals living in one 
community have the exclusive right to the distribution of membership to that 
community, according to that community’s common understanding of self-
determination24. Thus states, one of the widely accepted forms of human community, 
can be compared with clubs, according to Walzer. As clubs have pre-selection criteria 
                                                          
23Joseph H. CARENS, “Aliens and Citizens: the Case for Open Borders”, (1987) 49 The Review of Politics 
251, 251.  
24 Michael WALZER, Spheres of Justice : a Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New York, Basic Books, 
1983, p.31-32. 
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for admission of applicants to whom they choose to distribute membership, in the same 
way states are entitled to establish criteria for exclusion and inclusion of foreigners. 
 
On the other end of the free movement debate, Joseph Carens defends the liberal 
egalitarian view of the right of each individual to move freely. Reflecting on the 
contemporary meaning of citizenship, Carens compares it to a feudal status from the 
medieval world: assigned by birth, it determines one’s life opportunities for individual 
development. He argues that when affluent countries like Canada are limiting entry to 
their territory this equals to protection of birthright privilege. Therefore, modern 
exclusionary practices employed by the affluent countries are feudal restrictions to free 
movement of people25. For Carens, such practices challenge the equal moral worth of 
each individual and their right to equal opportunities and treatment. 
 
Can free movement of people be considered as a basic human right? The natural law 
tradition recognizes certain rights as inherent or universal to each human by virtue of 
human nature. However, as rightly observed by Ann Dummett26, modern political 
philosophy too often constrains the entitlement of rights and obligations of each 
individual within the relationship with a given state. Thus, in states where the theory of 
universal rights is accepted, those rights are translated into “citizens’ rights” in order to 
reflect that bond27. Consequently, fewer rights are accorded to the residents who are not 
                                                          
25 Joseph H. CARENS, “Migration and Morality: a Liberal Egalitarian Perspective” in B. M. BARRY & R. 
E. GOODIN (eds.) Free Movement : Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of 
Money, Pennsylvania, State University Press, 1992, p. 26-27. 
26 Ann DUMMETT, “The Transnational Migration of People Seen from within a Natural Law Tradition” in 
B. M. BARRY & R. E. GOODIN (eds.) Free Movement : Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of 
People and of Money, University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992, p.170. 
27 Id. 
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citizens of the state28, which makes non-citizens second-class individuals. Such two-
tiered approaches conflict fundamentally with the understanding of the universality of 
human rights.  Thus, in order to be pragmatic, we have to defend our argument of 
universality of the free movement within the constraints of the contemporary framework 
of state dominance over individual liberties. 
 
However, before embarking on such analysis it will be useful to develop the free 
movement argument within an ideal theory to serve as a standard to which states and 
individuals should adhere. We shall begin with Kant29 and his idea for a cosmopolitan 
society where every stranger has the right not to be treated as an enemy by the citizens 
of the given state. Such behaviour is dictated by universal hospitality. The stranger has 
the right of visitation and as long as they comport in a peaceful manner they should not 
be treated with hostility. Such right of visitation or also called by Kant ‘right of resort’ is 
inherent to every stranger by virtue of the right of the common possession of the surface 
of the earth, “to no part of which anyone had originally more right than another”30.  
 
The universal ownership of the earth is a valid argument to defend the free movement of 
people. The Earth as well as its natural resources are no one’s achievement and belong 
to every human being. Thus, people living in an area where resources are scarce have the 
right to move to resource rich parts of the Earth. Sharing the same thinking as Carens on 
citizenship, Risse31 concludes that “all human beings, no matter when and where they 
                                                          
28 Id., p.171. 
29 Immanuel KANT & W. HASTIE, Kant's Principles of Politics, Including his Essay on Perpetual Peace. 
A Contribution to Political Science, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1891. 
30 Id., p.101. 
31 Mathias RISSE, “On the Morality of Immigration”, (2008) 22 Ethics & International Affairs 25, 28. 
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were born, are in some sense symmetrically located with regard to the earth’s resources 
and cannot be arbitrarily excluded from them by accidents of space and time”. It is 
morally unacceptable for vast territories with sufficient resources to be populated and 
utilized by few32.  
 
In the ideal theory, the principles of justice, which govern any given society, are decided 
by the people regardless of their personal status (sex, race, class, etc.) or as suggested by 
Rawls33 behind “a veil of ignorance.” Rawls states that behind this veil most certainly 
people will choose the principle of equal liberties to govern their society, coupled with 
the principle of equal opportunities where any inequalities should be transformed to 
benefit those less advantaged. Such an approach will remove artificially created barriers 
such as citizenship and free movement will be regarded as an equal opportunity for 
individual growth to be enjoyed by all members of all societies. 
 
Access to equal opportunities is the reason for constant aspiration of individuals to 
create new and maintain existing basic rights. Each individual has a moral equal worth, 
therefore is entitled to equal chances in life. As pointed by Nett34 it is in a sense that 
justice should be defined. In his essay “The Civil Right We are not Ready for: the Right 
of Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth” he remarks that today’s set of 
basic human rights is not complete which renders those rights not functional35. 
                                                          
32 In such case the only justifiable restriction to free movement will be the population-to-state ratio. M. 
Risse, Op. Cit., note 31, p.29. 
33 John RAWLS, A theory of Justice, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971 cited in 
J. H. CARENS, Op. Cit., note 23, p. 255. 
34 Roger NETT, “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready for: the Right of Free Movement of People on the 
Face of the Earth”, (1971) 81 Ethics 212, 216. 
35 According to Nett “a functioning set of rights provides a climate of dignity for individuals and frees 
them from dissipating their energies in coping with arbitrary authority. People accustomed to basic 
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Accordingly, the right of free movement is the missing piece of this set in order for the 
rights to be complete and to serve their purpose.  The right of free movement has two 
dimensions. Material, covering the right to move freely to places where there are 
sufficient resources and political, justifying the right to move from oppression and 
persecution among others36. Therefore, it is only logical to assume that the right of free 
movement will be the best fit to fill the functional gap in the set of contemporary basic 
rights. Even in places where basic human rights are upheld, without free movement such 
rights-based systems will always be at best halfway efficient. 
 
The right of free movement implies the right to exit one’s country and the right to enter 
another. However, it is broadly accepted that while individuals may freely leave their 
state, they do not hold the exclusive right to enter another. Walzer defends this position. 
According to him “[i]mmigration and emigration are morally asymmetrical”37. 
However, denying someone the right to enter the territory will be equal to denying 
her/him basic rights as dignity and liberty among others providing that such person 
comes from place of oppression and/or poverty. As rightly pointed by Carens “a right to 
exit that does not carry with it some reasonable guarantee of entry will not seem 
adequate”38. The freedom of movement from one city or province to another is 
recognized as a basic human right. The same should be valid and for the cross-border 
                                                                                                                                                                           
freedoms are more likely to be critical of what transpires in a social order than those accustomed to forms 
of loyalty without rights”. Id., p.222. 
36 Id., p.218. 
37 Michael WALZER, Op. Cit., note 24, p.140. 
38 J. CARENS, Op. Cit., note 25, p.27. 
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movement. Even more so as people, everywhere moves for the same reasons: 
employment, religion, relationship, and so on39. 
 
While concluding on the construction of the free movement of people in ideal theory, we 
have to emphasize the most important advantage of that right which is the reduction of 
all inequalities40. By moving freely, people will pursue more opportunities to better suit 
their life choices. Thus, the success of each individual will not be determined by the 
chance of their place of birth, class, sex, etc. but by personal talents and strengths and 
the determination to develop those talents. In the context of oppressive government, by 
leaving their country people will tacitly express disagreement with the regime. 
Consequently, this may lead to positive changes in the system and reduce the power of 
the oppressor.  
  
Having said all of that, we need to accept today’s reality that free movement is subject to 
more closed borders and restrictions than ever before. For the near future, the restrictions 
imposed on free movement are here to stay. Then in order to implement at least some of 
the concepts of free movement within the existing political structure, we need to 
elaborate on the question of the extent to which state borders should be closed and what 
kinds of restrictions to free movement can be justified. Even within the libertarian 
theory, the open borders debate is controversial, ranging from complete openness to 
closure on different levels41. From a personal view, it is hard to justify any restrictions 
                                                          
39 Id., pp.27-28. 
40 Id., p.26. 
41 Berry THOLEN, “The Changing Border: Developments and Risks in Border Control Management of 
Western Countries”, (2010) 76 International Review of Administrative Sciences 259, 261. 
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on the will of each individual to move freely assuming their good intentions towards the 
new place42. However, as already stated, we need to be aware of the common perception 
over the border controls, which states claim to be inherent part of their sovereignty.   
 
There are two arguments brought by Carens, which we also support, that could justify 
state’s claim to close its borders43. Those arguments, however, would be morally and 
legally justifiable only if such restrictions are applied, not for mere convenience, but if 
there is a reasonable belief in the possible outcome44. Thus, national security and public 
order seem valid grounds to justify some degree of border closure. People who pose a 
real threat to national security, for example those aiming at destroying the existing order, 
should be denied entry. Public order45 grounds may exist when there is a real danger 
posed by the sudden mass and extraordinary influx of immigrants, which will bring 
chaos and threat to existing liberties and liberal institutions. Thus, restrictions on free 
movement will be necessary to safeguard the liberty and equality in the long term. 
Carens’s position is also justified from a natural law point of view. The freedom of 
movement can be restricted only if it threatens the fundamental rights of other 
                                                          
42 In this sense Risse suggests very progressive view on the legitimacy of border. He states:  “why it would 
be acceptable in the first place (especially to those thus excluded) that we draw an imaginary line in the 
dust or adopt the course of a river and think of that as a border”. M. RISSE, Op. Cit., note 31, p.26.    
43 More libertarian egalitarian arguments developed by different authors on close border justifications see  
Arash ABIZADEH, “Liberal Egalitarian Arguments for Closed Borders: Some Preliminary Critical 
Reflections”, (2006) 4 Revue éthique et économique / Ethics and Economic.s  
44 Often states are establishing measures for cross-border movement control based on national security, for 
example. However, in many instances those measures are harsh and may contradict the principle of 
proportionality. One can conclude that the real aim of such measures was to steam the movement across 
border.   
45 In this context public order implies only the maintenance of the law and order in the state and does not 
refer to the welfare states with the social practices and policies in place. J. H. CARENS, Op. Cit, note 25, 
p.30.  
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individuals. Then states, as guardians of those rights, can restrict freedom of movement 
in order to preserve the rights46. 
 
Notwithstanding, due to the controversy that the right of free movement generates, the 
question of refugees’ access to state territory seems less contentious. It is generally 
understood that refugees are entitled to enter any state in order to escape persecution. In 
addition, states hold a moral obligation to give them access47 in order to determine the 
legitimacy of their claim. Even Walzer48, to whom the membership distribution is a 
cherished privilege of the host society, agrees that the needy outsiders (refugees) should 
be given a refuge49. The debate of the state’s obligation to apply an open border policy 
towards refugees is mostly situated within the moral aspect of the issue implying that 
states have moral obligations to admit refugees. However, states also hold legal 
obligations towards people in need of protection. Those obligations are stemming from 
the orderly constructed international human rights system to which states have chosen to 
adhere.  
 
It is not politically feasible in the near future for states to embrace the right of free 
movement as a basic human right. Restrictions to this right will continue to be applied. 
However, there are only a few situations where such restrictions will be justified. While 
it is unrealistic to expect that, the right to free movement will be included in the set of 
                                                          
46 A. DUMMET, Op. Cit., note 26, p.177. 
47 J. H. CARENS, “Who Should Get in? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions”, (2003) 17 Ethics & 
International Affairs 95, 101-102; B. TOHLEN, Op. Cit., note 41, p.262. 
48 M. WALZER, Op. Cit., note 24, pp.51-51. 
49 Although he reserves the right of the host community to restrain the flow when the number of refugees 
pose a threat to the character of the communal self-determination. Id.  
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basic human rights that does not mean we should not continue to strive for this result. As 
rightly pointed by Nett:   
“[A]t some future point in world civilization, it may well be discovered that 
the right to free and open movement of people on the surface of the earth is 
fundamental to the structure of human opportunity and is therefore basic in 
the same sense as is free religion, speech, and the franchise”50. 
 
Until such moment comes, at least refugees are entitled to a safe haven and states have 
moral and legal obligation to grant one. 
CHAPTER I: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS RELATED TO 
THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM  
 
 
SECTION 1: Content of the Refugee Convention 
 
The framework of international refugee protection was established at the end of World 
War II when Europe was confronted with the precarious situation of millions of people 
being displaced by acute violence. The Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees195151 and the following Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 
Protocol) were put in place to address the needs of people in need of international 
protection52. The recognition of refugee status imposes a number of obligations on the 
State. The 1951 Refugee Convention establishes a variety of rights, including the right to 
                                                          
50 R. NETT, Op. Cit., note 34, p.218. 
51 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, UNTS, vol. 189 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html [Accessed 20 March 2011] [1951 Refugee 
Convention]. 
52 According to the 1951 Refugee Convention refugee is a person who: 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.” (art.1A(2)) 
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property (art.13), right of association (art.15), right to employment (art.17), right to 
housing (art. 21), right to education (art.22) which are enforceable against the State and 
are to be applied without discrimination (art.3). Moreover, the protection of refugees is 
placed within the wider framework of human rights protection53. States are obliged to 
protect the human rights of individuals under their jurisdiction, including asylum-seekers 
and refugees. However, such wider protection is somehow often neglected or denied54. 
In light of the contemporary shift in the international refugee regime, states tend to apply 
restrictively and in isolation the 1951 Refugee Convention provisions undermining 
international human rights regime55.    
 
SECTION 2: The Scope of the Right to Asylum within the International Law  
 
While the decline in protection for refugees is disturbing, the situation of asylum-
seekers56 is even more precarious. As previously mentioned, the rights of refugees and 
the corresponding legal obligations of the states towards them are codified in the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Asylum-seekers, on the other hand, are placed in legal uncertainty 
in regards to their rights and the corresponding state obligations, as the 1951 Refugee 
                                                          
53Alice EDWARDS, “Human rights, Refugees, and the Right ‘to enjoy’ Asylum”, (2005) 17 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 293, 297. According to the author “the drafting of a separate treaty on refugees 
was a pragmatic response to the reality surrounding Europe after World War II. It in no way removes the 
issue of refugees outside the realm of human rights”. Id., 298. 
54 Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, “Who to Protect, How …, and the Future?” (1997) 9 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 1, 3. 
55 Many states draw distinction between refugee and human rights regime in order to limit their 
international obligations. This is done in part because the definition of ‘refugee’, provided by the Refugee 
Convention, is very narrow and ignores situation of many people who otherwise would be recognized as 
refuges, thus enjoying the safeguards offered by the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
56 ‘Asylum-seeker’ means a third country national that has made an application for asylum in respect of 
which a final decision has not yet been taken. COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 343/2003 of 
18 February 2003 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State 
Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-
Country National, art.2(d). 
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Convention lacks provisions concerning them. What is more, there is no legally binding 
international instrument upholding the right to asylum which places asylum-seekers in a 
legal grey zone within the international refugee regime. The only international 
instrument where the right to asylum is articulated is the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)57 which although respected by the states is a declaratory 
instrument lacking legally binding power. Even within the UDHR, the right to asylum is 
vague and ill-defined. Closely linked with state sovereignty and lacking clear legal 
framework, the right to asylum is susceptible to abuse by states unwilling to accept 
people in need of protection58. 
 
As enshrined in the UDHR, the right to asylum affords every individual with the right to 
obtain asylum but does not impose correlative obligation on the state to grant one59. 
Thus, the right to asylum is the exclusive right of the state steaming from its sovereignty. 
Therefore, states are not legally bound to grant asylum. The lack of international 
obligation on the state to provide asylum is perceived as the ‘Achilles heel of the 
international refugee regime’, depriving individuals in need of protection to make an 
                                                          
57 Art.14(1) states:  
 “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. 
58 Hélène LAMBERT, International Refugee Law, Farnham, Surrey England; Burlington, VT, Ashgate, 
2010. 
59 Thomas GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN & Hans GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, “The Right to Seek - Revisited. 
On the UN Human Rights Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum Procedures in the EU”, (2008) 10  
European Journal of Migration and Law 439. According to the authors the original text of art.14 (UDHR) 
“everyone shall have the right to seek and be granted asylum from persecution” has been received with 
vigorous opposition during the drafting of the UDHR by most state representatives and after numerous 
consultations and long debates was rejected. More on the process of drafting the UDHR and the debates 
corresponding to the right to asylum see Morten KJAERUM, “Analyses of Article 14” in Gudmundur 
ALFREDSSON & Eide ASBJØRN (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a Common Standard 
of Achievement, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Pub., 1999. After abolishment of the initial proposition, the 
French representative had noted that: “[i]t had been a mistake...to recognize the individual’s right to seek 
asylum while neither imposing upon the States the obligation to grant it nor invoking the support of the 
United Nations”. G. S. GOODWIN-GILL & Jane MCADAM, The Refugee in International Law, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2007, p.360. 
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effective use of the provisions in 1951 Refugee Convention or other international human 
right instruments60. The 1967 UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum further reaffirms 
the position that granting asylum is an exercise of state sovereignty61. Consequently, the 
absence of the right to asylum in any international binding treaty points to the reluctance 
of the states to embrace asylum as an international obligation owed to individuals who 
are deprived from the protection of their own states62. 
   
SECTION 3: Non-refoulement: Inherent Part of the Right to Asylum 
 
Nevertheless, that right to asylum as articulated in art.14 UDHR is not without legal 
force and “must be held in greater regard”63. The right to asylum is to be considered in 
conjunction with a non-refoulement principle64, which forbids the return of any 
individual to place where they might by subjected to torture or ill-treatment. Moreover, 
the right to asylum and non-refoulement are deemed as cardinal principles of refugee 
                                                          
60 Eduard NEWMAN & Joanne van SELM, Refugees and Forced Displacement International Security, 
Human Vulnerability, and the State, New York, United Nations University Press, 2003, p.277. 
61 Art.1 states: 
“(1) Asylum granted by a State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to persons entitled to 
invoke article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including persons 
struggling against colonialism, shall be respected by all other States.[emphasis added] 
(3) It shall rest with the State granting asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of 
asylum.”[emphasis added] 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, GA Res, UNGAOR, 22nd sess., Suppl. no. 1614 UN Doc A/6716, 
(1967), p.81, [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f05a2c.html [Accessed 29 February 
2011] 
62G. S. GOODWIN-GILL and J. MCADAM, Op. Cit., note 59, p.369. The authors also remark that there is a 
humanitarian vision for asylum but no sense of obligation. 
63 Helen O’NIONS, “The Erosion of the Right to Seek Asylum”, (2006) Web journal of Current Legal 
Issues [Online] http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2006/contents2.html [Accessed 21 Janauary 2012] 
64 1951 Refugee Convention defines the prohibition of refoulement as follows:  
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. (art.33(1))” 
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protection65. State parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention are bound by the principle of 
non-refoulement and are prohibited to apply any reservations to it66. Moreover, state 
authorities, including provincial authorities and government agents, who are exercising 
state power within a state’s geographical territory as well as outside, are responsible for 
violating the principle when an individual is placed under their effective control67. This 
is a significant remark given the wide discretion vested to the state authorities when 
deciding on the fate of asylum-seekers within the territory of the state and abroad. 
 
The principle of non-refoulement is to be respected not only in relation to individuals 
fitting the refugee definition under art.1A of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but everyone 
at risk of ill-treatment in case of return68. In addition, it is widely considered that non-
refoulement is a principle of international customary law, implying obligation to all 
                                                          
65 Executive Committee, General Conclusion on International Protection. 42nd session. No. 65 (XLII) – 
1991, para (c). In this context the Committee urged states “...to avoid unnecessary and severe curtailment 
of their [refugees and asylum-seekers] freedom of movement, to ensure conditions of asylum compatible 
with recognized international standards, and to facilitate their stay in countries of asylum...” Id. See also E. 
FELLER, “Opening Statement by Ms Erika Feller”, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE & UNHCR (eds.). 
Proceedings of the 2nd Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of 
Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Displaced Persons : Consolidation and Development of the Asylum-related 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Pub., 2000, p.15. 
66 The rule applies to the State Parties to the Convention and to the Protocol (art.12) and has an absolute 
character as reservations to it are not permitted (1951 Refugee Convention, art.42). 
67Sir Elihu LAUTERPACHT & Daniel BETHLEHEM, « Avis sur la portée et le contenu du principe du non-
refoulement » in  Erika FELLER, Volker TÜRK, Frances NICHOLSON & NATIONS UNIES HAUT 
COMMISSARIAT POUR LES REFUGIES (eds.) La protection des réfugiés en droit international. 
Bruxelles, UNHCR, 2008, pp.141-143. Lauterpacht and Bethlehem ground their analysis of such 
responsibility on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) 
adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) of UN on 31 May 2001 (art.4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11). The 
bounding nature of non-refoulement is particularly relevant to agents or bodies exercising state 
responsibilities at the embarkation points, transit or international zones, etc., including carriers, airport 
officials checking documents at transit zones. The acts performed by the above listed authorities will 
engage state responsibility when non-refoulement principle is violated; also see G. GOODWIN-GILL & J. 
MCADAM, Op. Cit., note 59, p.248. 
68 S. E. LAUTERPACHT & D. BETHLEHEM, Op. Cit., note 67, p.157; EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 
General conclusion on international protection. 55th session. No. 99(LV)- 2004. 
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states to conform to it69. Thus, asylum-seekers under the jurisdiction of the state benefit 
from the protection of the principle of non-refoulement.   
 
Furthermore, refoulement when there is a risk of torture or other ill-treatment is 
prohibited ‘in any manner whatsoever’, including rejection at the frontier70. Although it 
does not afford the right of entry, the principle binds states “at least to temporary 
admission to determine an individual status. Only in this way can State ensure that it 
does not send back an individual to persecution or torture”71. However, the often 
repeated practices endangering the lives of asylum-seekers72 and the lack of strong 
condemning reaction on part of the international community73 points to the conclusion 
that states are still resilient to assume any obligation related to asylum-seekers not 
formally admitted into a state’s territory. Nevertheless, international bodies such as 
                                                          
69S. E. LAUTERPACHT & D. BETHLEHEM, Op. Cit., note 67, p.180; G. GOODWIN-GILL & J. MCADAM, 
Op. Cit., note 59, p.248; Also according to Subrata Roy Chodhury the right draws its customary law status 
from the position of the customary status of UDHR within the international law. There are three reasons to 
support such assertion. First, the commitment of 171 states to create the UN Charter and the UDHR 
expressed in the 1993 Vienna Declaration. Second, the status of the non-binding instruments given by 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In Nicaragua case, for example, the court “accords limited 
significance to State practice, especially to inconsistent or contrary practice, and attributes central 
normative significance to resolutions both of the United Nations General Assembly and of other 
international organisations.” Third, states are continuing to grant asylum despite the large number of 
asylum-seekers. Furthermore, the author points to the fact that prohibition of torture and non-refoulement 
are complementary. If the former is part of the customary law, therefore the latter should be considered in 
the same context. Subrata Roy CHOWDHURY, “A Response to the Refugee Problems in Post Cold War 
Era: Some Existing and Emerging Norms of International Law”, (1995) 7 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 100, 105-106. 
70 S. E. LAUTERPACHT & D. BETHLEHEM, Op. Cit., note 67, p.145; G. GOODWIN-GILL & J. MCADAM, 
Op. Cit., note 59, p.246; According to all, although the right to asylum does not imply obligation on the 
sate to grant entry, they cannot reject at free will people who have well founded fear of persecution. If 
they do not want to admit such individuals, states are obliged to take any measures to avoid refoulement, 
including third country removal. 
71 G. GOODWIN-GILL & J. MCADAM, Op. Cit., note 59, p. 215; Other documents confirming that 
conclusion see EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, Conclusion on international protection. 49th session. No. 85 
(XLIX) – 1998; T. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN & H. GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, Op. Cit., note 67, p.446 
conclude that the drafting history of art.14 shows clearly that although the substantial right of asylum has 
been rejected, the procedural right (the right to an asylum process) reminded untouched.  
72 The recent push-backs of asylum-seekers in high sea by the Italian authorities towards Libya (see 
below). 
73 H. O’NIONS, Op. Cit., note 63. 
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UNHCR74 and its Executive Committee, and scholars75 argue strongly in support of the 
wider interpretation of non-refoulement, thus questioning scrupulous deterrence 
practices applied by the states towards asylum- seekers.  
 
SECTION 4: International Human Rights Law and the Right to Asylum  
 
Asylum-seekers are entitled to benefit from the protection afforded by various 
international and regional human rights instruments76, which set out the basic standards 
and norms of treatment. Whereas each State has a right to control those entering into 
their territory, this right must be exercised in accordance with a prescribed international 
law. Thus, the legal power of right to asylum is reinforced by the international human 
rights law. Moreover, as already clarified, the Refugee law is not a separate branch 
within the international law. Refugees and asylum-seekers benefit not only from human 
rights provisions themselves but also from the international mechanisms for protection 
of those rights. Important consequence giving the fact that 1951 Refugee Convention 
lacks international body to exercise monitoring on the implementation of its provisions. 
Two core human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), offer ‘consistently overlapping’ protection with 1951 Refugee Convention77 
to asylum-seekers. In addition, the Executive Committee urges states to “reiterate ... the 
                                                          
74 UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under 
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 2007 [Online]  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45f17a1a4.html [Accessed 3 May 2011]. 
75 James HATHAWAY, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p.54; S. E. LAUTERPACHT & D. BETHLEHEM, Op. Cit., note 67; E. FELLER, 
Op. Cit., note 65, p.15. 
76A. EDWARDS, Op. Cit., note 53, p.299. 
77 J.HATHAWAY, Op. Cit., note 75, p.9. 
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obligation to treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance with applicable human 
rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant international instruments”78. The 
right to asylum is a human right. Thus, it has to be considered in correlation with all 
other human rights enshrined in the human rights treaties.  
 
Fundamental rights proclaimed by the ICCPR are inherent to all human beings. In that 
sense the Human Rights Committee has clarified that 
 “the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States Parties 
but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or 
statelessness, such as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other 
persons who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the State Party”79.  
 
In regards to asylum the connection with the art.12 ICCPR80, the right to leave one’s 
country, is especially strong. As it was demonstrated above, in the theooretical 
phramework, it is only logically to conclude that every person has the right to leave their 
country and to enter another country for purpose of seeking asylum. Otherwise, the right 
to asylum can be considered ‘at best a half right’81. 
 
Asylum-seekers, within state territory and subject to its jurisdiction, benefit from the 
general requirement of non-discrimination in respect to the rights provided in the 
Covenant as well as judicial protection for procedures related with claiming asylum. 
                                                          
78 EXEXUTIVE COMMITTEE, Conclusion on safeguarding asylum. 48th session. No. 82 (XLVIII)- 
1997, para d(vi). 
79 HRC, General Comment No. 31: Article 2: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, 21 April 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, Para. 10. 
80 Art.12(2) reads:  
“Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”.  
81 Louis HENKIN, “An Agenda for the Next Century: the Myth and Mantra of State Sovereignty”, (1994) 
35 Virginia Journal of International Law 115, 117. 
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Thus, the right to an effective remedy is of particular importance to asylum-seekers 
among the rights upheld by the ICCPR. The right is articulated in art. 2(3) ICCPR and 
requires States to ensure that individuals have accessible, effective and enforceable 
remedies in order to upheld the rights guaranteed by the Covenant. States must ensure 
appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms to address the violations of rights82. 
In addition, the remedies should be appropriately adapted to take into consideration the 
special vulnerability of certain categories83 such as asylum-seekers.  
  
 
The right to an effective remedy is also protected under art.13 ECHR. The ECtHR has 
held that whenever there is “arguable complaint” alleging violation of a Convention 
rights States should put in place in their national legislation provision of a domestic 
remedy and grant appropriate relief. Moreover, the remedy must be “effective” in 
practice as well as in law84. Such effectiveness is secured when the remedy is rendered 
available in practice as well as in law and not unjustifiably hindered by the authorities85. 
Some of the effective remedies are secured by art.6 ECHR that guarantees to everyone 
the entitlement to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. According to art.1 ECHR States are obliged to 
secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention to everyone within their 
                                                          
82HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, Communication No. 1328/2004, CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004, 16 
August 2007, Para 7.10 [Online] 
http://www.univie.ac.at/bimtor/dateien/hrc_2007_kimouche_vs_algeria.pdf   
83 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 may 2004, Para 15 
[Online] http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff600533f5f?Opendocument 
84 Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No(s).30696/09, ECHR (Grand Chamber) 21 January 
2011, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2011, Para 288 [Online]  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-103050 [Accessed 30 August 2011] 
85Id., Para 290. 
 
29 
 
jurisdiction, this includes not only the citizens of the State but also third country 
nationals such as asylum-seekers.  
 
The right to an effective remedy has been proclaimed as “a key provision in terms of 
guaranteeing certain procedural safeguards to refugees”86. In regards to non-refoulement 
(art.3 ECHR), for example, art.13 offers important safeguards for asylum-seekers not to 
be removed to countries where they would face danger to their lives.  In this respect, the 
ECHR has stated that 
 “given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of 
torture or ill-treatment alleged materialised the notion of an effective remedy 
requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist 
substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 
and the possibility of suspending the implementation of the measure 
impugned.”87  
 
Moreover, it also requires that the person concerned should have access to a remedy 
with automatic suspensive effect88.  
 
In terms of EU law, the right to an effective remedy is enshrined in art.47 EU Charter. 
The first paragraph of the provision reads as follow: “Everyone whose rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective 
                                                          
86 Helene LAMBERT, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees: 
Limits and Opportunities”, (2005) 24 Refugee Survey Quarterly 39, 47. 
87 Case of Jabari v. Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98 ECHR (Forth Section) 11 July 2000, Para 50 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6dac.html [Accessed 15 December 2011] 
88 Čonka v. Belgium, Appl. No. 51564/99 ECHR (Third Section) 5 February 2002, Para 81-83 cited in 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Op. Cit., note 84. However, this is not a right to stay in the country until 
decision is reached on appeal against negative asylum decision but until a judge has passed a decision on 
the lawfulness of the authorities’ decision in a preliminary protection procedure. EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, Minimum Standards for the Procedures For Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status 
in the Member States – Assessment (Summary) of the Implementation of the 2005 Procedures Directive 
and Proposals for a Common European Regime of Asylum, September 2008, PE 393.291, p.8 [Online] 
http://www.ulb.ac.be/assoc/odysseus/CEAS/PE393.291.pdf  
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remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article”89. 
[Emphasis added] As it becomes clear from the legal explanations to the Charter, the 
provision is more extensive than the one enshrined in ECHR because it guarantees the 
right to an effective remedy before the court. Further to that, art.47 applies to member 
states and Union when implementing Union law and to all rights guaranteed by the 
law90.   
 
The prohibition of collective expulsion is another right within international human rights 
law very closely related to asylum. This prohibition is absolute in nature91 and has 
acquired status of customary international law92. The Human Rights Committee has 
stated that art.13 of the Covenant entitles each individual to a decision of its own case 
and to submit reasons against expulsion thus, placing the collective expulsion in 
variance with art.1393. This is a measure, which cannot be derogated from even in state 
of emergency, as there are no justifiable circumstances to entail such measure94.  
 
                                                          
89 Paragraph 2 and 3 states :  
“Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources insofar as such aid 
is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” 
90 JUSTICE, Legal Explanations to the EU Charter, art.47 [Online] 
http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page_id=56 [Accessed 20 November 2012] 
91UNITED NATIONS, International Law Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-ninth session, 7 
May to 5 June and 9 July to 10 August 2007), Supplement No. 10 (A/62/10) para 200 [Online] 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2007/2007report.htm  
92 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Intervener Brief in the case of 
Hirsi et al v. Italy, Application No 27765/09, para 7 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4f5f11a52.pdf [Accessed 20 November 2012] 
93 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, General Comment 15/27 of 22 July 1986, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, para 
10 [Online] [Accessed 20 October 2012] 
94 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a 
State of Emergency, 31 August 2001 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 13(d) [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/453883fd1f.pdf  [Accessed 25 October 2012] 
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The prohibition of mass expulsions is articulated expressly in art.4 of Protocol 4 
ECHR95. According to the Court, it “is to be understood as any measure compelling 
aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis 
of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien 
of the group”96. In order for a State to be in line with art.4 when considering expulsion 
of a group, it should consider “with due diligence and in good faith, all individual 
circumstances that may militate against the expulsion of each particular individual in the 
group”97. Moreover, the procedure put in place should afford sufficient guarantees 
demonstrating that the personal circumstances of each of those concerned had been 
genuinely and individually taken into account.98 Thus, art.4 of Protocol 4 ECHR 
imposes a duty for each case to be examined individually. Push back operations of 
asylum-seekers in high sea done by many states without individual assessment of each 
case amount to a breach of the above article and should be regarded illegal99.  
 
The right to liberty is a fundamental right inherent to all human beings, including 
asylum-seekers and refugees. Asylum is not a crime and those seeking refuge should not 
be penalized, including held in detention when accessing State territory. Art.31 Refugee 
Convention recognizes the particular situation of asylum-seekers and obliges States not 
to impose penalties on a count of an illegal entry. However, the reality is that States 
                                                          
95 The prohibition from collective expulsion in EU Charter (art.19 (1)) has the same meaning and scope as 
the one in ECHR. 
96 Case of Vedran Andric v. Sweden, Appl.No 45917/99 ECHR (First Section) 23 February 1999, Para 1 
[Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b7048.html [accessed 15 November 2012] 
97 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Op. Cit., note 92, para 8.  
98Čonka v. Belgium, Op. Cit., note 88, Para 63  
99Jan Arno HESSBRUEGGE, “European Court of Human Rights Protects Migrants against “Push Back” 
Operations on the High Sea”, (2012) 16 Insights [Online] 
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight120417.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2012] 
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routinely subject asylum-seekers to detention on arbitrary basis and for prolonged 
periods without an opportunity to challenge the reasons of their detention100.  
 
Many international and regional human rights instruments tackle the right to liberty, 
including protection from arbitrary detention. Art.9 ICCPR accords important safeguards 
to ensure that detention for any purpose including immigration control101 is in line with 
the international human rights standards and national law. Art.9 (1) ICCPR requires that 
depravation of liberty is not arbitrary and against the law. To avoid arbitrariness every 
detention, including detention of asylum-seekers, should be assessed against criteria 
such as reasonableness, necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination102. Moreover, 
it requires States to set their national legislation in line with the standards prescribed by 
the international law, otherwise, the depravation of liberty will be unlawful103. Further to 
that, paragraph four lays down important procedural guarantees requiring the lawfulness 
of the detention to be decided by court without any delay. 
 
Art.5 of the ECHR also aims at preventing arbitrary depravation of liberty104. The 
ECtHR has extensive case law in regards to this provision and in particular detention of 
                                                          
100 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER’S PROGRAMME, Detention of 
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The Framework, the Problem and Recommended Practice, 
EC/49/SC/CRP.13, 4 June 1999, Para 5 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/47fdfaf33b5.pdf 
[Accessed 21 October 2012] 
101 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CCPR General Comment No. 8: Article 9 (Right to Liberty and 
Security of Persons), Sixteenth Session, 30 June 1982, Para 1 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4538840110.pdf [Accessed 30 October 2012] 
102 UNHCR, Back to Basics: The Right to Liberty and Security of Person and ‘Alternatives to Detention’ 
of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Stateless Persons and Other Migrants, PPLA/2011/01.Rev.1,  
April 2011, p.20 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4dc935fd2.pdf [Accessed 20 November 
2012] 
103 Id. 
104 Art.6, the right to liberty and security in the EU Charter, has the same meaning and scope as the one 
guaranteed by art.5 ECHR. 
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asylum- seekers. In regards to the increased use of detention of asylum-seekers and 
refugees by the States, the Court has held that: “States' legitimate concern to foil the 
increasingly frequent attempts to circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive 
asylum-seekers of the protection afforded by [Refugee Convention and ECHR]”105. 
 
 
Article 5(1) ECHR requires, in a first place, that every arrest or detention is lawful. To 
be lawful the depravation of liberty should conform to the substantive and procedural 
rules of national law106, which should be sufficiently accessible, precise107 and 
compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the 
Convention108. The reasons for detention are defined in exhaustive manner in art. 5(1) a-
f and should be interpreted narrowly in order to be consistent with the aim of that 
provision, i.e. to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his liberty109. Thus, in 
regards to asylum-seekers art.5 (1) (f) permits detention only for two reasons: 1) to 
prevent unauthorised entry and 2) for the purposes of deportation or extradition.  
 
Despite the panoply of international human rights provisions protecting asylum-seekers 
many states remain reluctant to assume the obligation to accept the individual right to be 
granted an asylum and to accord to asylum-seekers fundamental human rights benefiting 
their own citizens. The proliferation of interdiction measures, aiming to prevent potential 
                                                          
105 Case of Amuur v. France, Appl.No 17/1995/523/609, ECHR, 25 June 1996, Para 43 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b76710.html [accessed 15 November 2012] 
106 Id., para 50. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Case of Vasileva v. Denmark, Appl.No 52792/99 ECHR (First Section) 25 September 2003, Para 33 
[Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/502d4ae62.pdf [Accessed 23 November 2012] 
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protection seekers to enter state’s territory110, is justified with the exclusive power of the 
state to control the movement across its borders, which is a key element of state 
sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty is reinvigorated in the current security 
discourse111 where, so it is argued, the states have to balance between international 
human rights commitment and successfully ensure the safety of their citizens. However, 
such statement is not convincing. The concept of sovereignty has lost much of its power 
since the conception in Westphalia. The globalization has resulted in open state borders 
for purpose of conducting business. As pointed by Henkin the EU is another example 
where state sovereignty was reduced for the benefit of a common goal. International 
Criminal Court (ICC), UN Security Council, ECtHR, etc. which decisions are binding 
upon the states, are challenging even further the notion of sovereignty112. Therefore, 
state sovereignty is not particularly convincing justification to avoid international 
obligations.  
 
SECTION 5: EU Human Rights Framework and its Relevance to the Access 
to Asylum  
 
The debate that touches upon the relevance of 1951 Refugee Convention to the 
protection of refugees and the need for the Convention to be reformed is still ongoing. 
Regardless of the outcome, the current lack of comprehensive protection available to 
                                                          
110 Those who had the “fortunate” luck to claim asylum are facing harsh living conditions having to 
survive on insignificant government allowances without right to employment, basic healthcare, which is 
leading many of them into destitution. BRITISH RED CROSS, Not Gone but Forgotten: The Urgent Need 
for More Humane Asylum System, London, British Red Cross, 2010 [Online] 
http://stillhumanstillhere.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/not-gone-but-forgotten-june-2010.pdf [Accessed 24 
January 2011]. 
111 A. EDUARDS, Op. Cit., note 53, 300. 
112 L. HENKIN, Op. Cit., note 81, 118. 
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asylum-seekers, and the practice of exclusion deployed by the states, point to major gaps 
within the refugee protection regime. The narrow definition provided in art.1A of the 
Refugee Convention is “removed from the reality of modern forced migration”113, thus, 
excluding from the protection regime the majority of people in need of a ‘safe haven’. 
The lack of an international body to oversee the implementation of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention renders the proper implementation of refugee regime even more obscure. 
The UNHCR is awarded only a supervising role114 - without powers to enforce 
compliance by the states. Consequently, the interpretation of the Convention and state 
practices vary considerably as they depend upon the willingness of the individual state to 
provide protection. In such a climate of uncertainty, the judiciary proves to be useful for 
setting standards for protection.     
 
A. Protection Standards Set by the ECHR and the ECtHR 
 
The aim of this section is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence of 
the European Court on Human Rights or provisions of ECHR relevant to the protection 
of asylum-seekers. Instead, it seeks to outline some standards related to asylum set by 
the court and to determine how effective they are when it comes to imposing obligations 
on Contracting States as to the implementation of those standards. To this end, the 
jurisprudence on art.3 ECHR115 will be analyzed in detail because art.3 is related to non-
refoulement, the most important pillar of refugee protection regime.   
  
                                                          
113 Colin J. HARVEY, “Dissident Voices: Refugees, Human Rights and Asylum in Europe”, (2000) 9 
Social & Legal Studies 367, 369. 
114 1951 Refugee Convention, Op. Cit., note 51, Preamble and art.35. 
115 Art.3: 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
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1) Applicability of ECHR to Asylum Cases 
 
The absence of the right to asylum within the ECHR may lead one to conclude, wrongly 
so, that the Convention is of no relevance to the protection of asylum-seekers and 
refugees116. Interestingly, the ECtHR itself has repeatedly stated that there is no right to 
asylum contained in the Convention117. However, in recent years, the ECtHR has 
developed significant jurisprudence related to asylum-seekers, thus setting protection 
standards that in some cases are wider in scope118 than those provided by the 1951 
Refugee Convention. While the Refugee Convention is set to provide protection only to 
refugees, such protection can be lost relatively easily119. On the other hand, the ECHR 
(art.1) applies to anyone within the jurisdiction of the State Parties, including refused 
asylum-seekers and refugees facing removal. The Court’s judgments are legally binding 
as the states and Committee of Ministers oversees the implementation of its decisions120. 
Furthermore, in cases of removal the Court can apply interim measures by requesting the 
respondent state not to proceed with any actions that would be detrimental to the 
applicant until the final judgment on the case is delivered121. Finally, in regards to 
accountability, ECtHR through its jurisprudence “has pushed states to provide a more 
                                                          
116 According to Nuala Mole the reason why asylum was not included in ECHR is because the drafters 
anticipated Refugee Convention to be a lex specialis and cover in full the needs of refugees. Nuala MOLE, 
Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Pub., 2000, p.5.  
117 Case of Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, App. No(s).13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 
13447/87; 13448/87, ECHR (Chamber) 30 October 1991, Series A215, para 102 cited in N. MOLE, Id., 
p.9. 
118 UNHCR, Manual on Refugee Protection and the European Convention on Human Rights (updated 
2006), p.1. 
119 N. MOLE, Op. Cit., note 116, p.15. The author refers to art.1F 1951 Refugee Convention. 
120 ECHR, Op. Cit., note20, art.46. 
121 More E. FELLER, Op. Cit., note 59, p.12. 
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convincing and evidence-based justification in curtailing rights pertaining to individuals 
belonging to various kinds of minorities”122, including asylum-seekers.  
 
2) Scope of art.3 ECHR  
 
One of the most important and commonly invoked provisions of ECHR in regards to 
asylum-seekers is art.3. According to the Court, the great importance of art.3 stems from 
the fact that it “enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies 
making up the Council of Europe”123. Although the article invokes obligation similar to 
the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has wider 
scope then art.33 of 1951 Refugee Convention124. Art.3 is non-derogable and provides 
for no limitations even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation. While the personal scope of non-refoulement is considerably limited under art.33 
of the Refugee Convention125, art.3 of the ECHR protects everyone irrespective of their 
status in the country126. The Court has also broadened the application of art.3 by 
                                                          
122 Dia ANAGNOSTOU, “Does European Human Rights Law Matter? Implementation and Domestic 
Impact of Strasbourg Court Judgments on Minority-Related Policies”, (2010) 14 International Journal of 
Human Rights 721, 723. 
123 Case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, App. No(s).14038/88 ECHR (Plenary) 7 July1989, A161, para 
88 [Online] Available: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57619 [Accessed 3 
July 2011]. 
124 In Chahal v. UK the Court acknowledges the limits of the 1951Refugee Convention in relation to non-
refoulement. Case of Chahal v. the United Kingdom, App. No(s). 22414/93, ECHR (Grand Chamber) 15 
November 1996, Reports 1996-V, para 80 [Online] 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-100631  [Accessed 12 June 2011] 
125 Only refugees and asylum-seekers waiting for decision on their cases benefit from art.33 Refugee 
Convention. 
126 Non-refoulement applies to all persons who have a well-founded fear of persecution, whether or not a 
person has been recognised as a refugee. Helene LAMBERT, “Protection against Refoulement from 
Europe: Human Rights Law Comes to the Rescue”, (1999) 48 The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 515, 522. 
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including cases where harsh medical conditions in the country of origin can lead to ill-
treatment127.  
 
The prohibition of ill-treatment under art.3 is absolute and provides protection to 
individuals irrespective the illicitness of their conduct. According to the Court “there can 
never be, under the Convention or under international law, a justification for acts in 
breach of that provision”128. In the case of Chahal v. UK129 the Court, while 
acknowledging the difficulties faced by the State when protecting its citizens from 
terrorist violence, concluded that prohibition against treatment contrary to art.3 is 
absolute and “the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or 
dangerous, cannot be a material consideration.” Since the “War on terror” became a 
mainstream argument for greater security measures, governments are actively seeking, 
although unsuccessfully, to rebut the absolute nature of art.3 insisting on the need for 
balance between the interests of the applicant and those of the community130. 
                                                          
127 According to the Court the receiving government cannot be blamed or held responsible for the absence 
of socio-medical support. In its reasoning the Court stated that whether the medical facilities and treatment 
is not adequate the act of removal would be in breach of art.3 as it would expose the applicant “to a real 
risk of dying under the most distressing circumstances and would thus amount to inhumane treatment.” 
However, this applies only in extraordinary circumstances. Case of D. v. the United Kingdom, App. 
No(s).30240/96 ECHR (Chamber) 2 May 1997 Reports 1997-III , Para 53 cited in UNHCR, Op. Cit., note 
118. 
128 Case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, App. No(s). 5310/71, 18 January 1978, Para 162 [Online] 
Available: http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/2607   
[Accessed 13 June 2011]; The absolute character of non-refoulement was recently reaffirmed in Case of 
Saadi v. Italy, App. No(s).37201/06, ECHR (Grand Chamber), 28 February 2008, Para 138-141 [Online]  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-85276 [Accessed 21 June 2011] 
129 Chahal v. UK, Op. Cit., note 124, Para 79-80. 
130 CENTRE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Saadi v Italy, the ECtHR Reaffirms 
Article 3's Absolute Protection, 4 March 2008 [Online] http://www.ucc.ie/law/blogs/ccjhr/2008/03/saadi-
v-italy-ecthr-reaffirms-article.html [Accessed 3 April 2011]. In Saady v. Italy, Op. Cit., note 128, para 140 
the UK, which was intervening in the case, further argued that because the right to asylum does not exist 
under the ECHR, this right is governed by the 1951 Refugee Convention which provides exception to non- 
refoulement in cases where there is a risk to national security and the asylum seeker acted contrary to UN 
Charter.  
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3) State Responsibility under art.3 
 
Art.3 of the ECHR has an extraterritorial jurisdiction invoking the responsibility of the 
contracting state for any possible ill-treatment committed by the receiving state, not 
party to the Convention131. When substantial grounds have shown that if removed, the 
person would face a real risk of being subjected to ill-treatment, the state will be 
responsible under art.3132. The existence of other international instruments does not 
preclude the contracting party’s responsibility “for all and any foreseeable consequences 
of the act of removal suffered outside their jurisdiction”133. The source of ill-treatment 
can come from state authorities as well as non-state agents, as long as the state cannot 
provide protection134. 
 
In cases of removal under the ‘safe third country’ concept, the Court has stated that the 
state, which automatically relies on safe third country arrangements made under the 
Dublin Regulations and removals to an intermediate country party to the Convention, do 
not affect the responsibility of the sending state under art.3135. Furthermore, the Court 
has observed, “the existence of domestic laws and accession to international treaties 
guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights in principle are not in themselves sufficient 
                                                          
131 In Soering v. UK, Op. Cit., note 123 the Court has stated that the sending state would be in violation of 
art.3 if extradite the applicant to a country not party to the Convention, such as USA, where she/he will 
face a death penalty.  
132 Id., Para 91; Chahal v. UK, Op. Cit., note 124, Para 74. 
133 Soering v. UK, Op. Cit., note 123, Para 86. 
134 Case of Salah v. the Netherlands, App. No(s).8196/02, ECHR (Third Section) 6 July 2006, Para 147 
[Online] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-76256 [Accessed 24 July 2011] 
135 Case of T.I. v. the United Kingdom, No. 43844/98, ECHR (Third Section) 7 mars 2000, Reports 2000-
III, p. 15 [Online] http://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/jur_cedh_ti-royaume-uni_2000-3-7.pdf  [Accessed 23 
September 2011]. 
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to ensure adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment”136. Subsequently, each 
state should give a thorough consideration of each applicant’s submission before 
exercising any removal under the Dublin Regulations.  
 
It can be firmly concluded that the ECHR, with its extensive jurisprudence, “set the 
standards for the rights of asylum-seekers across Europe”137. In fact, cases brought 
before the ECtHR by asylum-seekers and refugees are the fastest growing area of case 
law138. The Convention offers important safeguards to asylum-seekers against states 
trying to avoid their protection responsibilities.  
4) ECtHR: Limitations of the Procedure   
 
However, the protection under the ECHR has limitations and, according to some 
authors, the protection provided rests within the theoretical framework without practical 
importance139. There are several reasons to reach the later conclusion. 
 
Although the ECtHR has undertaken a progressive approach towards safeguarding the 
rights of asylum-seekers under the ECHR, especially art.3, some procedural hurdles 
overshadow the effective protection offered by the Convention. In the first place, the 
rigid admissibility criteria under Court rules pose huge barriers to applicants140. The 
                                                          
136 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Op. Cit., note 84, Para 353. 
137 N. MOLE, Op. Cit., note 116, p.9 
138 A. ANAGNOSTOU, Op. Cit., note 122. 
139 Nuala MOLE, “Keynote presentation by Ms Nuala Mole” in COUNCIL OF EUROPE & UNHCR 
(eds.) Proceedings of the 2nd Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection 
of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Displaced Persons : Consolidation and Development of the Asylum-
Related Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Pub., 
2000, p.39. 
140 ECHR, Op. Cit., note 20, art.35. 
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standard of proof141, among others, is set so high making it very difficult to be 
reached142. Secondly, the ECtHR procedure may take 5-6 years until the final judgement 
is reached, which is a great challenge for asylum-seekers facing deportation or 
expulsion, as it is usually executed in short periods143. The interim measures under Rule 
39 are very useful in urgent situations144. However, according to the Court, the interim 
procedures are not binding in nature. The fact that Rule 39 ECHR has been obeyed by 
contracting parties before does not make it binding145. Moreover, very rarely cases of 
asylum-seekers considered by the Court result in decisions in favour of the applicant146. 
It is true that the ECtHR cannot assume the role of European Court of appealing for 
unsatisfactory asylum decisions147, but at the same time the Court has to take into 
consideration the vulnerable situation of asylum-seekers in the receiving state, and the 
huge differences in the treatment of asylum-seekers in different EU states. Moreover, the 
court has to acknowledge the lack of an international monitoring mechanism for the 
accurate application of Refugee law by the state. 
 
Further to the above, the implementation of ECtHR decisions into domestic policies 
varies across European states. In some instances, even after direct involvement by the 
Committee of Ministers, some states remain reluctant to take the necessary steps to 
                                                          
141 The applicants have to be able to show that they would be personally at risk if returned and to be 
relatively more at risk of prohibited treatment than others in similar vulnerable situations.   
142 N. MOLE, Op. Cit., note 139, p.39-40; A. ANAGNOSTOU, Op. Cit., note 122, 725. 
143 H. LAMBERT, 1999, Op. Cit., note 126, 529-530. 
144 Id., p.531, they can be granted only in cases where asylum-seeker can show that “irreparable” and 
“irreversible” damages would occur if the removal is carried on before decision. 
145 Case of Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, App. No(s).15576/89 ECHR (Plenary) 20 March 1991, 
A201, Para 92 [Online] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57674 [Accessed 20 
September 2011] 
146 N. MOLE, Op. Cit., note 139, p.39. 
147 N. MOLE, Op. Cit., note 116. 
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comply with the court’s decision148. Moreover, the Court lacks guidance and gives a 
broad margin of appreciation to states to decide on relevant changes of domestic law, 
and polices149.   
 
Finally, the Court is silent on the status of the applicant once a stay of removal is issued. 
It is up to the individual state to decide what social and other benefits are to be assigned 
to asylum-seekers. Such uncertainty can be detrimental to the applicant’s well being. 
Particularly the lack of any adequate status, which can guarantee basic social and 
economic rights, can amount in many instances to ill-treatment under art.3150. 
 
 
 
B. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Court of Justice of the European Union: 
Impact on Rights of Asylum-Seekers 
 
Initially established as a community with economic aims, the EU has long evaded the 
need for the implementation of a human rights framework within its legal treaty 
structure to assure compliance by EU and member states alike. It was not until the 
Treaty of Maastricht when human rights were officially codified into the EU legal 
structure151. Since then, the EU has gradually advanced the human rights agenda with 
                                                          
148 Kerstin BUCHINGER & Astrid STEINKELLNER, “Litigation Before the European Court of Human 
Rights and Domestic Implementation: Does the European Convention Promote the Rights of Immigrants 
and Asylum Seekers?”, (2010) 16 European Public law 419, 432-433. 
149 A. ANAGNOSTOU, Op. Cit., note 122, 724. 
150 UNHCR, Op. Cit., note 118, p.12. In case of Ahmed v. Austria, the Somali applicant committed suicide 
a year and a half after the Court’s stay of removal, unable to coop with the situation of limbo in the 
country of asylum. Case of Ahmed v. Austria, App. No(s).25964/94, ECHR (Chamber) 17 December 
1996, Reports 1996-VI [Online] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58001 
[Accessed 3 September 2011] 
151 Art. F of the Treaty affirmed the respect for fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. It needs to be point out that human rights were 
first mentioned in the Single European Act; however the provision was included in the preamble which 
awards it with a declaratory character. 
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point of culmination the adoption of EU Charter152. The aim of the Charter is to provide 
more coherent protection of human rights within the EU by making those rights more 
visible153. The Charter has acquired a rank of primary legislation with the same legal 
value as EU treaties with entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. Thus, 
directives and other secondary laws have to be drafted and implemented in compliance 
with the Charter. Furthermore, the Charter is directly enforceable in national courts in 
cases concerning the application of EU law154. 
 
1) Scope of the Charter 
 
The scope of the Charter is limited to areas of application of the Union law, and binds 
EU institutions, bodies, and member states when implementing Union law155. The 
Charter catalogues the existing rights under the EU legal order, but does not extend the 
competence of the Union outside Community law, in areas where member states have 
competence156. Many of the Charter’s provisions correspond to those listed in the ECHR 
and have the same meaning and the same scope as the ECHR provisions157. In regards to 
its personal scope, the Charter applies to everyone, including third country nationals, 
except for provisions expressly limiting the application to EU citizens, such as the right 
                                                          
152 For general overview see COUR DE CESSATION DE FRANCE, Dossier : la Charte des droits 
fondamentaux - historique et enjeux juridiques, 2010 [Online] 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/publications_cour_26/publications_observatoire_droit_europeen_2185/veill
es_bimestrielles_droit_europeen_3556/octobre_2010_3810/droits_fondamentaux_18630.html [Accessed 3 
June 2011]; Contra see Joseph H. H. WEILER, “Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter 
of Rights?”, (2000) 6 European Law Journal 95. 
153 EU Charter, Op. Cit., note 21, Preamble. 
154 EU Charter, Op. Cit., note 21, art.51(1).   
155 Poland, UK and Czech Republic have opted for a limited national effect of the Charter. Also the 
Charter does not apply in areas of EU law where UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out. 
156 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union [TEU] 2010 OJ, C 83/13, art.6 [Treaty of 
Lisbon]. 
157 EU Charter, Op. Cit., note 21, art.52 (3). 
44 
 
to vote, for example158. Accordingly, Guild159 has concluded that the Charter has 
equalized the rights for everyone in the EU, thus diminishing the divide between citizens 
and non-citizens. 
 
The EU Charter itself does not expressly list the situations when its provisions can be 
subjected to limitation. Art. 52(1) EU Charter160 only requires that the law provide 
limitations to any of the Charter provisions and meet the principles of proportionality 
and necessity. However, as concluded by Peers, the lack of any express statement of 
situations when the legislator can derogate from Charter provisions does not allow the 
Union or the member states to apply derogating measures under the Charter as they 
please161. For example, following Peers’ logic, in case of derogation from provisions 
corresponding to the rights of the ECHR, EU institutions (when EU becomes party to the 
ECHR) or member states will be in breach of the ECHR, which lists limited situations 
where derogation is permitted162. Moreover, the derogating state risks being in breach of 
art.53 of the Charter163. Therefore, in cases where the ECHR itself envisages the 
                                                          
158 Steve PEERS, “Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights”, (2001) 
3  European Journal of Migration and Law 141, 146; See also art.39 as well as arts. 12(2), 15(2) and (3), 
21(2) and 34(2), for example.  
159Elspeth GUILD, “The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon Fundamental Rights and EU 
Citizenship” , Global Jean Monnet/European Community Studies Association World Conference. Brussels 
25-26 May 2010, p.5. 
160 The article states:  
“Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must 
be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others.” 
161 S. PEERS, Op. Cit., note 158, 152-155. 
162 ECHR, Op. Cit., note 20, art.15. 
163Art. 53 states: 
“Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by 
Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the 
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possibility of derogation, the Charter is offering additional limitations164. Thus, art.52 
(1) is only “a ‘residual’ derogation clause” related to the provisions that are unique to the 
Charter165.    
 
2) Scope of the Right to Asylum in EU Charter 
The right to asylum166 is included within the EU Charter, therefore acquiring the status 
of a fundamental right within the EU legal order. As such, it is directly enforceable in 
national courts and national courts have to ensure effective protection of the right167. 
However, it is difficult to determine the exact content of the right to asylum within the 
EU legal order given the vague language used in the provision itself. The unclear 
wording of the right to asylum within the international law further complicates the task. 
Prof. Steve Peers and Maria Gill- Bazo accord the right to asylum, as provided by the 
EU Charter, a wider scope than under art.14 of the UDHR168. Considering art.52 (4) of 
the EU Charter and the travaux préparatoires, Gill-Bazo concludes that art.18 “[is] to be 
construed as the right of individuals to be granted asylum when they meet the criteria. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' 
constitutions.”  
164 S. PEERS, Op. Cit., note 158, 152-155. 
165 Id., p.155. 
166 According to art.18: 
“The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of 
refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.” 
167 Marcelle RENEMAN, An EU right to interim protection during appeal proceedings in asylum cases? 
European journal of migration and law, 12(4), 411. 
168 S. PEERS, Op. Cit., note 158, p.161; Maria-Teresa GIL-BAZO, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union's Law”, (2008) 27 Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 33, 48. 
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These criteria are necessarily those established by the Union’s law, rather than by the 
member states themselves”169.  
 
Further to the right to asylum, art.19(2) EU Charter170 articulates the prohibition of 
removal, extradition or expulsion to a state where there is a serious risk of an individual 
being subjected to a death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. According to the Commentary accompanying the EU Charter, art.19 (2) 
incorporates art.3 case law of the ECtHR pertinent to non-refoulement. Moreover, the 
non-refoulement principle is repeated twice in the Charter. Once it is stated in art.4 and 
then reprinted in art.19 (2). The second repetition is not accidental. It emphasizes the 
extreme vulnerability of the third country nationals facing refoulement thus, providing 
further safeguarding of their rights. At the same time, such repetition strengthens the 
position of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of the asylum institution. Although art.19 
(2) does not correspond to a specific provision of ECHR, it cannot be derogated from. 
The core element of the provision is the non-refoulement principle, which does not 
allow for derogations under ECHR171. Therefore, any derogation will lead to breach of 
art.53 of the Charter, as it will limit and adversely affect the obligations of member state 
under ECHR172. Furthermore, in cases where there is a violation of Charter rights by a 
                                                          
169 M-T. GIL-BAZO, Op.Cit., note 168; Also according to the Protocol on Asylum attached to the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (1997), the EU nationals are excluded from the application of art.18. Thus, Member States 
have discretion to apply art.18 in regards to such claimants. 
170 Article 19(2) states: 
“No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that 
he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” 
171 S. PEERS, Op. Cit., note 158, 159. 
172 Id. 
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Union’s institutions and member states, art.47 confers to individuals, including asylum-
seekers, the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal. 
 
3) ECJ and the Relevant Jurisprudence 
 
Over the years, the ECJ’s jurisprudence in relation to the place of human rights within 
the community order has significantly progressed: from complete reluctance to 
recognize human rights as a standard for the interpretation of community legislation and 
to express recognition of human rights as general principles protected under the Union 
law173. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the ECJ has acquired jurisdiction to legislate in 
regards to asylum. The preliminary rulings procedure174 is one of the main instruments 
of the ECJ for harmonizing the EU legislation in areas of asylum, as the Court’s rulings 
on particular case are legally binding for all member states (for extensive discussion see 
below).  
Despite the scarce jurisprudence on asylum, it can be affirmed that court adjudications 
have been in line with the international human rights standards. In regards to non-
refoulement principle ECJ has taken the same line of reasoning as ECtHR. It has 
recognized the prohibition of torture laid down in art.3 of the ECHR as absolute and not 
                                                          
173 Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, Case 29-69, 12 November 1969, Para 7 [Online] http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61969J0029&lg=
en [Accessed 12 July 2011]; Following threat from some member states to disregard the supremacy of the 
community law which jeopardizes human rights guaranteed within their constitutional order, ECJ 
expressly recognized human rights as a general principle of the law protected by the Union. Yaşar 
DOĞAN, “The Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice: Protection for Human 
Rights within the European Union Legal Order”, (2009) 6 Ankara Law Review 53, 54. More on human 
rights and ECJ see S. PEERS, “Human Rights, Asylum and European Community Law”, (2005) 24 
Refugee Survey Quarterly. 
174 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], 2010 OJ, C 
83/49, aer.267 [Treaty of Lisbon] 
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susceptible to any restrictions175. The court is already developing its own jurisprudence 
in regards to asylum. One recent decision will be commented on here in order to 
demonstrate the court’s willingness to align its jurisprudence with human rights 
standards.  
 
In the Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie case176, the court was asked to interpret 
art.15(c) of the Qualification Directive. This provision is of particular importance to 
asylum-seekers who fall outside of the scope of art.1A of the Refugee Convention as it 
affords them with a subsidiary protection which is a relatively new instrument of 
international protection pertaining to asylum177. Member States intervening in the case 
supported the position that art. 15(c) requires the person in need of protection to prove 
individual risk to their life in the case of a return. In contrast, the court held that art.15(c) 
covers situation where there is also a general risk of harm faced by the individuals178. 
According to the Court, in situations of indiscriminate violence, due to armed conflict, 
the person will face individual risk solely on account of their presence in the territory 
                                                          
175Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, Case C-112/00, 
12 June 2003. Free movement of goods - Restriction resulting from actions of individuals - Obligations of 
the Member States - Decision not to prohibit a demonstration by environmental protesters which resulted 
in the complete closure of the Brenner motorway for almost 30 hours - Justification - Fundamental rights 
- Freedom of expression and freedom of assembly - Principle of proportionality, Para 80 [Online] 
Available: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-
112/00&td=ALL&parties=Schmidberger [Accessed 23 December 2011] 
176 Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie. Case C-465/07, Court (Grand 
Chamber), 17 February 2009. Directive 2004/83/EC - Minimum standards for determining who qualifies 
for refugee status or for subsidiary protection status - Person eligible for subsidiary protection - Article 
2(e) - Real risk of suffering serious harm - Article 15(c) - Serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life 
or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict - Proof .[Online] 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-465/07&td=ALL&parties=Elgafaji 
[Accessed 21 June 2011].  
177Roger ERRERA, “The ECJ and Subsidiary Protection: Reflections on Elgafaji - And After”, European 
Asylum Law Judges Association - European Academy Workshop, Berlin, October 19 - 20, 2009, p.17 
178 Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Op. Cit., note 176, Para 33. 
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where such violence takes place179. At the same time, however, the court assigned the 
national authorities the task of assessing the exceptionality of indiscriminate violence in 
each case180. This is an important decision as it creates an enforceable right to asylum 
for individuals fleeing indiscriminate violence181, establishing that the protection of 
refugees fleeing generalized violence is not a matter of executive discretion but is 
governed by law. It can be concluded that with the new powers assigned to the ECJ by 
the Lisbon treaty, its role for developing asylum standards aligned with human rights 
will be indispensable. This will enable for speedy harmonization of the practices of 
member states to provide more consistent treatment of asylum-seekers.   
 
CHAPTER II: ACCESS TO ASYLUM IN EU: QUESTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBSERVANCE OR POLITICAL PRIORITIES 
 
SECTION 1: Where is EU Heading? Main Trends in the EU Asylum 
Acquis182 
 
In this chapter, our aim is to take a glance at the EU policy on asylum and outline the 
legal and socio-political context in which such policies have developed. In the brief 
overview of the EU asylum acquis we shall demonstrate the gradual establishment of 
exclusionist policies as well as the debatable reasons and fears which prompted the 
establishment of such policies. This will allow a better understanding of the current state 
                                                          
179 Id., Para 43. 
180 Id. 
181 Maryellen FULLERTON, “A Tale of Two Decades: War Refugees and Asylum Policy in the European 
Union”, (2010) 10 Global Studies Law Review 1, 4. 
182 The EU Asylum acquis (body of law) comprises of legislative measures and harmonised standards on 
asylum (there are five legal instruments that make up the EU acquis on asylum. Discussed below.) 
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of the EU asylum shaped by narrow political interests of member states with little 
account for the rights and well-being of those seeking protection. 
 
A. Historical Background 
 
The fall of the Berlin wall and the following developments have produced numbers of 
asylum-seekers and provoked gradual tightening of the EU borders to the point where 
EU was labelled “Fortress Europe”. Obsessed with scare-mongery about refugees 
flooding their territories and menacing national values, member states took on a race to 
introduce controversial restrictive asylum policies that are completely at odds with the 
international human rights instruments. Such development was facilitated by the initial 
lack of human rights framework within the EU legal order. The EU was originally 
conceived as a common market. This goal was achieved by the abolition of the internal 
borders so as to facilitate the free movement of capital, goods, services and labor183. In 
other words, until recently, EU affairs have been driven mainly by internal market logic, 
with no or little attention to the human rights principles184. It is true that gradually, 
human rights have emerged onto the EU political agenda according to EU citizens’ 
various freedoms. However, the internal market logic is still persistent when it comes to 
according rights for asylum-seekers and refugees185.  
                                                          
183 Elspeth GUILD, “EU Dimension of Refugee Law: the Europeanisation of Europe's Asylum Policy”,     
(2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 630, 631-633. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. In the context of internal market logic, Guild has compared asylum-seekers with tins of beans 
whose access to the EU territory is pending upon approval of state authorities.  
“Determination of asylum claims by state authorities was assimilated to the certification 
of extra EU imported goods, a prerequisite for the goods gaining access to the internal 
market and free movement within the EU... In the internal market logic, asylum seekers 
should be certified on arrival like beans, or warehoused (like tins of beans) until this is 
administratively convenient.”  
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Moreover, due to the initial policy making process within the EU186, narrow state 
interests to stem asylum-seekers’ flow187 have found their way into EU asylum acquis 
through multilateral agreements and intergovernmental cooperation directed to 
harmonize the response to asylum188. Controversial measures such as ‘safe country of 
origin’, ‘safe third country’ and the notion of the manifestly unfounded claim, among 
others are products of national legislations attempting to regulate the movement of 
asylum-seekers across national borders189. Such policies have quickly become popular 
as they corresponded completely to the ‘race to the bottom’ pursued by the states in 
order to make them less attractive for asylum-seekers. Thus, at the beginning, the EU 
asylum was dominated by ‘bottom up approach’190 contrary to the popular 
misconception about the ‘Brussels dictate’191 over national policies. The ‘informal 
governmentalism’192 which characterizes the initial approach toward asylum as 
amenable to criticism because of the lack of transparency during the negotiations and the 
adoption process with little or no participation of the Community institutions and the 
civil society.   
 
                                                          
186 Until the Treaty of Amsterdam the asylum was not part of the common EU goals and was regulated by 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
187 Rosemary BYRNE, Gregor NOLL & Jens VEDSTED-HANSEN, “Understanding Refugee Law in an 
Enlarged European Union”, (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 355, 359. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. For example, ‘safe third country’notion was originally invented and introduced in the Danish 
asylum law. It is known as a Danish clause. 
190 Id., 357. 
191 The term refers to EU institutions. 
192 Andrew GEDDES, “Asylum in Europe: States, the European Union and the International System”, 
(2001) 20 Refugee Survey Quarterly 59, 60. 
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Thus, geo-political changes, market driven logic of asylum measures and narrow states 
interests determined the initial stage of policy development in the field of asylum in the 
EU. This set the tone for further inhospitable legislation towards asylum-seekers and 
refugees. 
 
B. Overview of the EU Asylum Acquis 
 
Bill Frelick has identified three major paradigms in the international refugee protection 
regime: exilic, source country and security paradigm193. It can be suggested that the EU 
asylum policy follows similar patterns in its responses toward asylum-seekers and 
refugees. Furthermore, the EU due to its political influence was one of the main players 
in shaping the international refugee regime ever since its conception194. 
 
1) Exilic Paradigm 
 
The exilic paradigm, until 1991, was marked by deep ideological tensions between the 
Western Countries and the Soviet Bloc. Due to the impossibility of resolving the root 
causes in the countries of origin, refugees could not be returned home195. During that 
period, refugees clearly had an ideological value, and granting a safe haven to them was 
                                                          
193 Bill FRELICK, “Paradigm Shifts in the International Responses to Refugees” in WHITE J. D. & 
ANTHONY J. M. (eds.) Fear of Persecution : Global Human Rights, International Law, and Human 
Well-being. Lanham, Lexington Books, 2007. 
194 According to Hathaway “[d]ominated by EU western states the Refugee Convention was conceived to 
serve their political and ideological views.” The author concludes that the Convention is “[e]urocentric, 
offering not universal but rather two-tiered protection where non-European refugees were offered only 
indirect and discretionary financial assistance”. J. HATHAWAY, “A Reconsideration of the Underlying 
Premise of Refugee Law”, (1990) 31 Harvard International Law Journal 129, 157. 
195 B. FRELICK, Op. Cit., note 193, p.34. 
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used, so to say, as a tool by the Western states for promoting liberal values196. Most of 
the Western European countries lacked a comprehensive refugee determination regime, 
and refugee status was granted almost automatically197. The EU for its part had no 
competences in the field of migration and asylum, which were considered internal 
matters.  
 
2) Source Country Paradigm 
 
The source country paradigm described the 1990s and was characterized by shift in the 
approach toward granting asylum. Refugees were kept as close as possible to their areas 
of origin and afforded temporary status at most 198. An increased use of temporary 
protection, safety zones within the country of origin and similar policies were put in 
place to facilitate the task. Refugees were subjected to policies aiming to prevent them 
from reaching the Western shores. From the 1980s, asylum applications in EU countries 
                                                          
196 Id. Also Sara COLLINSON, Beyond borders : west European migration policy towards the 21st 
century, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993 cited in Joan FITZPATRICK, “Flight from 
Asylum: Trends toward Temporary "Refuge" and Local Responses to Forced Migrations”, (1995) 35 
Virginia Journal of International Law 13, 27. 
197 Id., Collinson describes the situation at that time:  
“During the 1950s and 1960s, the 1951 Convention proved both adequate for responding 
to the refugee problems faced by the Western states, and suited to their political 
interests. The majority of those seeking asylum in the West were people attempting to 
escape political repression and economic hardship in the Eastern bloc. Despite a 
reluctance to enter into any obligations over the granting of asylum, the Western states 
offered refuge to these groups in an almost automatic fashion ("presumptive refugee 
status"), even though the majority would not have been able to make a case for refugee 
status according to a strict interpretation of the 1951 Convention. By accepting exiles 
from the Eastern bloc as refugees, the Western countries could deal an ideological blow 
to the communist countries by stigmatizing them as persecutors, while simultaneously 
promoting Western liberal values. Furthermore, owing to the imposition of exit 
restrictions by the Eastern bloc countries, the numbers were generally low.” 
198 Id., p.16. Widespread state practice is to afford asylum-seekers with a temporary protection. Such 
approach prevents such individuals from all rights to which refugees are entitled under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Id. 
54 
 
rose rapidly to reach 672,385 in 1992199 a number, which was perceived as ‘asylum out 
of control’200. The Treaty of Maastricht201 has now enshrined the ‘three pillar system’202 
in the legal structure of the EU. Asylum and immigration are placed in the security 
framework of the third pillar on “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”, 
characterised by intergovernmental cooperation. This leads one to the conclusion that 
the security trend of EU asylum policies had begun earlier, outside the EU 
framework203. Asylum policy was now placed in one policy framework together with 
illegal immigration, organized crime, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking and 
police cooperation.  
 
                                                          
199 EUROSTAT, Asylum applications in the European Union,  2007 [Online]  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-07-110/EN/KS-SF-07-110-EN.PDF  
[Accessed 3 January 2011]. 
200 Joan Fitzpatrick points out three reasons for the sharp increase of the asylum applications: 1. The end 
of the cold war where 1.2 million people left the Warsaw Pact states in search of new lives in the West; 2. 
Improved means of transportation and the increase of smugglers facilitating the arrival of asylum seekers 
from developing countries; 3. The oil crisis in 1970’s limited the legal venues for immigration in Europe 
and asylum channel used as an easy venue for entering the country. J. FITZPATRICK, Op. Cit., note 196, 
27. The third point is also highlighted by Peter Stalker. Peter STALKER, “Migration Trends and 
Migration Policy in Europe”, (2002) 40 International Migration 151, 153.   
201 For a first time EU Treaty made reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article K.1 which 
regulates matters, including asylum policy, states that it “shall be dealt with in compliance with the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 
1950 and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and having regard to the 
protection afforded by Member States to persons persecuted on political grounds”. Treaty on European 
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ, C191 [Treaty of Maastricht]. 
202 The term refers to the EU legal structure before entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The fisr pillar 
was the European Communities consisting of the European Community (EC), the former European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). This pillar 
was the supranational (community) pillar handling common European policies such as economic, 
environment, agrculture, social, etc. The Common Foreighn and Security Policy (CFSP) was the second 
pillar and the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, the third pillar comprising police and 
criminal cooperation. The last two pillars were characetrized by intergovernmental cooperation.  
203 The first intergovernmental body to tackle asylum and immigration among issues as drugs, 
international crime, etc. was the TREVI Group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme et Violence 
Internationale); The ad hoc Working Group on Asylum and Immigration was formed after separation from 
TREVI Group to tackle matters on abuse of the asylum systems of the participating Member States and 
the volume of applications. Dace SCHLENTZ, Did 9/11 Matter? Securitization of Asylum and 
Immigration in the European Union in the Period from 1992 to 2008, Refugee Studies Centre Working 
Paper Series 56, 2010, p.17 [Online]  
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:5570 [Accessed 5 May 2011]. 
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The 1990s were critical in paving the way to a decidedly restriction oriented EU asylum 
policy, completely ignoring the protection needs of asylum-seekers recognized in 
international law. While abolishing borders between member states, the Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement204 introduced the beginning of the ‘Fortress 
Europe’ by strengthening the control of the common external border. The Convention 
put in place short-term visa entry205 together with a list of countries whose citizens 
should possess visas to enter the EU territory206. Although not directly aiming at 
tightening access for asylum-seekers, one of the intentions of such a list was clearly to 
stem refugee flows. Most of the countries on the list like Afghanistan, and Somalia are 
refugee-producing countries. In addition, the Convention put in place carrier sanctions 
for air transporters carrying third country nationals who are not in possession of valid 
travel documents207. It is a well-known fact that many asylum-seekers are traveling 
without documentation due to legitimate reasons such as the urgency of their flight, the 
lack of nearby visa posts, among others208. Thus, visa requirements on countries that 
generate refugees along with carrier sanctions constitute “the most explicit blocking 
mechanism for asylum flows and it denies most refugees the opportunity for legal 
                                                          
204 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany And the French Republic, on the 
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 19 June 1990, [Schengen Convention] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38a20.html [Accessed 29 June 2012] 
205 Id., art10. 
206 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 200 Listing the Third Countries whose Nationals 
Must be in Possession of Visas when Crossing the External Borders and those Whose Nationals are 
Exempt from that Requirement. 
207 Schengen Convention, Op. Cit., note 204, art.26. 
208 Art. 26 require the return of undocumented passengers and imposition of penalties to be undertaken in 
compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and the corresponding 1967 Protocol. However, such 
reference appears useless as the carrier personal is not trained and qualified to identify potential asylum-
seekers. Clearly, the preference will be given to deterrence of all passengers without necessary documents 
rather than risking stiff penalties for the carrier company.    
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migration”209. Consequently, many asylum-seekers have resorted to irregular channels 
for entering the EU territory210.  
 
The so-called Dublin Convention211 was another instrument, which fell short of 
implementing international standards for the protection of asylum-seekers. In broad 
terms, it obliged the asylum-seekers to submit their application in the first country of 
entry212, thus significantly limiting asylum-seekers to choose which country to apply for 
protection213. In suspicious cases where an individual passed through a member state 
without applying for asylum there, they are requested to return to that first country of 
entry.  According to the EU Parliament, such allocation of responsibility deprives 
asylum-seekers of their access to a fair and efficient determination procedure214. 
Preventing asylum-seekers to choose freely in which country to claim asylum, and given 
the varying acceptance rate in different member states, they are subjected to an ‘asylum 
lottery’215. The heaviest responsibility was placed on the member states situated on the 
                                                          
209John MORRISON & Beth CROSLAND, Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: the End Game in 
European Asylum Policy, UNHCR Working paper No. 39, 2001 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/3af66c9b4.html [Accessed 20 May 2011]. 
210 Estimations suggest that 90% of refugees rely on irregular means to gain access to the EU. ECRE, 
Broken Promises - Forgotten Principles. An ECRE Evaluation of the Development of EU Minimum 
Standards for Refugee Protection. Tampere 1999, 2004, p.17 [Online]  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4124b3cc4.html [Accessed 3 May 2011]. 
211 In 2003, Dublin Convention was replaced by the Dublin Regulation. Council Regulation (EC) No 
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213 It is well known that, if the circumstances allow it, asylum-seekers would prefer to lodge an asylum 
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214 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Op. Cit., note 88, p.7. 
215 Id. According to the same report, in 2007 acceptance rates within member states varied considerably 
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periphery of the EU such as Italy and Greece216. Thus, the Convention has failed to 
apply a responsibility-sharing217 concept between member states, which was one of the 
initial aims.  
 
In line with the restrictive, hard-lined policies, the 1992 London Resolutions218 and 
Conclusions put in place the concepts of ‘manifestly unfounded applications’, ‘safe third 
country’ and ‘safe country of origin’219. Those concepts have allowed states to introduce 
accelerated or simplified determination procedures with few safeguards for the rights of 
the claimants. In summation, the post-Maastricht period is characterized by 
intergovernmental cooperation and non-binding instruments, emphasising the lowest 
common denominator and restriction-oriented policies220. 
 
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred asylum and immigration policies to the 
first (Community) pillar221, giving the EU Commission the power to introduce measures 
on asylum and the EU Parliament the right to be consulted on the matter. Furthermore, it 
was affirmed that measures adopted under the new title IV, have to be in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention and related Protocol222. For the first time the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced the concept of “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” 
                                                          
216 ECRE, Summary Report on the Application of the Dublin II Regulation in Europe, 2006, p.8 [Online] 
http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/135.html [Accessed 2 June 2011]. 
217 Many authors apply the term “burden” and “burden-sharing”. However, it is advisable such terms to be 
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218 Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum [London 
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220 A. Geddes, Op. Cit., note 192, 60. 
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(AFSJ)223 establishing, among other things, that EU is an area where people can seek 
international protection224. However, given the restricted jurisdiction of the ECJ and the 
considerable power of the individual states to influence the legislation due to the 
unanimity voting procedure in the Council, there was not a significant change in regards 
to the hard-lined asylum policies.  
 
In 1999, the European Council met in Tampere where the first 5-year strategy (1999-
2004) in the asylum and immigration field was laid down225. The EU Council agreed to 
work towards an establishment of a Common European Asylum System to be based on 
the full and inclusive implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention, absolute respect 
for the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum226. The Conclusions 
acknowledged the distinction between immigration and asylum227, important distinction 
given the different needs of both categories of migrants. The Council also proposed 
measures for common European border management, suggesting a balanced approach in 
upholding refugee rights and managing external borders. Along with the positive 
development in the field of asylum, Tampere Conclusions laid down a framework 
leading to more securitisation of asylum. As priorities for the next five years, the 
Council envisaged, among others, to finalize its work on Eurodac, the electronic system 
                                                          
223 Analysis of the concept see Pieter BOELES, “Introduction: Freedom, Security and Justice for All”, in 
E. GUILD & C. HARLOW (eds.), Implementing Amsterdam, Portland, Hart Pub, 2001, p.2-8; and Olga F. 
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for the identification of asylum-seekers228, to pursue further the common active policy 
on visas including establishment of common EU visa offices229, etc. Thus, although 
giving the impression to project a direction axed on safeguarding the rights of asylum-
seekers, refugees and other migrants, the post-Tampere legislative period placed the 
focus on border protection making the access to EU territory even harder and the post 
Tampere legislative developments are mostly disappointing. 
3) Security Paradigm  
 
The third period in refugee protection, according to Frelick, is marked by the security 
paradigm and began around the year 2000230. The period is characterized with an 
extensive ‘War on terror’ and further erosion in the application of the Refugee 
Convention across countries. Asylum-seekers and refugees are regarded as a security 
threat and asylum as a channel for terrorism231. Anti-refugee discourse was reinforced 
by the mainstream media, which intentionally or through misinformation has supported 
misleading myths about asylum-seekers and refugees created by far right nationalistic 
movements. The link between asylum-seekers and refugees with terrorism was 
reinforced by the ‘problematic language’232 used by the UN Security Council in several 
anti-terrorism resolutions where states are urged to deny safe haven to terrorists and to 
ensure that refugee status is not abused by such people233. Thus, the terrorism agenda 
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230B. FRELICK, Op. Cit., note 193. 
231 Id., p.45. 
232Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, “Forced Migration: Refugees, Rights and Secuity” in J. MCADAM (ed.) 
Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security, Oxford, Hart Pub., 2008 
233 UN Security Council, Resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace and security caused by 
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provided many states with ‘spurious justification’ to adopt hostile asylum measures234. 
Goodwin-Gill has suggested that the UN Security Council bears the responsibility for 
the fact that asylum legislation in many countries is in breach with International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL), International Refugee Law (IRL) and International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL)235. The 9/11 terrorist attacks accelerated the anti-refugee discourse and the 
securitization of the EU asylum acquis236. 
  
Right after the 9/11 attacks, the EU Council held an extraordinary meeting in Brussels 
which called for strengthening the controls over the external borders237 inviting the 
Commission “to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal 
security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments”238   
thus, reaffirming the tendency of the implied relation between asylum and terrorism. 
Although the Commission’s working document in response of the call did not suggest a 
dramatic change in the EU asylum polices, it called for revising the non-refoulement 
                                                                                                                                                                           
national and international law, including international standards of human rights, 
before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker 
has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts; 
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not 
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims 
of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the 
extradition of alleged terrorists”;  
In addition, the language of the resolutions has been problematic in view of the fact that there is no 
internationally agreed definition on terrorism. It remains within the prerogatives of each state to decide 
who is a terrorist and therefore excluded from refugee status. Thus, the matter is open for abuses from 
states. Rene BRUIN & Kees WOUTERS, “Terrorism and the Non-derogability of Non-refoulement”,  
(2003) 15 International Journal of Refugee law 5,7. 
234As noted by GOODWIN –GILL: “For some States, (or rather, for some governments), that has been the 
opportunity to introduce yet more stringent laws and policies, often in the aftermath of a terrorist incident, 
but also generally under a carefully constructed cloud of fear”. G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, Op. Cit., note 
232, p.7. 
235 Id., p.13. 
236 D. SCHLENTZ, Op. Cit., note 203. 
237 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Extraordinary Council Meeting in Brussels on Justice, Home Affairs and 
Civil Protection. 20 September 2001, para 24. 
238 Id., Para 29. 
61 
 
principle enshrined in art.3 ECHR, which, according to the ECtHR case law, is absolute 
and non-derogable239. 
 
The following two EU Council meetings in Laeken240 and Seville241 marked a new trend 
in EU asylum policy: externalization.  The EU Council242 called for an integration of the 
policy on migratory flows into the EU’s foreign policy. The Union did not hesitate to 
use its trade agreements, diplomacy and other tools to “persuade” third countries for 
“joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in event of illegal 
migration”243.  Furthermore, asylum was treated within the irregular migration discourse 
placing the emphasis on the abuse of the asylum system coupled with the quick return of 
the rejected claimants244. The important distinction made in Tampere between asylum 
and immigration was once again blurred. One commentator has pointed that “EU is 
heading for a situation where people fleeing poverty and persecution are to be expelled, 
repatriated, deported, and back to where they have come from regardless of the 
circumstances”245. Combating irregular migration and prioritizing border control was 
supplemented by the creation of a common EU agency for border control: Frontex.  
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Between 1999 and 2005, following the Tampere Conclusions, five Directives have been 
adopted comprising the backbone of the CEAS. In a first place, Directive on Reception 
Condition for Asylum-Seekers246 aiming at “harmonis[ing] the laws of the Member 
States concerning the reception conditions applicable to asylum seekers, thus 
contributing to the establishment of an EU-wide level playing field in the area of asylum 
and to reduce secondary movements”247. Without entering into details regarding the 
content of the Directive, it can be affirmed that the vague provisions of the document 
accord to the member states large margin of discretion in regards to treatment of asylum-
seekers. Such vague language has created conditions for different treatment of asylum-
seekers in each member state rendering impossible the harmonization of the legislation 
of member states on the matter248.  
 
One of the most prominent examples to support such a conclusion is the provision, 
which tackles the administrative detention. Art.7 (3) of the Directive lets member states 
to confine an asylum-seeker when it is necessary in accordance with state national law. 
However, the grounds for detention vary considerably from exceptional grounds to 
general practice of detaining asylum-seekers irregularly entering the country. Moreover, 
                                                          
246 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers. 
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Directive 2003/9/EC (the "Reception Conditions Directive"), the wide margin of discretion left to Member 
States by several key provisions of this Directive results in negating the desired harmonisation effect.” 
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the length of detention varies considerably from 7 days to 12 months or even 
indefinitely249.  
 
Another instrument part of the CEAS is the Directive on qualifications for becoming a 
refugee or a beneficiary of subsidiary protection status250. The Directive aims at 
ensuring that persons who need protection are identified and granted the same level of 
protection regardless the member state they are logging their asylum application251. The 
Directive has imported many positive developments in regards to the conditions of 
obtaining a protected status. For example, the applicant is awarded with the benefit of 
the doubt when the facts and circumstances in application are assessed252. Further, non-
state actors are considered as agent of persecution253. The gender-based violence is 
considered as act of persecution254; sexual orientation255 as well has been included in the 
reasons for persecution to be taken into consideration when state is assessing a claim for 
asylum. Least but not last, the Directive has promoted the notion of subsidiary protection 
(explained in details above) which permits protection to be granted to individuals 
subjected to general violence but does not qualify as refugees. 
 
Despite the positive developments, the Directive is criticized for falling short to reach 
the stated objective. According to ECRE and UNHCR the Directive  
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“clearly demonstrated that the possibility of finding protection varies 
dramatically from one Member State to another. At present, the Directive 
allows for extensive divergence in practice among Member States, 
undermining not only the EU’s harmonization objective, but also the rights 
of people needing protection. It is imperative to guarantee that people fleeing 
persecution can find protection and enjoy the same level of rights across 
Europe.”256  
 
Directive on Asylum Procedures257 is another legislative instrument part of the CEAS. 
Its main objective is to establish common rules in Member States on the procedure of 
granting and withdrawing refugee status.  This Directive is among the most controversial 
within the EU asylum acquis. While the Directive introduces many basic procedural 
guarantees to assure effective and fair refugee determination procedure such as right to 
receive information on their own language258; right to an interpreter259; right to a 
personal interview260; right to a legal assistance and representation261; right to 
communicate with UNHCR262; the right to an appeal263 etc., it has introduced some 
controversial concepts and legal measures which generated vast critique. 
 
In a first palace, art.18 of the Directive provides for detention of asylum-seekers. While 
the detention of asylum-seekers is not prohibited under the international law, the 
language of the provision is vague giving States wide margin of discretion. For example, 
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there are no exact criteria providing reasons to detain as well as time limit for which 
asylum-seeker can be deprived from their liberty.  
 
 Another controversy generated by the Directive is the introduction in the EU law of 
‘safe third country’ concept264. The idea carried by the concept is that EU member state 
can consider country outside EU for a safe and refuse to examine a claim for protection 
if the claimant first passed through this country. The concept is controversial simply 
because it allows the protection responsibility to be transferred to another country265 
denying asylum-seeker the choice where to loge the application for protection. Thus, 
asylum-seekers seeking to enter the territory may be denied access and subject to return 
without thorough consideration of their claim and verification of the safety of the 
country266. 
 
Real risk exists that the state, which adopted the concept, would automatically return 
asylum-seekers without individual examination of the circumstances of the application 
for asylum. Given the different refugee determination systems in each country such 
return may amount to violation of non-refoulement. Moreover, the returns will be 
directed to the neighbouring EU countries that have weak asylum determination 
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procedures and where serious human rights violations persists267. Thus, art.27 of the 
Directive “fails to comply with international standards and potentially fundamentally 
undermines asylum in the EU”268. Thus, given the minimum standards applied in the 
Directive and the wide discretion accorded to the member states the Directive failed to 
harmonize the asylum procedures between member states269 assuring uniform treatment 
of asylum-seekers throughout the EU. The member state managed to maintain their 
existing procedures, while applying only relatively minor changes270. 
 
The Temporary Protection Directive271 is another legislative instrument part of the 
CEAS. The main goal of the Directive is to provide temporary (generalised) protection 
in situations of mass influx of displaced persons from third countries to EU member 
states when the individual refugee determination status is not a viable solution, such as 
in cases when many persons’ refugee status must be determined. Temporary protection 
is given for a limited period of one year that can be extended by six monthly periods for 
a maximum of two years272. The Directive establishes numerous benefits for the 
individuals under temporary protection including a residence permit273, possibility for a 
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family reunification274, access to employment275, and suitable accommodation276. One of 
the positive outcomes of the Directive is that it does not preclude access to an individual 
asylum determination procedure277. Moreover, in cases when refugee status or other 
protection is not granted, the individual is still eligible and can benefit from temporary 
protection278.   
 
Notwithstanding the positive developments it contains, the Directive is criticised as 
being an obstacle to obtaining refugee status279. As pointed out by Gilbert, the Directive 
does not accord the same rights as those enjoyed by refugees, and temporary protection 
can be terminated at state’s will280. Moreover, the Directive lacks a right to appeal in 
cases when temporary protection is denied281.  
 
In summation, following the post 9/11 pattern, first phase instruments, such as the 
Asylum Procedure Directive282, has been placed within the security paradigm, with 
fewer rights for asylum seekers283. Despite some positive developments, the overall 
outcome of the legislative instruments was the upholding of the lowest common 
denominator. Thus, the legislation was placed at odds with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the principle of non-refoulement, and allowed member states to 
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continue to apply narrow national practices. The EU Commission284 has concluded that 
member states were reluctant to cooperate, prioritizing national agendas over EU, and 
making it difficult to reach an agreement. Member states were criticized for the lack of 
transparency during the final negotiations of the instruments and the absence of dialog 
with civil society285. Currently, the EU Commission has proposed amendments to most 
of the instruments to address that criticism.  
 
The Hague Programme286, which launched the second phase of the CEAS, clearly puts 
the emphasis on the external dimension of the Union’s asylum policy. The Programme 
gave priority to the refugee protection programs in cooperation with countries of origin 
and transit. Data collection and the information exchange were referred to as being of 
key importance for the Union’s asylum policy, thus reaffirming the continuum with the 
asylum-security nexus. The same tendency is observed in the latest 5-year asylum and 
immigration programme, agreed upon in the Stockholm287. Therefore, the program is 
promoting more state cooperation than common EU initiatives on asylum288. 
 
Another recent major development concerning the EU asylum law is the establishment 
of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The idea for such entity was first 
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established by the Hague Program to facilitate “all forms of cooperation between 
Member States relating to the Common European Asylum System”289. Thus, in 2008 the 
Commission put forward a legislative proposal for a regulation for the creation of EASO 
which main task will be “to provide practical assistance to member states in taking 
decisions on asylum claims”290. This regulation is based on two legal provisions. First, 
art.74 TFEU that tackles the cooperation between member states and between them and 
the EU Commission and the EU Parliament. Second, art.78 (1) and (2) TFEU tackling 
the common policy on asylum and the co-decision powers divided between EU 
Parliament and the Council.  
 
The mandate of the Agency is as follows: a) to improve the implementation of the 
Common European Asylum System; b) to strengthen practical cooperation among 
Member States on asylum and c) to provide support to Member States subject to 
particular pressure on their asylum and reception systems291. Thus, EASO, steaming 
from its mandate, may play significant role in harmonizing the asylum legislation of EU 
member states. 
 
Another positive aspect brought by the EASO’s Regulation is the cooperation of the 
agency with the UNHCR. UNHCR also will take part of the agency’s management 
board with non-voting rights292. Given the vast expertise of the UNHCR, its 
participation in various activities undertaken by the Agency will assure the observance 
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establishing a European Asylum Support Office, art.1. 
292 Id., art25(1). 
70 
 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  Moreover, civil society organizations and other 
agencies on national, regional and international level competent in the field of asylum 
can take part of the Consultative forum set up by the EASO. The forum will be a 
platform for information and knowledge exchange293. This may lead to more 
transparency in the work of the Office making sure the voices of civil society are heard.  
 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon (TFEU and TEU) which came into force in December 2009 
brought some radical changes into the EU legal stricture, abolishing the Union’s pillar 
structure and giving a legal personality to the EU. Furthermore, the co-decision294 
procedure became the ordinary decision making process, with the full participation of 
the European Parliament. The qualified majority voting in the European Council295 
substituted the unanimity voting, making it more difficult for single member states to 
block legislation and therefore, to influence its content. Finally, the EU Charter was 
incorporated in the Treaty, giving it legal binding force and jurisdiction was granted to 
the ECJ to interpret its provisions. Title V of the TFEU called for the establishment of 
CEAS, making it a priority for the Union in the field of asylum. The positive influence 
of the new changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon over asylum policies remains to be 
seen.  
CHAPTER III: BORDER CONTROL AND DATABASES: BARRIERS 
FOR ACCESS TO PROTECTION   
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294 Before the Treaty of Lisbon the co-decision procedure was an exceptional procedure articulated in art. 
251 (Treaty of Amsterdam) 
295 art.248 TFEU. 
71 
 
As established above, people escaping persecution have the right to asylum proclaimed 
by the UDHR and various other international and supranational legislative acts. States 
carry the obligation to give at least temporary access to their territory for purpose of 
claiming asylum. The right to asylum is rendered meaningless if there is no place for 
someone to go”296. However, over the recent years the entry into EU for the purpose of 
seeking refuge has been proven difficult.   
 
The tragic events of 9/11 gave an additional impetus to the EU and member states to 
develop further the general framework of deterrence. Increasingly, national security and 
the fight against terrorism are justifications used for the implementation of advanced 
surveillance technologies and other technological tools such as databases to secure state 
borders. However, implementation of these surveillance technologies is done at a fast 
pace, completely overlooking fundamental rights, such as right to privacy of third 
country nationals. The emphasis is placed on massive data processing and on exchange 
of information between governments and agencies on third country nationals, thus 
changing the perception of the cross-border movement to security issues and criminal 
activity297. Currently, there are several databases that process and store very sensitive 
personal information on individuals for immigration control. The information stored in 
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these databases is increasingly used for crime related purposes298. Furthermore, the quest 
for massive data exchange has been supported by the extensive use of biometric 
identifiers without thorough consideration of their reliability and the impact of this new 
technology on individual’s rights, including those of asylum-seekers. 
 
In the following sections the development of the EU border management will be 
discussed and the influence of the member states and their narrow political interests over 
border policies. The focus will be placed on some of the current databases developed 
and used as tools to control migration. In particular, we will discuss three of the EU 
databases, SIS, VIS and Eurodac, and how the mass exchange of information on 
individuals negatively affects vulnerable non-EU nationals such as asylum-seekers and 
refugees. Although not specifically created to store information on asylum-seekers 
(except for one database: Eurodac), the databases are creating additional barriers to 
access to asylum.  
 
Our choice to discuss in length the use of databases as a barrier to access asylum in EU, 
among other intercepting measures, was determined by the recent proliferation of such 
policy tools and the extensive reliance of the EU and member states on them to control 
asylum movements which significantly exacerbates the vulnerability of asylum-seekers 
to treatment contrary to basic human rights in the country of asylum. The problem lies in 
the fact that such new technological instruments are developed with a fast pace without 
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sufficient knowledge about their efficiency and impact on fundamental rights of people 
subjected to them. Moreover, for individuals escaping persecution and for regular 
travelers it is not immediately evident of the significant impact on their privacy rights, 
among others, once their data is taken, stored and exchanged between numbers of law 
enforcement and other agencies within EU and outside. While the databases offer the 
possibilities for improving EU border control, this should not be done at the expense of 
the rights of asylum-seekers who already suffered grave human rights violations. 
  SECTION 1: EU Border Management in a Snapshot  
 
Needless to say, the administration of EU external borders is a complex task. The border 
which encompasses an area of 3.6 Million Km²299 is changing its geographical 
dimensions with the accession of every new member state. Moreover, the borders of the 
Schengen area do not coincide with the EU external frontiers. A Protocol attached to the 
Amsterdam Treaty enabled UK, Ireland and Denmark to opt-out and not to participate in 
any common measures adopted in relation to Schengen acquis, and to continue to 
impose border checks on persons entering their territory. While the two most recently 
accepted members, Bulgaria and Romania, are not yet members of the Schengen area300, 
the non-EU states of Switzerland, Norway, Island and Lichtenstein are Schengen 
members301. Therefore, different legal instruments govern the responsibility of different 
                                                          
299 Stefano BERTOZZI, Schengen: Achievements and Challenges in Managing an Area Encompassing 3.6 
Million km², CEPS Working Document No. 284, 7 February 2008 [Online]  
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countries for complying with human rights legislation, such as the right to privacy and 
data protection. 
 
In historical terms, as discussed earlier, it was the Schengen Agreement followed by the 
implementation Convention that completely changed Europe’s geography, by rendering 
invisible the internal EU frontiers. The control over the EU borders was shifted to those 
EU Members on the periphery of the EU. Negotiated in secrecy, without consultation 
with civil society302, the Agreement was presented as a ‘laboratory for Europe’ 
furthering the European unification303. In order to compensate for the abolishment of the 
internal frontiers, the Agreement introduced rigid entry measures transforming EU into a 
society, where only selected categories of third country nationals, such as skilled 
workers, were welcome. Thus, some Schengen candidate countries, which were 
historically friendly to immigration as they benefited from cheap labour, had to tighten 
the control on immigrants in order to be accepted as members to the borderless 
territory304. Furthermore, the Agreement pioneered measures, which although not 
directly challenging the states’ international protection obligations towards asylum 
seekers, severely hampered their access to the Union’s territory.  
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Besides the abolishment of the internal borders and other measures already discussed, 
the Convention pioneered the establishment of a joint information system, referred to as 
SIS. The system allows the personnel responsible for border control checks, police and 
other custom checks, as well as visa issuing authorities, to access information on persons 
wanted for arrest, missing persons, refused entry third country nationals, stolen vehicles 
and other objects305.  
 
The Schengen project was deemed successful306 as regulations governing the matters 
had been implemented in the Amsterdam Treaty, thus becoming part of EU law. Art. 
62(2) of title IV granted the Council with ability to adopt external border crossing 
measures307.  
 
Currently, the Schengen external border acquis is a complex “multi-layered compilation 
of provisions” to be found in the founding Treaties, Council Regulations and Decisions, 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with individual states, and with third countries308. 
Rijpma divides the acquis into five categories: 1) Measures governing the border 
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crossing regime at the external borders (most important legislative act being the 
Schengen Borders Code (SBC)); 2) Measures establishing the burden-sharing 
responsibilities between Member States in management of the common borders (most 
important instrument is the External Borders Fund (EBF)); 3) Measures establishing 
centralized databases for border management and migration: the Schengen Information 
System, the Visa Information System and Eurodac; 4)Measures penalising illegal entry, 
smuggling and trafficking; 5) Measures linked with the establishment of operational 
coordination necessary for managing the borders309.  
 
Notwithstanding the multitude of measures to facilitate the free movement of people, 
numerous difficulties continued to impede access to and the movement within the EU 
territory of third country nationals310. The difficulties were further exacerbated by the 
diverse implementation of border policies on a national level. Urged by the Council, the 
Commission came forward with a proposal for an integrated management of the external 
borders. Such integrated approach comprises “mechanisms for working and cooperation 
at European Union level which will permit practitioners of the checks at the external 
borders to come together around the same table to co-ordinate their operational actions 
in the framework of an integrated strategy which takes progressively into account the 
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multiplicity of aspects to the management of the external borders”311. Five areas are 
identified as essential elements of the new Integrated Border Management (IBM):  
• a common corpus of legislation; 
• a common coordination and operational cooperation mechanism; 
• common integrated risk analysis; 
• staff and inter-operational equipment; 
• burden-sharing between Member States.   
 
The integrated border management concept was furthered by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which called for introduction of an integrated management system for external borders, a 
common objective to be achieved within the framework of freedom security and 
justice312. 
 
With the sensitivity of border controls, which States claim as an inherent part of their 
sovereignty, such a communitarian approach towards the Schengen borders seems 
irrational but its development was determined by very pragmatic reasons. The awkward 
intergovernmental framework within which Schengen was conceived was based on 
cooperation among member states, and was simply not fit to meet the new security 
threats in the context of the fight against terrorism. Moreover, some member states 
voiced the concern that a non-functional external border would undermine the collective 
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trust, threatening the entire functioning of the single market313. However, the 
communitarization of the border control was not able to address adequately some of the 
critiques of the old policies: lack of transparency, of accountability, and of respect for 
human rights.  
 
SECTION 2: The Cyber-fortress Europe  
 
After 9/11, the governments of industrialized countries embarked on a race to develop 
complex systems for data processing, sophisticated biometric reading machines, and 
other state-of the-art security tools for the benefit of bona fade travellers and the security 
of their own populations. However, the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA only provided 
“an additional window of opportunity for supranational executives” 314 to push the 
technological development in the border security field. Controversial body scanners at 
the airports, biometric data collected at border checks and included in travel documents, 
invasive strip searches, for example, embittered the travel experiences of many 
passengers. The situation becomes even more perplexing in context of the mass personal 
data of the travellers being processed and stored in a multitude of databases, accessible 
to law enforcement and other government agencies315, and exchanged between agencies 
and countries. Many travellers are unaware of the manner in which their personal data is 
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used, accessed, stored, and protected, and the implications of such a data process. 
Moreover, many data subjects are not aware that personal data is held against them up 
until the point when a person’s name wrongly ends up in a database and this person 
“finds [him or herself] increasingly the object of state suspicion, with no concrete reason 
or grounds”316. 
 
The abolition of EU external borders has spurred the development of numerous highly 
technological tools to facilitate the cross-border movement while strengthening, so was 
stated, the cooperation to fight terrorism and organized crime. Retention of personal data 
and information exchange has become central elements of the EU border strategy. 
Numerous data systems have been conceived with different purposes and legal 
mechanisms regulating the access, process and data protection. Moreover, there are 
numerous initiatives in place enabling the free flow of information between EU 
agencies, EU governments and third countries. For example, the Swedish initiative, 
streamlining the process of exchange of information between member states for criminal 
investigations; the Prüm Decision enabling the exchange of DNA, fingerprints, and other 
biometric data among member states for combating terrorism; the Passenger Name 
Record Agreements with third countries allowing for passenger data to be sent in 
advance and screened by law enforcement for potential terrorist activities of the subject. 
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Those are only few of the activities deployed in cross-border information exchange for 
security purposes317. 
 
Additionally, in 2008 the Commission proposed a new border package that complicated 
the EU dependence on new technologies to secure its borders. The proposed legislative 
package sparked criticism318 because it suggested more IT data systems for border 
security without a proper impact assessment of already existing ones and of those under 
implementation. The strategic objective of the new proposal was to facilitate the entry of 
bona fide visitors into the EU while enhancing security319. In order to achieve the above 
objective, the Commission proposed the introduction of the following: 
• An entry/exit system to register the border crossing of TCN, which will be 
supported by a new EU wide database interoperable with the existing and 
planned databases, and biometric systems. In the Commission’s opinion, such a 
system will allow for the detection of individuals who have overstayed their 
visas and alter the responsible national authorities320.  
 
• An Automated Border Control system to allow EU citizens and “low risk” third 
country travellers for a quick border crossing through an automated border check 
without the intervention of border guards321. 
 
• Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA), which requires travellers to 
electronically submit their personal and travel information in advance. Once the 
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information is submitted it will be checked against the existing databases in order 
to prevent third country nationals deemed unwanted to “offloading national 
border guard resources” by arriving at the EU external borders322.  
 
The Stockholm Programme continued the e-border control tendency within the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice by remaining “overtly oriented towards the reinforcement 
of the reliance on technology within the context of EU security policies, particularly 
computerised systems of information exchange and data processing”323. The Programme 
was criticised for falling short of recognizing the fundamental data protection rights of 
third country nationals, including asylum seekers “despite the fact that they are chiefly 
concerned with EU-wide information exchange schemes (e.g. Eurodac, the Schengen 
Information System, and the future Visa Information System)”324. 
 
A. Network of Databases Controlling Migrants’ Movement  
 
 
As previously stated, in the context of EU border security, multiple extant operational 
information systems store a variety of data and accessible to a myriad of national and 
supranational authorities for different purposes. Of these, SIS, Eurodac, and VIS 
“constitute the backbone of the EU’s internal information exchange dimension”325. 
While the main purpose of the latter two databases is to control the movement of 
migrants at the EU external frontiers and within the territory, the SIS has many 
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functions. It contains information on a wide range of issues such as stolen vehicles, 
missing persons, and so on. However, the majority of data on individuals held in the 
database concerns third country nationals who have been refused entry to the EU326 
emphasising the role of the SIS as a tool for controlling immigration flows. Therefore, it 
will be true to state that the most ambitious of the EU data processing projects represents 
tools for supporting the EU policy of controlling migration movements to and within the 
Union.  
1) Schengen Information System 
 
The fight against terrorism and organized crime has significantly influenced the current 
trend of replacing the supporting purpose of the above mentioned information systems 
with functions that allow for criminal investigation of third country nationals327.  
 
 
Thus, the SIS was introduced with the Convention Implementing Schengen 
Agreement328 as part of the measures compensating for the abolishment of the internal 
borders. SIS is a joint information system, which enables the states party to the 
Convention “[...] by means of an automated search procedure, to have access to alerts on 
persons and property for the purposes of border checks and other police and customs 
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83 
 
checks”329. The objects entered into SIS can be stolen motor vehicles, boats, firearms, 
passports, identity cards, travel documents, etc.330 Categories of persons entered into SIS 
include: a) persons wanted for arrest or extradition331; b) third country nationals whose 
entry into Schengen area have been refused332; c) missing persons or persons placed 
under police protection333; d) witnesses in judicial trials and convicted persons334; e) 
persons or vehicles for the purpose of discreet surveillance or specific checks335.  
 
Each Schengen member enters the information in the database, which is only basic. Each 
member state disposes of a national SIRENE Bureau where more detailed information is 
entered and is provided upon request to member states. Since its introduction, SIS has 
been deemed one of the most important databases used for immigration and border 
controls in the EU. As mentioned, the majority of the data contained in SIS is on third-
country nationals to be refused entry based on Article 96 CISA336. 
 
Art.96 of the Convention is of particular importance for our argument as it concerns 
alerts on third country nationals refused entry to EU. Art.96 (1) reads as follows:  
“1. Data on aliens for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of 
refusing entry shall be entered on the basis of a national alert resulting from 
decisions taken by the competent administrative authorities or courts in 
accordance with the rules of procedure laid down by national law”.  
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Therefore, data is stored, among others, on asylum-seekers refused entry to the Union. 
Although the Convention lists the rules to be followed to issue an alert, state parties have 
found way to establish their own practices at variance with the Convention337. The 
decision to issue alerts is guided by national policies, giving a significant margin of 
discretion to each state in the refusal of entry of third country nationals338. Thus, some 
countries are routinely labelling asylum-seekers as “illegal aliens” and flagging them in 
the system339. Still other countries issue alerts based on minor offences or even on 
suspicion of a criminal act340. The problem is twofold. On the one hand, the refusal of 
entry is valid for the whole Schengen area. Thus, asylum-seekers who are refused entry 
in one country cannot look for protection in other Schengen member nations. On the 
other hand, even if a Schengen member wants to authorise entry of a person, it cannot do 
so if an alert has been issued for this person by another state341.  
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Recently, the SIS underwent major changes and was upgraded to the SIS II342 with new 
functionalities343 including new categories of data stored in the database344. Once 
operational the new SIS II will store a wide range of data including biometric data 
(fingerprints and photographs)345 possibly DNA and retina scans346. The new data will 
allow for two types of searches: a “one-to-one” search to confirm the identity of the 
concerned individual by comparing the biometric data only against other individuals 
carrying the same name347. The second and most problematic search, the “one-to-many” 
will allow the data stored in the system to be used to identify the person comparing 
his/her biometrics against all subjects in the system348. The latter search will allow for 
the “so-called ‘fishing expeditions’ in which people registered in the database will form 
a suspect population”349. 
 
                                                          
342 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 
on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II); 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II). 
343 The SIS II is currently under construction and according to the global schedule presented by the 
Commission it will become operational by the first quarter of 2013. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report 
on the global schedule and budget for the entry into operation of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II), SEC(2010) 1138 final; There are five critical new functions in the SIS II:1) 
new categories of alert; 2) new categories of data, including ‘biometric’ data; 3) the interlinking of alerts; 
4) widened access to the SIS; 5) a shared technical platform with the VIS. See generally STATEWATCH, 
Analysis, SIS II: fait accompli?, Construction of EU’s Big Brother Database Underway 
[Online]http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/sisII-analysis-may05.pdf [Accessed 4 December 
2011]. 
344 Two reasons were brought forward to justify the SIS upgrade: to accommodate the needs of the 
constantly enlarging members of the Schengen area and to respond more efficiently to the perceived new 
threats such as terrorism. 
345 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, Op. Cit., note 342, art.20. 
346 HOUSE OF LORDS, Schengen Information System II (SIS II), 9th Report of Session 2006-07; 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, Police Access to Eurodac and VIS, (Fortieth Report) 
London, para 57. 
347 Currently the SIS operates on hit/no hit principle. If the data subject information is already in the 
system, when a search is performed, the database will produce a “hit” and the person will be apprehended. 
Since the SIS does not store detailed information on the individual, in case of a “hit” the competent 
authorities request additional information from national SIRENE bureaus.  
348 HOUSE OF LORDS, Op. Cit., note 346, para 57. 
349 STATEWATCH, Op. Cit., note 343. 
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Along with the new categories of data, the Council has decided to widen the access 
authorities have to the SIS by including law enforcement agencies such as Europol and 
Eurojust350 in order to facilitate their tasks in fighting terrorism and organized crime. 
Due to opposition by the EU Parliament,351 the authorisation of law enforcement to 
access information stored in relation to immigration issues (art.96)352 was put on hold. 
Nevertheless, the legislation has given unrestricted access to such information to 
national judicial authorities353 allowing the data on third country nationals to be used in 
criminal proceedings. Thus, according to Hayes354 the relationship between judicial 
authorities on the EU level (e.g. European Judicial Network or joint investigation teams) 
will inevitably grant access to the data by EU agencies355.  
 
2) Visa Information System 
 
Similarly, to the SIS, VIS is designed to process and store biometric identifiers including 
photographs and fingerprints along with alphanumeric data. The VIS role is to support 
the common EU visa policy by improving communication exchange between visa 
issuing authorities. The purpose of the VIS is to facilitate the identification of visa holder 
by relevant authorities at border crossings; to contribute to the prevention of visa 
                                                          
350 COUNCIL DECISION 2005/211/JHA of 24 February 2005 concerning the introduction of some new 
functions for the Schengen Information System, in particular in the fight against terrorism; The Decision 
granted access to data information of Europol for the purposes of art. 95, 97, 99 and to Eurojust to art. 95 
and 98; See more T. BALZACQ, Op. Cit., note 325, p.84. 
351 S. PEERS, “Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union: SIS II”, (2008) 10  
European Journal of Migration and Law 77, 92. 
352 Currently, authorities who have access to the SIS for the purposes of art.96 include authorities 
performing  border control, police and custom checks, visa issuing authorities and those issuing residence 
permit and since 2005 to the national judicial authorities. Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, Op. Cit., note 
342, art.27. 
353 T. BALZACQ, Op. Cit., note 325, p.86. 
354 Ben HAYES, From the Schengen Information System to SIS II and the Visa Information (VIS): the 
Proposals Explained, Statewatch, 2004 [Online] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/analysis-
sisII.pdf [Accessed 25 July 2011] 
355 Id. 
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shopping, where one individual may lodge a visa application in numerous EU 
Consulates; to facilitate the application of the Dublin II Regulation; to assist with the 
identification of undocumented irregular migrants and facilitate a subsequent return; to 
contribute towards improving the administration of the common visa policy and towards 
internal security and to combat terrorism356. 
 
The system has wide capacities357 and will allow for processing and storing of 
information on all requested, issued, refused, annulled, revoked, or extended visas and 
the visa claimant358. A refusal of visa by one member state will possibly have therefore a 
visa ban for the same individual by other member states.  
 
Although the VIS was not developed as part of the EU counter terrorism strategy359, it 
was given enforcement functions to straighten the fight against terrorism and organized 
criminality. Border check authorities as well as other law enforcement, immigration, and 
internal security authorities may consult the system for performance of their tasks360.  
 
                                                          
356 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 
concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between member states on short-
stay visas (VIS Regulation). Since October 2011, the VIS operates in North African states of Algeria, 
Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The start dates for other parts of the world are yet to be 
announced. Carlos COELHO, MEP, Visa Information System up and Running Today, [press release] 
11October 2011 [Online] 
http://www.eppgroup.eu/press/showpr.asp?prcontroldoctypeid=1&prcontrolid=10671&prcontentid=17979
&prcontentlg=en [Accessed 4 December 2011]. 
357 The system is set to connect at least 12,000 users in 27 Member States and at 3,500 consular posts. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Development of the Schengen Information System II and possible synergies with a future Visa 
Information System (VIS), COM(2003) 771 final.p.26. 
358 Regulation (EC), 767/2008, Op. Cit., note 356. 
359 Maria TZANOU, “The EU as an Emerging Surveillance Society: the Function Creep Case Study and 
Challenges to Privacy and Data Protection”, (2010) Vienna Online Journal on International Constitutional 
Law, 416. 
360 Only visa issuing authorities are granted access for entering and updating information in the system. 
Regulation (EC), 767/2008, Op. Cit., note 356, art.6.  
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 In 2008, the Council has authorised Europol and national authorities responsible for 
investigating terrorist offences to access the database for investigation purposes361. 
Additionally, the future VIS was set to share a common technical platform with SIS II. 
Therefore, before issuing a visa the VIS users will be able to consult the SIS II in order 
to determine if the person is subject to an alert in the SIS II. In the same manner, the SIS 
users will be able to check for visa authenticity or identity of the visa holder by 
consulting the VIS database362. However, the Council maintains that the VIS and the SIS 
II will be “two different systems with strictly separated data and access”363. 
 
3) Eurodac 
 
Eurodac364 is the first EU fingerprint-collecting database and is set up as an asylum tool 
to facilitate the implementation of the Dublin II Regulation. Eurodac stores biometric 
data of three categories of aliens over 14 years of old apprehended while crossing EU 
border: 1) applicants for asylum; 2) aliens apprehended with connection of irregular 
border crossing and 3) aliens found illegally present in a member state. By comparing 
the fingerprints through Eurodac, the authorities can determine if an asylum-seeker or 
another foreign national has previously claimed asylum in another member state and if 
such claim was rejected in order to prevent multiple applications also known as “asylum 
shopping”. As already explained, asylum seekers are expected to apply for asylum in the 
                                                          
361Council Decision 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for consultation of the Visa 
Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of member states and by Europol for the purposes of 
the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences.  
362 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Op. Cit., note 357. 
363 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Council Conclusions on the development of the Visa Information System 
(VIS). Brussels. 20 February 2004, para 6. 
364 Council Reulation (EC) No. 407/2002 of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement 
Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention. 
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first safe country in which they arrive, and subsequently returned to the first safe country 
if it can be proven that the applicant has been in that country before arrival in the 
country in which the claim for asylum is made.  
 
Eurodac is the only database among the three discussed here in which law enforcement 
authorities were not granted access to investigate terrorism related crimes365. The lack of 
access by the law enforcement to Eurodac in cases where person in suspicion is 
registered in Eurodac but not in other database has been considered by the Commission 
as “a serious gap in the identification of suspected perpetrators of a serious crime”366. 
That is why the Commission has recently suggested a legislation to amend Eurodac in 
order to allow access of member states’ police and law enforcement authorities for 
detecting and investigating criminal and terrorist offences367. Followed by a criticism of 
EU Parliament and European Data Protection Supervisor368 the latter suggestion was 
withdrawn, at least for the moment. 
 
The law enforcement access to the Eurodac for investigative purposes will pose 
numerous dangers to the individuals whose information is stored in the system. 
Considering the vulnerability of asylum-seekers who are escaping persecution, it cannot 
                                                          
365 M. TZANOU, Op. Cit., note 359, 424. 
366 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and synergies among european 
databases in the area of justice and home affairs. COM(2005) 597 final, para 4.6, 5.2.3.  
367 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Council Decision on requesting comparisons with 
EURODAC data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement 
purposes was adopted at the same time COM(2009) 344 final. 
368 OCMC EUROPEAN CONSULTANCY, Access to Eurodac Database for Law Enforcement Purposes 
Not Allowed, 2011 [Online] http://www.ocmc.eu/news/access-to-eurodac-database-for-law-enforcement-
purposes-not-allowed-%E2%80%93-but-for-how-long/ [Accessed 3 December 2011]. 
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be assured369 that the information exchange between agencies like Europol and third 
countries will not reach the persecutors of the asylum-seeker. This therefore jeopardizes 
the applicant’s security370. Additionally, in the context of criminalization of migrants, 
the law enforcement access for investigation purposes will lead to further stigmatization 
of asylum-seekers. 
B. Interoperability by Design  
 
The increased access to law enforcement authorities and exchange of information 
between the existing and future planed EU databases is based on the principle of 
availability launched with the Hague Programme371, implying that data held in one 
                                                          
369 According to UNHCR “[c]onfidentiality of data is particularly important for refugees and other people 
in need of international protection, as there is a danger that agents of persecution or rights violations may 
ultimately gain access to such information, potentially exposing a refugee to danger even in her/his asylum 
country”. UNHCR, UNHCR comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a recast of the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person ("Dublin II") 
(COM(2008) 820, 3 December 2008) and the European Commission's Proposal for a recast of the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for 
the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [the Dublin II Regulation] (COM(2008) 
825,p 19 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49c0ca922.html [Accessed 3 December 2011]. 
370 For example, Europol has signed an agreement for exchange of private information with US in 2002. 
STATEWATCH,  Proposed Exchange of Personal Data between Europol and USA Evades EU Data 
Protection Rights and Protections, 2002 [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/nov/12eurousa.htm [Accessed 3 December 2011]; USA was 
recognized to have the weakest laws of data protection meaning that USA lacks adequate assurance that 
the obtained data will not be exchanged with the country persecuting the asylum-seeker. R. THOMAS, 
Op. Cit., note 315, 391; Farraj points out for example that the Department of Homeland Security which 
maintains IDENT ( the Automatic Biometric Identification System that is used for various DHS functions, 
including the enforcement of immigration laws) shares data with foreign government and agencies 
charged with law enforcement and immigration functions. Although it is established that the information 
sharing complies with the law, there are no real guarantees that such sensitive data will become available 
to persecutors. Achraf FARRAJ, “Refugees and the Biometric Future : The Impact of Biometrics on 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers”, (2011) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review  891, 931. 
371The Hague Programme, Op. Cit., note 286., rectal 2, p. 2.1. The principle of availability is defined by 
the EU Council as follows: "[w]ith effect from 1 January 2008 the exchange of ... information should be 
governed by conditions set out below with regard to the principle of availability, which means that, 
throughout the Union, a law enforcement officer in one Member State who needs information in order to 
perform his duties can obtain this from another Member State and that the law enforcement agency in the 
other Member State which holds this information will make it available for the stated purpose, taking into 
account the requirement of ongoing investigations in that State...The method of exchange of information 
should make full use of new technology and must be adapted to each type of information, where 
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member state should be shared between the law enforcement agencies on international 
and national level. One of the key safeguards for data subjects’ rights is that the 
available data can only be exchanged to permit “legal tasks” to be performed. However, 
the vagueness of the term “legal task” allows use of the information for a variety of 
purposes including surveillance and investigations372. Based on the principle of 
availability, “interoperability by design”373 between EU databases has been consistently 
pursued on an EU level. The last five-year program in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice carried even further the idea of information availability based on complete 
interoperability of the data systems, full access to the databases for the needs of law 
enforcement agencies and information exchange with third countries authorities374.  
 
C. Consequences to Access to Territory for Asylum seekers 
 
The gradual shift towards “cyber-fortress Europe”375, presumably advancing measures to 
fight terrorism and organized crime376, is affecting disproportionately asylum-seekers 
and refugees among other categories of third country nationals. Moreover, asylum- 
                                                                                                                                                                           
appropriate, through reciprocal access to or interoperability of national databases, or direct (on-line) 
access, including for Europol, to existing central EU databases such as the SIS.” 
372 STATEWATCH, The “Principle of Availability” Takes Over from the “Notion of Privacy”: What 
Price Data Protection? [Online] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/07eu-data-prot.htm [Accessed 
3 December 2011]. More on the complications of the principle of availability and the need of EU 
comprehensive framework for data protection in context of the principle see EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION AUTHORITIES, Common Position of the European Data Protection Authorities on the 
Use of the Concept of Availability in Law Enforcement, Spring Conference of the European Data 
Protection Authorities, Cyprus 10-11 May 2007. 
373D. BIGO and J. JEANDESBOZ, Op. Cit., note 323, p.2. The term “Interoperability” is defined by the 
Commission as the “ability of IT systems and of the business processes they support to exchange data and 
to enable the sharing of information and knowledge”. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Op. Cit., note 366, 
Para 2.2. 
374 The Stockholm Programme, Op. Cit., note 287, Para 4.3.1. 
375 F. GEYER, S. CARRERA & E. GUILD, Op. Cit., note 316. 
376 Most likely, such intense measures have double purpose: fighting terrorism and limiting access to the 
EU of less desirable third country nationals, including asylum seekers. 
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seekers are more susceptible to violations of their rights in the host country as they lack 
protection of their own country.  
 
 
 
1) Non-discrimination 
 
The current and planned information systems on border security are focused on 
gathering and processing information on non-EU nationals. The VIS goes even further 
by considering particular geographic regions as high risk377, thus subjecting their 
nationals to more intrusive measures for border control purposes378. Intensive screening 
of migrants only based on their status of non-EU nationals is at odds with the principle 
of non-discrimination. The principle is deeply rooted in the international human rights 
instruments as well as in regional ones such as the ECHR and in EU law. 
 
 Article 14 of the ECHR entails that Convention rights “be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.” Thus, being third country national, including asylum-seeker is not 
                                                          
377EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Draft Council Conclusions on the consular roll out for the Visa Information 
System (VIS). 24 November 2005. Although the document does not clarify what a high risk implies, given 
the context within which the document was drafted it can be concluded that high risk countries are those 
where there is a high possibility of irregular movement of migrants towards EU.  
378 The North Africa and Near East have been targeted as priority for piloting the VIS. The system is 
already operational in North African countries. The change in the political landscape in North Africa since 
the beginning of the so called “Arab spring” will increase significantly the role of the VIS in steaming the 
migrant flux towards EU. STATEWATCH, Small Steps to Big Brother: the Development of the Visa 
Information System and the Schengen Information System II is Back on Track, 2011 [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/aug/01eu-vis-sis.htm [Accessed 4 December 2011]. 
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a reason per se to be subjected to a differential treatment in respect to the rights 
accorded by the ECHR379.  
 
While non-discrimination is not absolute380 and “Contracting States enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise 
similar situations justify a different treatment in law”381, the Strasbourg Court has 
established a criteria to measure a discriminatory treatment. Accordingly, a treatment is 
deemed discriminatory “if it has no objective and reasonable justification", that is, if it 
does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if there is not a "reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised”382. 
 
Thus, when asylum- seekers are treated differently than country nationals such measures 
have to pursue a legitimate aim and to have balance between means and the aim sought. 
In the context of databases, the intensive screening of asylum-seekers and storage of 
their data for law enforcement purposes would inevitably lead to stigmatization of these 
persons as criminals383. Therefore, it will harm their social well-being and possibly 
increase their persecution “on the mere basis that its members have made use of their 
                                                          
379 Helene LAMBERT, The Position of Aliens in Relation to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Strasbourg, Council of Europe Pub., 2007, p.19 [Online] 
http://www.hurights.eu/docs/9789287162793/9789287162793_txt.pdf   [Accessed 23 October 2012] 
380 Id. Except in very limited cases based on explicit provision in the ECHR allowing such differential 
treatment (e.g. art.5, 6, 15).  
381 Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No 15/1983/71/107-109 
ECHR 24 April 1985, Para 72 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6fc18.html [Accessed 
15 October 2012] 
382 Id. 
383 MEIJERS COMMITTEE, Note Meijers Committee on the EURODAC proposal (COM(2012) 254), 
Letter communication to the European Parliament, 10 October 2012 [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/oct/eu-meijers-committee-eurodac-proposal.pdf [Accessed 1 
December 2012] 
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fundamental right to seek asylum”384. Such differential treatment based on nationality is 
not reasonably justified by claims based on national security, for example.        
 
 In the same manner, the EU principle of non-discrimination requires the equal treatment 
of any individual or group irrespective of their particular characteristics, including 
nationality385. In the case of Heinz Huber v. Germany, the Advocate General has pointed 
that the existence of a database for German citizens and another for foreign nationals, 
when the latter consists of more extensive in scope information and allows for stricter 
and systematic monitoring of foreign nationals, is a discriminatory treatment based on 
nationality. Such difference in treatment of citizens and non-German nationals cannot be 
justified by crime prevention or security threat reasons386.  
 
2) Purpose Limitation Principle 
 
The intelligence-led access to the stored data and increased interoperability between the 
systems provide the possibility of information to be used for purposes other than the 
ones originally anticipated and not consented to by the data subject at the time of 
enrolment387. Considering the fact that data protection legislation is advancing at a 
                                                          
384 Id.  
385 EU principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in particular is articulated in art. 21 of EU 
Charter and art. 18(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
386Poiares MADURO, Heinz Huber v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-524/06. Opinion of Mr 
Advocate General delivered on 3 April 2008, European Court reports 2008 Page I-09705 [Online] 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=467835:cs&lang=en&list=649103:cs,517112:cs,467835:cs,467617:cs,46459
5:cs,455301:cs,425652:cs,424637:cs,412373:cs,412755:cs,&pos=3&page=1&nbl=33&pgs=10&hwords=
&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte [Accessed 4 december 2011]. The ECJ has reached similar 
conclusion. See more on the subject González FUSTER Gloria DE HERT, Erika ELLYNE & Serge 
GUTWIRTH, Huber, Marper and others: Throwing New Light on the Shadows of Suspicion, CEPS INEX 
Policy Brief No. 8, 2010 [Online]  http://aei.pitt.edu/14985/ [Accessed 6 November 2010]. 
387 Also known as a “function creep”. R. THOMAS, Op. Cit., note 370, p.392. 
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slower pace than privacy invasive counter-terrorism and organized crime policies388, 
such a trend can be considered as a breach of the purpose limitation principle389. The 
principle of purpose limitation390 is considered a fundamental principle of EU data 
protection regime because the individual’s consent to the collection of personal data 
depends upon information on the purpose and use of the data collected391. Although the 
existing legislation states that use of information will be applied on case-by-case basis, 
no further guarantees exist in order to preclude permanent access to the data for 
investigation of criminal offences392, which threatens the privacy of individuals 
concerned393.  
 
According to the European Data Protection Supervisor, the ultimate goal of internal 
security cannot justify the consequences to the travellers, including those seeking 
asylum, in regards to their data privacy394. Moreover, 
                                                          
388 SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN UNION, Op. Cit., note 346. 
389 M. TZANOU, Op. Cit., note 359, p.421. 
390 According to art.6 (1) of the Data protection directive the purpose limitation principle establishes that 
the personal data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical 
or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that member states present 
appropriate safeguards”. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.  
391 M. TZANOU, Op. Cit., note 359, p.421. 
392 A. BALDACCINI, Op. Cit., note 298, p.41. 
393 In context of VIS, for example, the European Data Protection Supervisor stated that VIS is an 
information system that supports the common EU visa policy not an investigation tool and routine access 
“would entail a disproportionate intrusion in the privacy of travellers who agreed to their data being 
processed in order to obtain a visa, and expect their data to be collected, consulted and transmitted, only 
for that purpose”. EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a council decision concerning access for consultation of the 
Visa Information System (VIS) by the authorities of member states responsible for internal security and by 
Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and of other 
serious criminal offences. COM (2005) 600 final, point 1.2(b). 
394 The Commission holds the opposite opinion. According to the Commission the “[a]ccess to 'Eurodac' 
cannot be considered disproportionate to the aims to be achieved”. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Op. 
Cit., note 367, p.6.  
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 “[s]ince information systems are built for a specific purpose, with 
safeguards, security, conditions for access determined by this purpose, 
granting systematic access for a purpose different from the original one 
would not only infringe the principle of purpose limitation, but could also 
make the above mentioned elements inadequate or insufficient.”395  
 
The interoperability between the SIS, VIS and Eurodac will further contravene the 
purpose limitation principle396. It will allow for de facto exchanging of data between 
systems conceived for different purposes threatening the privacy of the data subjects. In 
summation, it can be concluded that the use and exchange of information is not justified 
for reasons other than originally stated and for the sake of convenience of state 
authorities.  
 
3) Implied Risk of Biometrics 
 
National security concerns and the fight against terrorism gave an impetus for the states 
to further increase the use of biometrics, which are perceived to determine  more 
accurately one’s identity. The use of biometrics in EU information systems is 
consistently growing but without proper risk consideration and safeguards against 
adverse effects of such technology on the individuals whose fingerprints or photographs 
are taken for processing397. The biometrics are highly criticised by experts due to their 
                                                          
395 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Op. Cit., note 393, point 1.2. 
396 The Commission has stated that the interoperability of the EU systems is more technical than a legal or 
political concept. In this regard, the EDPS has emphasised that the exchange of information between the 
systems is clearly a legal issue, as it has consequences towards the data protection of the subjects. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR,Opinion on the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on an area of freedom, security and justice 
serving the citizen. COM(2009)0262 final, Para 61. 
397 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor — on the roposal for a council decision on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (COM(2005)230 final);— the Proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (COM(2005)236 final), and — the Proposal for a 
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fallibility and vulnerability to fraud398. When biometrics are built in databases with huge 
storing capacity such as SIS, VIS and Eurodac even a small error rate will lead to 
disproportionate number of false rejections399.  Therefore, it will be “overstated to 
consider that these technologies will offer an ‘exact identification’ of the data 
subject”400.  
 
The error rate coupled with the use of the data for investigation purposes entails serious 
risk for all data subjects401. In the case of asylum-seekers and refugees, the 
misidentification can lead to a ban on the EU territory and refoulement to the place of 
persecution, where they risk possible torture and even death402. In view of the serious 
consequences in case of misidentification, there is a pressing need for a thorough 
assessment of the necessity and the impact of the biometrics on individuals.  Otherwise, 
the use of biometric identifiers is disproportionate, as the identity of the data subjects 
                                                                                                                                                                           
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding access to the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) by the services in the Member States responsible for issuing vehicle 
registration certificates. COM(2005)237 final, p.43. 
398 Joanna PARKIN, The Difficult Road to the Schengen Information System II, the Legacy of 
'Laboratories' and the Cost for Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, CEPS, 2011, p.28 [Online] 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/difficult-road-schengen-information-system-ii [Accessed 12 December 2011] 
399 European Data Protection Supervisor points that an error rate of 0, 5 to 1 % is normal which means that 
the check system at external borders will have a False Rejection Rate (FRR) between 0, 5 and 1 %. 
EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Opinion of the European Data Protection 
Supervisor on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between member states on short stay-visas 
COM(2004)835 final, p.19. In case of VIS which is expected to support up to 22 million entries a year 1% 
will result in 22000 false rejections.  
400 Id. 
401 In 2004, a lawyer from Portland (US) has been jailed for two weeks because his fingerprints matched 
with one found in Madrid bombings. The lawyer was released after proving that the biometric matching 
process was flawed and resulted in misinterpretation through such matching process. EUROPEAN DATA 
PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Op. Cit., note 397, p44. 
402 A. FARRAJ, Op. Cit., note 370, pp.936-939. 
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could be verified through less intrusive means such as the gathering of alphanumeric 
data403.    
 
The wide biometric data being collected, exchanged and stored for extended periods 
raises great concerns for the fundamental freedoms of individuals, including asylum-
seekers. Especially the processing and the storage of the data in a centralized database 
such as Eurodac may interfere with the private life of the individual404. Moreover, 
biometrics are susceptible to leaving traces in the virtual spaces, endangering the privacy 
of the data subjects by leading to possible collection of data without the owner’s 
knowledge405. Thus, information on asylum-seekers can become available to their 
persecutors, the people from whom they are trying to escape. 
 
 
Given the fact that the biometric technology has been in use not for a long time there are 
many concerns in regards to the observing the privacy of the data subjects. Having 
commented on the regulation establishing of biometrics in the passports of EU 
citizens406 the EU Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs 
has concluded that “the setting up of a centralised database [such as Eurodac or SIS] 
                                                          
403 European Data Protection Supervisor highlights the intrusiveness of the biometrics by stating that 
“[u]sing biometrics in information systems is never an insignificant choice, especially when the system in 
question concerns such a huge number of individuals. Biometrics are not just another information 
technology. They change irrevocably the relation between body and identity, in that they make the 
characteristics of the human body ‘machine-readable’ and subject to further use. Even if the biometric 
characteristics are not readable by the human eye, they can be read and used by appropriate tools, forever, 
wherever the person goes”. EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Op. Cit., note 399, p.19. 
404 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, The Need for a Global Consideration of the Human Rights Implications of 
Biometrics, Report, Doc. 12522, 16 February 2011, p.6 [Online] 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=13103&Language=EN  [Accessed 3 October 
2012] 
405 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Op. Cit., note 399, p.19. 
406 EU Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics 
in EU citizens' passports on 13 December 2004. 
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would violate the purpose and the principle of proportionality. It would also increase the 
risk of abuse and of function creep. Finally, it would increase the risk of using biometric 
identifiers as access keys to various databases, thereby interconnecting data sets”407.  
 
 
The right to privacy is one of the central rights articulated in the art.8 ECHR and is 
subject to extensive jurisprudence by the ECtHR. In terms of the scope of the right, the 
Court has stated that a right balance should be struck “between the competing interests 
of the individual and of the community as a whole”408.  Since by nature biometrics are 
intrusive toward the lives of individuals, states should minimise, as much as possible, 
interference with individuals’ rights 
 “by trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve 
their aims in the least onerous way as regards human rights. In order to do 
that, a proper and complete investigation and study with the aim of finding 
the best possible solution which will, in reality, strike the right balance 
should precede the relevant project.”409 
 
In a recent landmark decision in regards to the use of biometrics and the right to privacy 
the Strasbourg court has made some very important conclusions. In a first place, the 
Court highlighted that States should be aware that the retention and storing of personal 
data have a direct impact on the private life of the concerned individual “irrespective of 
                                                          
407 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Opinion on Implementing the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States,1710/05/EN, adopted on 30 September 2005, p.5 
[Online] http://www.biteproject.org/next_events/WORKING%20PARTY%2029%20wp112_en.pdf 
[Accessed 5 November 2012] 
408Case of Hatton et al. v. The United Kingdom, Appl. No. 36022/97 ECHR (Third Section) 2 October 
2001, Para 96[Online] http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/517   
[Accessed 3 November 2012] 
409Id., para 97. 
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whether subsequent use is made of the data”410. With respect to the collection and 
storage of data of persons who have been suspected but not convicted of offences, the 
Court concluded that “the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of 
[biometric data of such persons... in the present case] constitutes disproportionate 
interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded 
as necessary in a democratic society”411. Thus, databases where biometric data of 
asylum-seekers is retained, stored, and exchanged for use of law enforcement authorities 
will turn such population of suspect and may subject them to disproportionate criminal 
investigations.    
 
In respect to data protection, in 1995 EU passed a Directive 95/46/EC on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data. Art.6 of the Directive sets out fundamental principles of data protection 
such as data to be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not 
further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”; data to be “adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or 
further processed”; data to be kept for periods no longer than what is necessary for the 
purposes for which data is collected or further processed. EU Member States are obliged 
to set up their national legislation in compliance with those principles.  However, on a 
                                                          
410 Case of S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom, Appl.Nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04 ECHR (Grand 
Chamber) 4 December 2008, Para 121 [Online] http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581.html 
[Accessed 4 November 2012] 
411 Id., para125. 
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practical level, the privacy laws are differing from country to country, which will lead to 
implications with data sharing and the interrelation of databases412.  
 
 
In addition to the Directive, art.8 of the EU Charter holds that “everyone has the right to 
the protection of personal data concerning him or her. Such data must be processed 
fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law.” The use of Eurodac by law enforcement 
authorities, for example, is at odds with the right outlined in the Charter, since the 
collected and processed data on asylum-seekers will not only be used to determine the 
member state responsible for determination of the asylum claim, but also will be used 
for enforcement purposes. Moreover, not many asylum seekers would voluntarily agree 
for their information to be stored in a database, with the possibility that the data will fall 
in the hands of their persecutors413. 
 
4) Accountability 
 
In the context of the principle of availability upon which the data exchange between 
agencies is based, in case of misuse of information, accountability is rendered 
meaningless414. The flow of information between the systems that different authorities 
access for various purposes will inevitably lead to a ‘function creep’. This is especially 
true when data protection legislation is trying to catch up with high-tech IT innovations 
                                                          
412 ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Op. Cit., note 407, p.8.  
413J. P. AUS, Op. Cit., note 314, p.39.   
414 Bunyan rightly concludes that “the ‘principle of availability’ and data protection for the gathering, 
processing and passing on of personal data are absolutely irreconcilable”. T. BUNYAN, The “Principle of 
Availability” - the Free Market in Access to Data/Intelligence will Rely on “Self-regulation” by the Law 
Enforcement Agencies and Make Accountability Almost Meaningless, Statewatch,  2006 [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-59-p-of-a-art.pdf [Accessed 3 December 2011]. 
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in the border control field. Since data will pass through many channels where it will be 
edited, it will be virtually impossible for the data subject to track down unlawful 
exchange of data in order to claim protection of the subject’s fundamental rights415. 
Furthermore, access to a great amount of information by a great number of officials will 
likely make the tractability of consultation difficult and lead to security problems416. 
 
Accountability becomes even more complex with the multiplicity of measures 
characterising the use of databases by the EU member states and other European states. 
The UK and Ireland, for example, have complete access to Eurodac, but only partial 
access to SIS II and no access to VIS. Conversely, non-EU members of the Schengen 
area, such as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein, which have implemented 
or will implement the EU border acquis have been or will be given access to SIS II and 
                                                          
415Tony Bunyan gives the following example which leaves the data subject completely unprotected and 
without track of where their personal data is used and for what purposes. Example: “Information and 
intelligence on an individual can be gathered in state A for one purpose, passed to state B for another 
purpose and further processed (added to) and then passed to state C (e.g.: outside the EU) where the same 
thing happens again with data passed around the agencies. How the individual is meant to get access to 
this "information trail" is nowhere considered in the data protection proposal [referring to the Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in 
the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (30.12.2008)]. The accessing and 
processing of data/intelligence within the EU and outside – about which the individual will have no right 
to be informed – may well take on ominous implications with the growth of “watch-lists” (e.g.: to travel, 
financial transactions etc)” Id. 
416 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, Preliminary comments of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Preparing the next 
steps in border management in the European Union”, COM(2008)69 final; Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, “Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR)”, COM(2008) 68 final; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Report on 
the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency.” COM(2008) 67 final, p.7. 
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VIS417. However, the EU data protection legislation and the EU Charter are not binding 
to non-members in the use of databases, which will further impede the accountability.  
CHAPTER IV: BORDER CONTROL ACTIVITIES: AVOIDING 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLITICAL CONVENIENCE 
 
Since its inception, Frontex, the EU border control agency, has generated multiple 
critiques denouncing the lack of transparency in some aspects of its activities. In this 
context, the joint operations by sea, coordinated by the agency, raise many questions 
related with the fundamental rights of the people in need of protection. Furthermore, 
member states participating in such operations have the tendency to misinterpret legal 
obligations towards populations affected by the international and EU legislation, thus, 
barring access of asylum-seekers to their territory. Most of the controversial tactics 
deployed have resulted in turn backs and lost lives of asylum seekers among other 
migrants. The aim of the following chapter is to outline some questionable tactics 
deployed by Frontex and member states during sea operations and to highlight the 
obligations arising from the international and EU law towards the protection of asylum- 
seekers.   
 
SECTION 1: Frontex: Balancing Prevention of Irregular Migration with 
Protection of Human Rights of the Asylum seekers? 
 
                                                          
417 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Amended Proposal for a Regulation (EU) No../.. of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on establishing an Agency for the operational management of large-scale 
IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (presented by the Commission pursuant to Article 
293(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. COM(2010)93 final. 
 
104 
 
Strengthening the control over the EU common borders is a high priority of the member 
states and EU itself. Since Tampere, the border policies have been subject to a rapid 
development418. The integrated border management strategy, discussed earlier in the 
paper, was employed with the aim to coordinate the administration of the common EU 
frontiers and foster cooperation among member states when managing the EU external 
borders. To that end, in December 2001, the Laeken European Council gave the 
Commission the mandate “to work out arrangements for cooperation between services 
responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in which a 
mechanism or common services to control external borders could be created”419. 
Followed by lengthy political negotiations within the Council and the Commission420, 
Frontex (from frontières extérieures), the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union421, was established in 2004422 as a key player to facilitate the aforementioned 
aims.  
 
                                                          
418 Sergio CARRERA, Towards a Common European Border Service?, CEPS Working Document No. 
331, 2010, p.10 [Online] http://www.ceps.be/book/towards-common-european-border-service [Accessed: 
10 December 2011]. Among other actions, the Tampere summit called for “common policies on asylum 
and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop 
illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes” within 
the AFCJ. Tampere Programme, Op. Cit., note 225, Para 3. 
419 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Op. Cit., note 240, Para 42 
420 The main contingency issue in the process of creation of common mechanism for controlling the EU 
borders was the suggested by the Commission common European Corps of Border Guards: a centralized 
European structure for border control. However, many member states were in favour of more loose 
intergovernmental entities organised as operational centres in each member state. Sovereignty over the 
state borders was brought forward as a main issue related with the establishment of unified EU Border 
Guards. S. CARRERA, Op. Cit., note 418; Andrew NEAL, “Securitization and Risk at the EU Border : 
the Origins of FRONTEX”, (2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 333. 
421 The emphasis is added to stress that member states are still in control of their own borders. Thus, the 
external borders are not regarded as EU common frontiers but those of EU member states.  
422Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union.   
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Frontex is an intelligence-driven operational agency, whose objective is “to strike a 
balance between minimising the threat of illegality at the border while maximising the 
ease and convenience of bona fide travellers”423. However, the ‘threat of illegality’ 
referred to by the Agency, as pointed out by Carrera424, is simply persons trying to cross 
the EU border in a manner non-compliant with the established border framework. The 
asylum-seekers also constitute such ‘thread of illegality’, as they, in many cases, attempt 
to cross borders through irregular means and usually travel within the context of mixed 
flows. However, as it will be argued, the Agency’s main activities are far from balanced. 
Its efforts are mostly directed towards deterring or diverting migrants from reaching 
European shores without considering claims for asylum in conflict with core 
international human rights obligations such as non-refoulement.  
 
A. How Frontex Operates 
 
One of the main tasks accorded to the Agency is the coordination of operational 
cooperation between member states in the field of external border management425. The 
operational cooperation is facilitated through joint operations426. Those operations are 
organized at sea, air and land borders of the member states and Frontex coordinates the 
                                                          
423 FRONTEX, webpage [Online] http://www.frontex.europa.eu/  
424 S. CARRERA, The EU Border Management Strategy : FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular 
Immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working Papers No 261, 2007, p.14 [Online]  
http://www.ceps.be/book/eu-border-management-strategy-frontex-and-challenges-irregular-immigration-
canary-islands [Accessed 3 December 2011] 
425 Other responsibilities within the Agency’s mandate include: a) assist Member States on training of 
national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; b) carry out risk 
analyses; c) follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external 
borders; d) assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance 
at external borders; e) provide Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return 
operations. Council Regulation, Op. Cit., note 422. 
426 Frontex’s joint operations are among the most important in terms of expenses as they account for 76% 
of the Agency’s budgetary expenses (Frontex budget, 2011). Approximately the same percentage is 
observed in the earliest Frontex’s budgets.  
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planning and communication427. A joint operation can be initiated by Frontex based on 
its own risk analysis. Such an operation can be proposed by a member state, and can also 
be requested by a member state facing a particular situation on its borders that may 
require assistance. In the two latter cases, the need for conducting a joint operation is 
evaluated through risk analysis followed by a recommendation for joint operation or 
refusal428. The participation of the other member states is encouraged but not mandatory. 
Since Frontex does not carry its own equipment, member states, at their own will, supply 
surveillance and technical equipment such as vessels, helicopters, and so on for 
temporary disposal of the host Member State. The available equipment is listed in the 
“Central Record of Available Technical Equipment” (CRATE)429.  
 
Frontex regulation explicitly states that the responsibility for the control and surveillance 
of the external borders lies within each member state430. The Agency disposes of its own 
budget funded by the Community and the member states parties to the Schengen 
acquis431. Since 2005, the Frontex budget is constantly increasing, from approximately 
19 million in 2006 to 85 million in 2011432. The Agency’s staff also underwent a 
significant increase from 43 persons in 2005, to 219 in 2008433.  
 
                                                          
427 COWI, External Evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation 
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Denmark, 2009, p.34. 
428 Id. 
429Sarah LÉONARD, FRONTEX and the Securitization of Migrants through Practices, 9 February 2011, 
p.16 [Online] http://www.nuovicittadini.it/briguglio/immigrazione-e-asilo/2011/febbraio/art-leonard-
frontex.pdf [Accessed 2 January 2012] 
430 Council Regulation, Op. Cit., note 422, Para 4. 
431 Elisabeth SPIEGEL, FRONTEX – Legitimate Agent for Border Security or Ruthless Deportation 
Agency? : An Analysis of the Activities of the European Union’s Border Agency with a Special Focus on 
Legitimacy and Controllability of its Operations, BA Thesis, University of Twente, Netherlands, 2010, 
p.14. 
432 Frontex, budget 2005-2011. 
433 COWI, Op. Cit., note 427, p.24. 
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B. Joint Operations Conducted by Sea 
 
Frontex sea operations are by far the most expensive and controversial activities 
conducted by the Agency434. In recent years, pictures of overcrowded fishing boats 
caring migrants towards EU Southern borders have flooded the media giving an 
impression of migration crisis and foreign invasion of the EU. In the same time, 
hundreds of people have lost their lives during perilous sea journey in search for safe 
haven or better opportunities in foreign lands435. The image of migration crisis at the 
Mediterranean shores, significantly inflated by the media, urged the EU to focus efforts 
to reinforce the management of the Southern external maritime borders. The 
Commission suggested a twofold approach: 1) operational measures with reinforced 
control and surveillance; and 2) cooperation with third countries436. The focus was set 
on the first part of the above approach, as it can deliver immediate results, and Frontex 
was set to playing a crucial role in order to achieve the goal437.     
 
The maritime operational cooperation led by the Agency is taking place in the territorial 
waters of member states, at high sea or within the coastal waters of third countries. The 
HERA joint operation, for example, was two-dimensional: 1) to establish migration 
routes and improve future operations by interviewing migrants already on the shores; 2) 
                                                          
434 Sea operations account for the majority of the expenses- 59% of all funds allocated for joint operations. 
(Frontex, budget 2011) The pattern is observed in previous Frontex’s budgets with the exception of the 
2005 budget where no specification of how the budged for joint operations is spread is indicated. The sea 
operations have generated extensive critiques from civil society, including human rights and pro-migrant 
NGO’s., for example PRO ASYL in Germany, Noborder network and others. S. LÉONARD, Op. Cit., 
note 429, p.3; for civil society critique and media coverage see E. SPIEGEL, Op. Cit., note 431, p.16-20. 
435 According to UNHCR for year 2011 alone, more than 1500 people have lost their lives in attempt to 
cross Mediterranean Sea. UNHCR.. More than 1,500 Drown or Go Missing Trying to Cross the 
Mediterranean in 2011, [Online] 2012 http://www.unhcr.org/4f2803949.html [Accessed 3 May 2012]. 
436 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission Communication, Reinforcing the Management of the 
European Union’s Southern Maritime Borders. COM(2006) 733 final, para 8. 
437 Id., Para 11. 
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to patrol the zone between African coast and Canary Islands in order to deter boats 
transporting irregular migrants heading to the EU438. If the vessel is detected before 
leaving the shores of the third state, in this case Mauritania, Senegal, or Cape Verde, it is 
diverted back with the aim of “reducing the danger of losses of human lives [at sea]”439. 
Then the control and responsibility over the migrants is taken by the respective third 
country measures440. The approach of diverting boats with migrants before they set off 
for their journey involves “a process of externalization of EU border control”441 and will 
be discussed in the next chapter. Below we will analyze the intercepting joint operations 
in high sea and the compliance of the involved stakeholders, member states and Frontex, 
with the international and Community law regarding access to protection of asylum 
seekers.   
 
Since 2006, Frontex has coordinated multiple joint sea operations the majority 
conducted in the Mediterranean region442. The first sea operation, HERA, was requested 
by Spain and continued from 2006 to 2008 in different sequences. The aim of the 
operation was to tackle the irregular migration coming from Africa and disembarking on 
the Canary Islands443. During the HERA I operation 6,076 out of a total of 18,987 illegal 
                                                          
438 For information about different modules of the HERA joint operation see: FRONTEX, Longest 
FRONTEX Coordinated Operation – HERA, the Canary Islands, 19 December 2006 [Online] 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-
ZubSEM [Accessed 24 January 2011]; FRONTEX, HERA III Operation, 13 April 2007, [Online] 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/news/hera-iii-operation-DLbJwE [Accessed 4 March 2011]. 
439 Id., FRONTEX, HERA III Operation. 
440 S. CARRERA, Op. Cit., note 424, p.21. 
441 Id., p.21. 
442 FRONTEX, Frontex Press Pack, 2011, p.13[Online] 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Media_centre/Frontex_Press_Pack.pdf [Accessed September 2011]. 
443 FRONTEX 19 December 2006, Op. Cit., note 438 
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immigrants who landed in the Canary Islands were returned444. HERA II prevented more 
than 3,500 migrants from disembarking the African coast445. HERA III diverted back to 
their points of departure in ports of West Africa 1,167 migrants446. In the last HERA 
operation, run in 2008, along with NAUTILIUS447, the total migrants who were diverted 
back, intercepted at sea, convinced to turn back, or escorted back to the closest shore 
(Senegal or Mauritania), were 5,969448. 
 
Joint operations, including those carried out at sea, have been deemed ‘impressive’ by 
the Commission449. However, it is difficult to assess such statements, given the complete 
lack of transparency in the manner in which such operations are carried out. Frontex 
does not keep a publicly available record on the country of origin, sex, protection 
needs450, or the fate of those intercepted and diverted in high sea451. In regards to the 
migrants diverted back, Frontex only states that “[p]ersons that were intercepted during 
Joint Operations (…) at sea ... have either been convinced to turn back to safety, or have 
                                                          
444 FRONTEX, HERA 2008 and NAUTILIUS 2008 statistics, 17 February 2009 [Online] 
http://www.frontex.eu.int/newsroom/news_releases/art40.html [Accessed 3 March 2011]  
445 FRONTEX 13 April 2007, Op. Cit., note 438. 
446 Id. 
447 FRONTEX, GO ahead for Nautilius, 7 May 2008, [Online] 
http://www.frontex.eu.int/newsroom/news_releases/art36.html [Accessed 7 May 2011]. 
448 FRONTEX, Op. Cit., note 444. 
449 Anneliese BALDACCINI, “Extraterritorial Border Controls in the EU: the Role of Frontex in 
Operations at Sea”, in Bernard RAYAN. & Valsamis MITSILEGAS (ed.) Extraterritorial Immigration 
Control Legal Challenges, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p.242. 
450 Id. 
451 Violeta MORENO-LAX, “Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean : against a Fragmentary Reading of 
EU Member States' Obligations Accruing at Sea”, (2011) 23 International Journal of Refugees 174, 185. 
The existing official reports also does not avail how the situation of people seeking protection during such 
operations is dealt with; According to ECRE, some existing reports avail very serious violations of the 
human rights of people seeking international protection. ECRE, Defending Refugees' Access to Protection 
in Europe, 2007, p.12 [Online]  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c22514,46545e4c2,4766464e2,0,,,.html [Accessed 3 November 
2011] 
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been escorted back to the closest shore”452. The statement does not indicate if the 
fundamental rights of asylum-seekers are being respected453. On the contrary, this is an 
indication that asylum seekers are diverted back without consideration of their need for 
protection454, which is in conflict with the international and European law.   
 
C. Responsibilities during Sea Operations: a Shaky Legal Ground? 
 
 
Member states responsibilities towards asylum-seekers intercepted and rescued in high 
sea are not so clearly articulated within the framework of the international maritime 
law455. The question of which member state should hold responsibility for the 
disembarkation and subsequent review of the application for asylum intensifies within 
the context of the Frontex joint operations, where many states are taking part. The 
existing ambiguities stimulate different interpretations of the law and allow for 
application of erroneous practices, including push backs and refusal of entry to the EU 
territory, without granting access to refugee determination procedures and appeals 
against refusal of entry456. States “aware of the shaky legal ground ... that no 
international convention would cover interception operations of unarmed migrants in the 
                                                          
452 Seline TREVISANUT, “Maritime Border Control and the Protection of Asylum Seekers in the 
European Union”, (2009) 12 Touro International Law Review 5, 159. 
453 Id. 
454 V. MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 451, 185. 
455 Once asylum seekers are rescued at high sea it is not exactly clear which state should assume 
responsibility for the rescued. There is also no provision within the international maritime law stating if 
the asylum-seekers can disembark the ship after rescue therefore, it is not clear which state has to assume 
responsibility to review the lodged application for asylum. Vladislava STOYANOVA, “The Principle of 
Non-Refoulement and the Right of Asylum seekers to Enter State Territory”, (2008) 3 Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Human Rights Law 1, p.8; Silja KLEPP, “A Contested Asylum System the European Union 
between Refugee Protection and Border Control in The Mediterranean Sea”, (2010) 12 European Journal 
of Migration and Law 1, 14. 
456 STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL IMMIGRATION, REFUGEE 
AND CRIMINAL LAW,. Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a Mechanism for the Creation of Rapid 
Border Intervention Teams and Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as Regards that 
Mechanism (COM (2006) 401 final),UK Parliament. 
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high sea”457 are taking advantage of this situation by evading their responsibilities. In 
the same vein, Frontex is avoiding accountability by shifting the protection 
responsibilities to member states that maintain control over the joint operations and are 
responsible for the control over their borders. 
 
Schengen border legislation is also not precise on the matter. Ambiguities within the 
Schengen Border Code458 allow member states to defer their responsibilities with regard 
to the Code’s implementation at sea. Moreover, as pointed out by Hobbing and 
Koslowski “Europe still presents a scattered image of individual state and administrative 
traditions”459 which is especially relevant within the context of the EU border policy, in 
which the handling of border matters is a responsibility of each of the member states. 
Therefore, different national law traditions instigate divergent practices in handling 
similar border matters. One example is the identification of a situation requiring 
assistance at sea: some member states take the position that the vessel must be sinking in 
order to be assisted; others will render help to any unseaworthy vessel460. The European 
Council itself acknowledged that there is an express need for “clear rules of engagement 
                                                          
457 S. KLEPP, Op. Cit., note 455, 16. 
458 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Council decision supplementing the Schengen Borders 
Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of the operational cooperation 
coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders. COM(2009)658 final, point 2. 
459 Peter HOBBING & Rey KOSLOWSKI, The Tools Called to Support the 'Delivery' of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: A Comparison of Border Security Systems in the EU and in the US, European 
Parliament Ad hoc Briefing Paper, 2009, p.3 [Online] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/mar/eu-usa-
borders.pdf [Accessed 4 November 2011]. 
460 Most of the joint maritime operations turn into search and rescue operations which are guided by the 
international Search and Rescue system (SAR) which rules are not applied uniformly by each state. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Op. Cit., note 458, point 2.  
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for joint operations at sea, with due regard to ensuring protection for those in need who 
travel in mixed flows, in accordance with international law”461. 
 
One of the most problematic aspects of the joint sea operations is the respect of the 
principle of non-refoulement462. Klepp’s research demonstrates that non-refoulement is 
not part of the legal basis of Frontex sea operations. Thus, decisions on how to proceed 
with the intercepted migrants are taken unaccountably by security and military officials 
on ad hoc basis during the operation463. Even more, some member states are contesting 
the application of the non-refoulement with regard to protection seekers, since “the high 
seas are extraterritorial”464, and others are officially acknowledging that they “do not 
proceed with the formal identification of migrants who are intercepted at sea”465.  
 
The responsibilities of Frontex towards respecting the rights of asylum seekers in high 
sea during joint operations are also blurred because of the lack of definition of the 
Agency’s role when coordinating such operations. As mentioned, member states carry 
the responsibilities of the control and surveillance over their borders. Accordingly, the 
Agency claims responsibility only for the coordination of the joint operations between 
                                                          
461 Id., point 9. 
462 Efthymios PAPASTAVRIDIS, “'Fortress Europe' and FRONTEX : Within or Without International 
Law?”, (2010) 79 Nordic Journal of International Law 75. 
463 S. KLEPP, Op. Cit., note 455, 17. 
464 Andreas FISCHER-LESCANO, Tillmann LÖHR & Timo TOHIDIPUR, “Border Controls at Sea : 
Requirements Under International Human Rights and Refugee Law”, (2009) 21 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 256, 265. 
465 V. MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 451, 185. 
113 
 
member states without carrying further responsibilities for actions occurred during those 
operations, which are to be fully assumed by member states466.  
 
D. Responsibilities to be Carried out by All Parties in Sea Operations 
 
1) Framing International Responsibility within the context of EU complexities 
 
 
Before embarking on analysis of the responsibilities to be assumed by member states 
and Frontex as EU agency during joint operations conducted by sea, it will be useful to 
shed more light on the importance of responsibility under the international law and 
subsequently how such responsibility can be attributed to member states and EU for 
wrongfully committed acts. Most specifically, attention will be paid to the attribution of 
responsibility to EU in the context of its complex relations with member states in terms 
of legislative competences. 
 
 
Generally, within the AFSJ, member states and the EU enjoy shared legislative 
responsibilities467, which mean that both players can legislate and adopt legally binding 
acts468. However, many exceptions apply to this rule, since AFSJ is a complex area 
                                                          
466 The Executive Director of the Agency, IIkka Latinen has commented that “as regards fundamental 
rights Frontex is not responsible for decisions in that area. They are the responsibility of the Member 
States”. Barbara LOCHBIHLER, Ska KELLER, Ulrike LUNACEK & Helene FLAUTRE, MEPs, Frontex 
Agency: which Guarantees for Human Rights ? A Study by Migreurop into the European External Borders 
Agency in View of the Revision of its Mandate, 2011, p.22 [Online] http://barbara-
lochbihler.de/cms/upload/PDF_2011/GL_Frontex_E_1.pdf  [Accessed 21 December 2011]. 
467 TFEU, Op. Cit., note174, art.4(2)(j).  
468 Id., art.2(2). The competences within the EU are divided in exclusive and shared. In case of exclusive 
competence it is the EU which can adopt legally binding acts. In case of shared competences, the EU and 
member states are competent to legislate. However, once the EU has legislated in an area of shared 
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encompassing diverse fields such as border, asylum, visa, immigration, judicial 
cooperation on civil matters and criminal matters, and police cooperation where member 
states and EU have either exclusive jurisdiction and/or share competences. In the field of 
borders and asylum, with some exceptions, the EU enjoys exclusive competence to 
suggest and to adopt legislative measures; member states exercise their legislative 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its own.     
 
In addition to according more competences to the EU in the field of borders and asylum, 
art.78 (1) TFEU offers clear and broad protection framework in terms of asylum, 
specifying that the asylum policy should offer: 1) appropriate status of any third-country 
national in need of protection and 2) ensure compliance with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and Protocol and other relevant treaties, including human rights treaties and 
the principle of non-refoulement. Therefore, all EU secondary legislation must be in 
conformity with all of the above international treaties and norms. Thus, EU and member 
states’ obligations to provide protection to asylum-seekers have more legal force 
because those obligations are deriving from the founding Treaty itself and will apply to 
all aspects of the EU’s protection-related policies, not only to those related to the 1951 
Refugee Convention469.   
 
3) EU: Organization with International Legal Responsibilities 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
competence, it is the Union which posses the competence to enter in international agreements if the 
internal legal act implies the conclusion of such agreement. Esa PAASIVIRTA and Pieter KUIJPER JAN, 
“Does one size fit all? The European Community and the responsibility of international organizations”,  
(2005), 36, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 176. 
469S. PEERS, “Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and Decision-Making in the 
Treaty of Lisbon”, (2008) 10 European Journal of Migration and Law 219, 233. 
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According to art.3 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organization 
(DARIO) drafted by the International Law Commission (ILC) “[e]very internationally 
wrongful act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of 
that organization”470 However, attributing responsibility to EU for committing an 
internationally wrongful act is in many instances a complicating task given the EU legal 
structure and the complexity of the division of legislative competences between the 
Union and its member states. As argued by the Commission, in submission for the ILC, 
the EU is not a “classical” type of international organization471. The EU is an 
autonomous legal order, which has primacy over the national legal systems of its 
member states472. Member states have given part of their sovereignty to the Union to act 
in certain aspects in order to achieve goals common to its members. Thus, the Union can 
enter international agreements on its own right separate from its member states. 
Moreover, under the Lisbon treaty, the EU acquired legal personality473. Therefore, in 
                                                          
470 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, ILC, 63d sess., 
2011, Suppl. No. 10 (A/66/10). 
471 Auriel SARI & Ramses WESSEL, “International Responsibility for EU Military Operations: Finding 
the EU’s Place in the Global Accountability Regime” in B. VAN VOOREN, S. BLOCKMANS & J. 
WOUTERS (eds.), The Legal Dimension of Global Governance: What Role for the EU?, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press (forthcoming), 2012, p.5 [Online] 
http://www.utwente.nl/mb/pa/research/wessel/wessel88.pdf [Accessed 12 June 2012] 
472 Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L, Case 6-64, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, 593 the Court held that 
“[b]y contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, 
on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States 
and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own 
institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of 
powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves.” See also NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v 
Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26-62, Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963 
[Online] http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61962J0026:EN:NOT 
[Accessed 12 October 2012]. 
473 TEU, Op. Cit., note 156, art. 47. 
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context of international responsibility, EU can be held accountable for committing an 
internationally wrongful act474.  
 
Another particularity of the EU legal order is that once the EU concludes an 
international agreement, the assumed international obligations are directly applicable in 
the national legal system of member states without formal transposition. Furthermore, 
there is a lack of EU institutions/administration on local level475. Thus, even in cases 
when EU and member state/s are individual parties to international legal act, virtually 
the same institutions of member states carry the implementation of the agreement. In 
such complex situation, for third parties to an international agreement the question of 
responsibility for internationally wrongful act is of paramount importance.  
 
According to art.4 DARIO an internationally wrongful act (conduct, action and 
omission) consists of two elements: a) to be attributable to that organization under 
international law; and b) to constitute a breach of international obligation of that 
organization. On the attribution of conduct, given the fact that organizations, like states, 
cannot act for themselves but through their organs and agents476, art.6 (1) DARIO reads 
that the conduct of the latter in performance of their functions within the organization 
should be attributed to the organization477.  The rules of the organization will determine 
in which cases the organs and the agents have acted in performance of their functions 
                                                          
474 A. SARI & R. WESSEL, Op. Cit., note 471, p.3. 
475 E.g. the custom authorities of ms are entrusted with implementation of EU common custom tariffs, etc. 
476 Stefan TALMON, “Responsibility of International Organizations: Does the European Community 
Require Special Treatment?” in Maurizio RAGAZZI (ed.) International Responsibility Today, 
Netherlands, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005, p.410. 
477 Frank HOFFMEISTER, “Litigating against the European Union and Its Member States – Who 
Responds under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International Organizations?”, 
(2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 723, 726. 
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given to them by the organization478. How does such a conclusion resonate with the 
complex relationship between EU and its member states?  
 
It must be clarified beforehand that within the context of international agreements the 
attribution of conduct is not an issue in the so called mixed agreements of bilateral 
nature where EU and member states enter the agreement with third parties as “one legal 
person [...] [and] [t]heir conduct need not be attributed to each other but is attributed 
instead to the legal person consisting of the EC and its member States”479. The mixed 
agreements where EU and member states are contracting parties on their own right are 
found to be more challenging in this context. Frequent practice in such cases is for 
parties to attach a declaration of competence to the agreement clarifying each party’s 
responsibility. The declaration of competence demonstrates the separate responsibilities, 
which reflect different competences of the EU and member states, and makes it clear for 
third parties480 which party is responsible and to what extent. Where no declaration is 
present, it is assumed that both actors (EU and member states) are jointly responsible481 
(addressed in further details below).  
 
In general, in the areas of exclusive competence (e.g. asylum), the EU is the entity 
attributed with legislative powers and member states are the ones implementing the 
EU’s legislative decisions. When implementing EU directives, for example, member 
states are afforded with certain degree of discretion. Thus, the member state decides on 
                                                          
478 DARIO, Op. Cit., note 470, art.6(2). 
479 S. TALMON, Op. Cit., note 476, 408. 
480 E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note468, 185. 
481 Id., p.187. This view is supported by the ECJ. However, the joint responsibility in such cases is not 
articulated in straightforward manner within the doctrine. 
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how to transpose the act in accordance with the national legal system. Such margin of 
discretion limits the control that the EU can exercise on member states actions in a 
national context482. Consequently, it can be argued that in case of a wrongfully 
committed act deriving from incorrectly implemented EU secondary legislation, 
imputability for such conduct to the EU would not be justified.  
 
However, our analysis points to the opposite conclusion. As mentioned above, when EU 
concludes an international agreement on its own right, the agreement becomes part of 
the member states’ national legislation and they are the one to carry the implementation 
of the obligations resulting from the agreement483.  The Union should be attributed with 
the wrongful conduct and should assume responsibility for the internationally wrongful 
acts in situation when incorrect implementation by member states lead to a breach of 
international obligation484.  The European Commission, at least in the context of WTO 
litigations, has adopted similar position stating that measures adopted by the member 
states in the areas of exclusive EU competence should be attribute to the EU and engage 
its international responsibility485. The above conclusion follows the understanding that 
when implementing Union legislation the member states act as its agents according to art 
6(1) DARIO486.  
 
                                                          
482 A. SARI & R. WESSEL, Op. Cit., note 471, p. 5. 
483 Such problems may arise within the framework of the so called mixed agreements when they cover 
matters of exclusive EU competence. E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note 468, 189.  
484 Eva STEINBERGER, “The WTO Treaty as a Mixed Agreement: Problems with the EC’s and the EC 
Member States’ Membership of the WTO”, (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 873, 849-
850. 
485 A. SARI & R. WESSEL, Op. Cit., note 471, p. 5-6.  
486 E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note468, 190. 
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In an advisory opinion on Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United 
Nations, the International Court of Justice noted that the word ‘agent’ needs to be 
understand in the most liberal sense: “... that is to say, any person who, whether a paid 
official or not, and whether permanently employed or not, has been charged by an organ 
of the organization with carrying out, or helping to carry out, one of its functions – in 
short, any person through whom it acts”487. As pointed by Talmon the provision of art.6 
(1) is wide to cover the relationship between the Union and the authorities of its member 
states488. Therefore, when it can be firmly concluded that a member state’s organ or 
agent when performing Union’s functions perpetrated the wrongdoing, the wrongful 
conduct must be attributed to EU, which should assume the responsibility for it. 
 
Some scholars have argued that EU exercise weak control over its member states489. 
However, the Union disposes of panoply of tools to enforce correct application of EU 
law. The EU can initiate a procedure for non-compliance of a member state with the 
EU’s primary law, for example. This process can consist of political negotiations as well 
as ECJ’s involvement. Furthermore, member states’ courts may refer questions to ECJ 
for interpretation of EU law. Such process is initiated through a preliminary rulings 
procedure and the ECJ is the final court to decide on the compatibility of the 
implemented act with EU law. Therefore, the control exercised by the EU is sufficient so 
that the organization can be held responsible for wrongful conduct of a member state. 
Thus, “the internal regulatory competence of the Union for matters falling within the 
                                                          
487 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, Op. Cit., note 
470, p.17. 
488 S. TALMON, Op. Cit., note 476, 412. 
489 E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note468, 192. 
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scope of the Treaty is translated into the EU's international responsibility for measures 
taken under its normative authority”490. 
 
Further to the above, even more challenging is the question whether member states can 
bear international responsibility for EU’s acts contrary to international agreement, e.g. 
when EU institutions have adopted legal act which provisions contravene obligations 
undertaken by member state/s in the context of international agreement. In the area of 
human rights, where is our particular interest, it seems that the ECtHR has taken the 
position to hold member states individually or collectively accountable for legislative 
acts of EU suspected to be contrary to the ECHR491. Let us take for example art.3 ECHR 
that prohibits return of individuals to places of torture and ill-treatment. If EU adopts a 
legal instrument where possibility for such return may occur, can responsibility be 
attributed to member states transposing the legislation in the national law? In the context 
of Dublin Convention492 which allows member states to return persons to safe third 
countries, the ECtHR in case T.I.v.UK has ruled that member states cannot automatically 
return asylum-seekers under the Dublin Convention relying on the assumption that the 
member state to where the individual is returned will comply with its obligations under 
the ECHR493.  
 
                                                          
490 Andre NOLLKAEMPER, Joint Responsibility between the EU and Member States for Non-
Performance of Obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Amsterdam Law School 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2011-47, 28 [Online] 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966933 [Accessed 5 June 2012] 
491 E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note468, p.193-195. 
492 UNHCR, among others, has expressed opinion that the application of safe third concept which is 
central peace of the Convention, may result in chain deportations which will lead to violation of non-
refoulement principle. UNHCR, Implementaton of the Dublin Convention: Some UNHCR Observations, 
May 1998 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/43662e1b2.pdf [Accessed 12 October 2012] 
493 T.I.v.UK, Op. Cit., note 135. 
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Moreover, in Mathews v.UK the ECtHR observed that even, if a member state has 
transferred some competences to an international organization, the member states’ 
responsibility would continue even after such transfer494. Thus, the Court has 
emphasised that in situation where possible breach of human rights obligations may 
occur, member states have alternatives at their disposal so to avoid such situation. 
However, it should be pointed out that the position of ECtHR on these and similar cases 
is informed by the fact that the EU is not a party to the ECHR. As observed by Paasivirta 
and Kuijper in such cases probably the EU could possibly have claimed responsibility, if 
it was party to the Convention. Therefore, such cases should be regarded with 
reservations495.  
 
In the context of border control, more specifically the joint operations conducted by 
Frontex, the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts remain blurred. It is not 
clear whether Frontex or member states should be hold accountable for conduct resulted 
in a wrongdoing. According to Frontex’s Regulation, the responsibility for control and 
surveillance of the external borders lies with the member states and Frontex’s role is 
limited to “facilitat[ing] the application of existing and future Community measures 
relating to the management of external borders by ensuring the coordination of Member 
States’ actions in the implementation of those measures”496. Moreover, significant part 
of Frontex’s staff consists of seconded national experts (SNEs) borrowed to the agency 
by the member states. Even as Frontex’s personnel, those experts are paid by their 
                                                          
494 Case of Matthews v. the United Kingdom, App. No(s). 24833/94, ECHR (Grand Chamber) 18 February 
1999, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) para 32 [Online] Available: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58910  [Accessed 20 November 2011] 
495 E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note 468, 196. 
496COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004, Op. Cit., note 422, rectal 4. 
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respective home countries and remain employed by them. Thus, in situations where 
conduct has led to internationally wrongful act in breach of international obligation, the 
responsibility shall remain with the respective member state/s.      
 
 
 
In terms of SNEs, art.7 DARIO deals with attribution of conduct of state organ when it 
is placed at the disposal of international organization. The article states that “[t]he 
conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organization that 
is placed at the disposal of another international organization shall be considered under 
international law an act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective 
control over that conduct”. According to the commentary, the article applies in situation 
where state organ is not fully seconded to the organization but still acts to a certain 
degree as organ497 of the seconding state. The wording implies that the decisive factor 
for attribution is who has the effective control over the conduct.  
 
The personnel seconded by member states to Frontex during joint operations is still 
under the command, thus under the effective control of the former. During joint 
operations, every participating nation keeps command control over their own 
ships/vehicles. The joint missions are carried out following national law. Finally, 
according to Klepp’s research “all decisions concerning the operation at sea are reached 
at a round table with security officials of the member states who are joining the 
                                                          
497 The term organ in reference to a state needs to be understood in a broader sense as “comprising those 
entities and persons whose conduct is attributable to a State according to articles 5 and 8 on the 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts.” Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations, with commentaries, Op. Cit., note 470, p.20. 
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operation”498. Therefore, it can be concluded that wrongful conduct of Frontex’s 
seconded personnel should be attributed to the member states that have the effective 
control over their staff during joint operations.  
 
However, such a conclusion does not mean that Frontex is absent of any responsibility 
for wrongful conduct during joint operations. In practical terms, the Agency’s role is 
more than mere coordination and facilitation, especially during joint operations. Frontex 
can initiate joint operation by itself in agreement with member states. Moreover, request 
to be placed by member state for joint operation is subject to approval by Frontex. The 
agency co-finances the joint operations and takes active part in drafting and 
implementing the operational plans for the particular operation. Then the operation is led 
by the member state hosting the operation and coordinated by Frontex. Thus, Frontex 
activities are more operationally oriented and beyond mere facilitation.  
 
In addition to the above, in the context of recently amended Regulation499, the Agency 
has been awarded with even more pro-active functions. Among other activities, Frontex 
can now purchase/lease its own equipment; its executive Director can decide to 
discontinue joint operation, if there is a breach of human rights. Therefore, the Agency 
should be jointly responsible for actions of the personnel seconded to it during joint 
operations.  
 
                                                          
498 S. KLEPP, Op. Cit., note 455, 16. 
499 Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 25 October 2011 
Amending Council Regulation (Ec) No 2007/2004 Establishing A European Agency For The Management 
Of Operational Cooperation At The External Borders Of The Member States Of The European Union. 
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4) Joint Responsibility between Member States and EU  
 
 
Before backing up the argument that member states and EU can be held jointly 
responsible for internationally wrongful acts, we shall clarify that where the principle of 
“jointness” is not applicable, e.g. where there is clear division of obligations, the EU and 
member states are responsible for the wrongdoing caused by their own, separate act500. 
The conduct will be attributed to each one to the extent of its own international 
obligations. The principle pacta sunt servanda implying that every treaty is binding 
upon the parties to it501 is fully applicable.  Thus, the international obligations are 
binding only to the parties and to the extent of the individual commitments taken.  
 
Given the complex division of competence between EU and its member states, it is 
somehow tempting to apply the concept of joint responsibility in order to assure that 
international obligations steaming from given Treaty are met. Moreover, the division of 
competences internally can be confusing for third parties502. Thus, clarification who 
should be held responsible in case of internationally wrongful act has important practical 
significance “for accountability cannot be discharged effectively if it is unclear where 
responsibility lies”503. 
 
                                                          
500A. NOLLKAEMPER, Op. Cit., note 492, 5. 
501 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, into force 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, art.26 [Online] 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf [Accessed 30 November 
2012]  
502 A. NOLLKAEMPER, Op. Cit., note 492, 2. 
503 A. SARI & R. WESSEL, Op. Cit., note 471, p.1. 
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According to art.48 DARIO where international organization and one or more states are 
responsible for the same internationally wrongful act they can be hold jointly 
responsible for that act. Similarly, to the responsibility of States for internationally 
wrongful acts, art.48 (1) provides that the responsibility of each responsible entity may 
be invoked by the injured State or international organization. In its commentary to the 
article the ILC provides an example with the mixed agreements (in areas where the EU 
and member states exercise shared competence) concluded by the EU and member states 
together, where there is no explicit derogations laid down in the stated Convention.  In 
such cases, the EU and member states will be jointly liable for the fulfilment of the 
obligations arising from the wrongful act504. The Advocate-General Jacobs had reached 
similar conclusion, in context of unclear division of competences, stating that ‘[u]nder a 
mixed agreement the [Union] and Member States are jointly liable unless the provisions 
of the agreement point to the opposite’ adding that the division of competence should 
not be relevant to third states”505.   
 
In such situations, as pointed by Nollkaemper, there is a tendency that joint 
responsibility is used in terms of “joint and several”. This means that all responsible 
parties, States and/or international organization (EU and member states in this case), are 
together responsible for the wrongdoing and claim can be submitted against each one 
separately. Thus, “the responsibility of one is not reduced, if the other is involved in the 
                                                          
504 In the Commentary para 2 ILC also acknowledges that in some cases the responsibility of international 
organization or state can be subsidiary. Art.62 for example provides that, when the responsibility of a 
member State arises for the wrongful act of an international organization, responsibility is ‘presumed to be 
subsidiary.’ Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, Op. 
Cit., note 470, para 20, p.77. 
505 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs to Case C-316/91, European Parliament v Council of the 
European Union, [1994] ECR I-625, at para. 69 cited in A. NOLLKAEMPER, Op. Cit., note 492, p.16. 
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perpetration of a wrongful act”506. In case of mixed agreements, for example, member 
states will be responsible for wrongful conduct even though it is EU’s area of 
competence. In the same vain EU should be held internationally accountable for 
wrongdoings resulted from incorrect implementation by member state/s. In such 
situation, the third party to the agreement can bring claim against each one of the 
responsible parties507.    
 
The joint responsibility in the context of EU relations with member states would allow 
for the fulfilment of the main purpose of the concept, i.e. the ability to direct claim 
towards all responsible actors508. This is more so in cases where it is impossible to 
apportion the harm caused by one or more wrongful acts between the EU and member 
states. In such situations, the third party can direct the claim towards the EU and the 
member state/s and the question on how that responsibility will be divided between them 
will be an internal matter. The ECJ also adjudicated following the same reasoning509. 
Therefore, in matters where is not clear to whom responsibility for wrongful conduct can 
be attributed, it is only legitimate to conclude that member states and the EU can be 
jointly responsible for wrongful acts and the consequence of the division will be matter 
of EU law. 
 
                                                          
506 Id., p.49. Nollkaemper specifies that the use of the term ‘joint and several’ in the international law is 
not consistent. Id., p.9; See also E. PAASIVIRTA and P. KUIJPER JAN, Op. Cit., note 468, 186-187.   
507 However, Nollkaemper points that “ it is not obvious that (in a case where damage is caused) 
international law provides a basis for claiming from each of the responsible parties the full amount of 
compensation, only on the ground that respective contributions to the injury cannot easily be apportioned. 
A. NOLLKAEMPER, Op. Cit., note 492, 19. 
508 Id., p.8. 
509 Id., p.15. 
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E. Responsibilities Placed into Context 
 
Despite the erroneous claims outlined above in regards to the obscurity of responsibility 
at high sea and inconsistent interpretations of international obligations for political 
convenience, the high sea is not “a legal black hole”510 where no international or EU 
treaties apply. The ECtHR already stated that  
“the special nature of the maritime environment cannot justify an area 
outside the law where individuals are covered by no legal system capable of 
affording them enjoyment of the rights and guarantees protected by the 
Convention which the States have undertaken to secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction”511.   
 
A multitude of international obligations arising from the international human rights law, 
humanitarian law, refugee law, international maritime law, ECHR and finally EU law, 
are obligating States and EU to assume responsibility towards asylum-seekers512. Even 
though some aspects of the International Maritime Law may consist of lacunae with 
regard to state jurisdiction and various responsibilities during interception activities at 
high sea513, obligations arising from other branches of international law, including non-
refoulement principle, should be duly observed and implemented bone fade by the 
states.  
 
                                                          
510 ECRE, Defending Refugees' Access to Protection in Europe, 2007, p.19 [Online]  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c22514,46545e4c2,4766464e2,0,,,.html [Accessed 3 November 
2011] 
511 Case of Medvedyev and others v. France, App. No(s).3394/03, ECHR (Grand Chamber) 29 March 
2010, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2010 cited in Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy , Appl. 
No. 27765/09 ECHR (Grand Chamber) 23 February 2012, Para 178 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f4507942.html  [Accessed 20 December 2011] 
512G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, “The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of Non-
Refoulement”, (2011) 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 443; V. MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 
451;  
513 V. MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 451, 186-200. 
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As long as states exercise jurisdiction514, including extraterritorial one, over a person, 
every state must be held accountable for violations of international obligations. 
Moreover, any conduct that results in breach of international human rights obligations 
by a State or jointly with other states or organizations will engage their international 
responsibility regardless of where the conduct took place within its territory or 
extraterritorially515. In regards to the extraterritorial obligations, the Maastricht 
Principles516 emphasise that such obligations “arise when a state exercises control, 
power, or authority over people or situations located outside its sovereign territory in a 
way that could have an impact on the enjoyment of human rights by those people or in 
                                                          
514 It is important to stress that in terms of responsibility for human rights violations, the notion of 
jurisdiction has been detached with the state territory or other extraterritorial spaces where state exercises 
its power. According to Parisciani “[w]hat is crucial is that the individual is under the power, authority or 
control of a State’s organs, disregarding the geographical zone in which the action take place 
or generate its effects”. Emanuela PARISCIANI, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and State’s Obligations: 
Are there Human Rights on the high seas? Essay, Human Rights Law ERASMUS, p.4 [Online] 
http://www.academia.edu/350954/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_and_States_obligations_in_the_fight_again
st_illegal_immigration#outer_page_5 [Accessed 12 October 2012]; In the same vein, the ICJ in its 
advisory opinion  on the L e g a l  Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory 
in regards to the application of ICCPR concluded , 
 
“[...] while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be 
exercised outside the national territory. Considering the object and 
purpose of [ICCPR], it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, 
States parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions... [The 
travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR] show that, in adopting the wording chosen, 
the drafters of the [ICCPR] did not intend to allow State to escape from 
their obligations when they exercise jurisdiction outside their national territory”. ICJ 
Legal Consequences of the Constructions of Wall in the Palestinian Occupied 
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports No.131, §109 cited in E. 
PARISCIANI, Id., p.5. 
515 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Final version, 29 February 2012, art.11 [Online] 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1[downloadUid]=23 
[Accessed 1 December 2012]. 
516 The Maastricht Principles are focused on state’s extraterritorial obligations in regards to the economic, 
social and cultural rights. However, the legal bases of extraterritorial obligations in regards to civil and 
political rights are broadly similar. Olivier DE SCHUTTER, Asbjørn EIDE, Ashfaq KHALFAN, Marcos 
ORELLANA, Margot SALOMON & Ian SEIDERMANF,  “Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, (2012) 34 
Human Rights Quarterly 1084, Commentary (2) to art.5.   
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such situations”517. Goodwin-Gill arrives at the same conclusion pointing out that  
“international law looks not just to where the impugned act takes place, but also to the 
actor or actors to whom it is attributable and, above all, to consequences and effects”518. 
During joint operations, Frontex and member states take decisions and perform actions 
which directly or indirectly affect individuals’ lives. There is nothing to disengage both 
actors from their international responsibility519. Further to the above, the International 
Court of Justice in its Corfu Chanel Case520 held that the state’s international 
responsibility will be engaged even in cases when it fails to act, in court’s words due to 
“grave omissions” to prevent possible human rights violations521.  
 
Since the intercepting states are responsible for the people on board of the intercepted 
vessels in high sea, a fortiori they are under the obligation to respect the principle of 
non-refoulement522. In terms of seeking asylum, even though non-refoulement does not 
include general right to access; states are obliged to grant at least temporary admission 
to the territory in order to determine the protection needs of each individual523. 
Moreover, as argued by Goodwin-Gill, “there is a corresponding obligation on states not 
to frustrate the exercise of the right to seek asylum in such a way as to leave individuals 
at risk of persecution or other relevant harm”524.  
 
                                                          
517 Id., Commentary (1) to art.3.  
518 G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, Op. Cit., note 512, 452. 
519 Id., 453. 
520 Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] ICJ Reports 4 cited in G. S. GOODWIN-
GILL, Op. Cit., note 512, 453. 
521 This conclusion can be valid when the actor is not a state but international organization (e.g. EU).  
522 E. Papastavridis, Op. Cit., note 462, 104. 
523A. FISCHER-LESCANO, T. LÖHR & T. TOHIDIPUR, Op. Cit., note 464, p.283. 
524 G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, Op. Cit., note 512, 445. 
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In addition to the state’s international obligations, responsibilities of the member states 
towards third country nationals, including toward asylum-seekers, are further defined in 
the Schengen Border Code (SBC)525. As a legally binding document, the SBC obliges 
member states to respect the fundamental rights and principles, including those 
recognized by the EU Charter and those obligations related to international protection 
and non-refoulement526. All border checks must be completed with full respect to human 
dignity and must be free of discrimination527. The Code maintains special measures for 
people in need of international protection. Importantly, as stated in art.3, the Code 
applies without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons requesting international 
protection, in particular regarding non-refoulement.  
 
Additionally, the SBC requires states to derogate from the normal entry procedures for 
entries on humanitarian grounds or international obligations528. Asylum-seekers are also 
exempt from the requirements for refusal of entry applicable to other third country 
nationals529. The SBC also guarantees the right to appeal when entry is refused. In case 
of refusal of entry, the person has to be informed duly about the reason for refusal; how 
to lodge an appeal; and who can act as their representative530. The extraterritorial 
application of the SCB is implied in the Code itself and in the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
in regards to the application of Community rules outside the Community territory531. In 
                                                          
525 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders [Schengen Borders Code]. 
526 Id., rectal 20. 
527 Id., art.6. 
528 Id., art.5(4)(c). 
529 Id., art.13(1); art. 5(4)(c).  
530 Id., art.13(3). 
531 V. MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 451, 209-210. 
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addition, a recent Decision adopted by the EU Council532 introduced uniform rules to be 
followed by the member states when conducting maritime surveillance of the external 
borders533. Therefore, states are bound by the SBC provisions and other relevant 
community law when conducting border operations at high sea.  
 
 
F. Frontex:  the Way Forward 
 
As previously mentioned, with regard to erroneous acts committed in high sea during 
joint operations, Frontex has adopted a defensive policy, denying any participation and 
responsibility for such acts534. However, Frontex is liable for acts committed during 
operations that it coordinates. In the first place, Frontex can be held accountable due to 
its status of EU agency. As outlined above, Frontex, and the EU, must assume 
responsibility for international wrongful acts. In addition, a recent amendment to the 
Frontex Regulation brought more clarity to the question of Agency’s responsibilities. 
Accordingly, the Agency must fulfill its tasks in compliance with the relevant EU and 
international law, including the 1951 Refugees Convention and obligations related to 
access to international protection, in particular the principle of non-refoulement and 
fundamental rights535. 
                                                          
532 Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards 
the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union 
533 Although included in the Annex, thus not legally binding, the Rules for sea border operations 
coordinated by the Agency are helpful guidelines for the conduct of all parties during such operations.  
534 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Pushed Back, Pushed Around : Italy's Forced Return of Boat Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers, Libya's Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, New York, Human Rights 
Watch, 2009; G. S. GOODWIN-GILL, Op. Cit., note 512, p.451. 
535 Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Of 25 October 2011 
Amending Council Regulation (Ec) No 2007/2004 Establishing A European Agency For The Management 
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The amended Regulation brought many positive changes to the Agency’s mandate and is 
a decisive step toward more transparency and respect for fundamental rights. First and 
foremost, Frontex is required to develop a Fundamental Rights Strategy which includes 
a mechanism of effective monitoring towards the respect for fundamental rights in all its 
activities536. Such a mechanism is long overdue given the complete lack of transparency 
and accountability in which the Agency is operating. The establishment of such a 
mechanism will further the harmonization of the fundamental rights policies across the 
Union’s external borders, therefore improving the overall implementation of the SBC. In 
developing such a mechanism and other measures to protect fundamental rights, Frontex 
will be supported by a fundamental rights officer and will receive assistance from a 
Consultative Forum consisting of representatives from the European Asylum Support 
Office, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other relevant organizations.  
 
The amended Regulation also establishes more clear and visible rules in terms of 
responsibilities between member states and Frontex during joint operations. 
Accordingly, each joint operation must be preceded by a detailed operation plan, which 
outlines the tasks and related responsibilities of all participants537. More specifically, for 
joint operations at sea, such a plan must contain information about the relevant 
jurisdiction and the applicable legislation, including information concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Of Operational Cooperation At The External Borders Of The Member States Of The European Union, 
art.1. 
536 Id., art.26 (a). 
537 Id., art. 3(a). 
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international and EU law regarding interception, rescue at sea, and disembarkation538. 
Another significant improvement that must be emphasized is the responsibility of the 
Executive Director to suspend a joint operation in case of serious violations of 
fundamental rights539. The reluctance of member states to uphold their international and 
EU obligations, while operating outside the EU’s physical frontiers, is a persistent 
phenomenon. More clear and visible rules during sea operations, agreed to in advance, 
will eradicate the possibility for opportunistic political decisions to be implemented 
during operations at high sea.  
   
Finally, the improved legislation has revived the idea of European Border Guards. Those 
border officials, although directly accountable to their respective countries, will be 
available for deployment at the request of Frontex. The agency will be less dependent on 
the willingness of each member state to participate in a particular operation, as the 
number of border guards from each member state will be determined each year. States 
will be obliged to contribute the requested staff540 “unless they [states] are faced with an 
exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of national tasks”541. Lastly, 
the border guards would be bound to respect fundamental rights, including the access to 
asylum procedures. Establishing EU Border Guards teams is a decisive step forward 
towards more Community oriented action regarding border control. This will lead to 
more transparency and toward a human rights-based approach in all activities 
undertaken by the teams in the context of border control.  
                                                          
538 Id., art. 3(a)(j). 
539 Id., art3. 
540 Id., art.3(b). 
541 Id., art.3(b)(2). 
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CHAPTER V: EXTRA-TERRITORIALIZATION OF EU BORDER 
CONTROL542 
 
SECTION 1: Brief Overview of the EU Externalization of Asylum 
 
A. Readmission Agreements  
 
It is not in the scope of this paper to discuss in details the external dimension of EU 
migration policy, however, a quick glance over some of the measures within the external 
EU legislative framework will demonstrate their function to block access to asylum to 
the EU. The external dimension of EU asylum currently contains a number of 
components including, safe country concepts, readmission agreements with non-member 
states, Regional Protection Programmes (RPP) aiming at capacity building in the area of 
asylum with country of transit and origin, interceptions in third country coast lines 
among others. Measures such as processing centres for asylum seekers outside the EU 
have been considered but not developed yet. 
 
Policies such as ‘safe third country’ concept (explained in length above) and 
readmission agreements have been in the EU asylum panoply for many years and serve 
to transfer “the responsibility to protect” to countries outside EU. The readmission 
agreements are considered as “a cornerstone of the European Union’s so-called 
                                                          
542 Cremona and Rijpma place the following meaning in extra-territorialisation concept: “[T]he means by 
which the EU attempts to push back the EU’s external border or rather to police them at distance in order 
to control unwanted migration flow. Extra- territorialisation includes the way in which EU and its Member 
States attempt not only to prevent non-Community nationals from leaving their countries of origin, but 
also to ensure that if they managed to do so, they remain as close to their country of origin as possible, or 
in any case outside EU territory. It furthermore covers measures that ensure that, if individuals do 
managed to enter the EU, they will be repatriated or removed to “safe third countries”. Marise 
CREMONA & Jorrit RIJPMA, The Extra-Territorialisation of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of 
Law, EUI Working Paper No 2007/01, p.12 [Online]  
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/6690/LAW_2007_01.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed 21 May 
2011]. 
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externalization strategy for asylum and migration”543. The readmission agreements have 
a purpose to steam the flows of asylum-seekers and other migrants to EU by 
guaranteeing that third country nationals residing illegally in EU member state will be 
re-admitted unconditionally by the country of origin or transit. The agreements also 
target the return to the transit country of the asylum-seekers whose protection claims 
have been rejected on safe third country grounds544.  
 
The readmission agreements were introduced as a tool for migration control far back in 
1994 within the realm of the intergovernmental cooperation where member states agreed 
on common specimen agreement to be put in use in any type of negotiations with third 
countries545. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam EU has acquired power on its own to 
conclude readmission agreements with third countries546. In 2002, the EU Council 
meeting in Seville547 firmly expressed Union’s intention to make readmission 
agreements part of EU’s external policy on migration. The summit concluded the 
following in this regard:  
• Any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement of EU with third 
country to include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on 
compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration548. 
 
                                                          
543 Human Rights Watch, Buffeted in the Borderland.The Treatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers in 
Ukraine, December 2010, p.2 [Online] 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ukraine1210WebVersion.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2012] 
544 Sílvia MORGADES, The Externalisation of the Asylum Function in the European Union, Working 
Paper Series, Number 4, Spring 2010, p.16 [Online] 
http://www.upf.edu/gritim/_pdf/GRITIM_WP4_Spring10.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2012] 
545 EUROPA, Readmission Agreements, Summaries of EU Legislation, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l33105_en.htm 
546 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Op. Cit., note 225, Para 27. 
547 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Op. Cit., note 241. 
548 Id., Para 33. 
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• The readmission by third countries to include their own nationals as well as 
nationals of other countries provided they passed through the country in question 
on the way to EU549.  
 
• Non-cooperation or inadequate cooperation of the third country in the area of 
illegal immigration would hamper the relationship between the country and 
EU550.  
 
• In case of “unjustified lack of cooperation in joint management of migration 
flows” by the third country in question, the EU may adopt measures under the 
foreign policy or other Union policies while honouring Union’s contractual 
commitment551.  In other words, the Council threatened to use fully all EU tools 
in order to “punish” or force cooperation from the state in question.  
 
Pursuant to the Seville summit, EU Council has drafted criteria to identify third 
countries with which readmission agreements have to be negotiated. Among the criteria, 
the Council identified the nature and size of migratory flows towards EU; geographical 
position in relation to EU; attitude towards cooperation on migration issues552. Based on 
the criteria the following countries have been identified as “capable of forming a basis 
for further progress: Albania, China, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Morocco, 
Russia, Tunisia and Ukraine”553. Libya and Turkey are also considered as essential to 
initiate cooperation on controlling migration flows. Up until 2010, eleven readmission 
agreements negotiated at EU level have entered into force with the following countries: 
Hong Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, FYROM, Bosnia & 
                                                          
549 Id., Para 34. 
550 Id., Para 35. 
551 Id., Para 36. 
552EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Draft Council conclusions on intensified cooperation on the management of 
migration flows with third countries, 13894/02, 14 November 2002, Para 4. [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/may/12k13894-02.pdf [Accessed 23 November 2012] 
553 Id., para 5. 
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Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Moldova554. Mandate for negotiations or ongoing 
negotiations are undertaken with Pakistan, Georgia, Morocco, Cape Verde, China, and 
Algeria. This is apart from the bilateral agreements with readmission purpose concluded 
by single EU member states with third countries.  
 
In summation, as pointed by Prof. Peers:  
“The EU's approach to readmission agreements involves insisting that more 
and more non-EU countries sign up to broad readmission obligations to the 
EU with little or nothing in return. EU policy has been backed up by harsher 
and harsher rhetoric and threats against third countries, as the EU becomes 
more and more unilateralist and focused solely on migration control. These 
policies are unbalanced, inhumane, and internally contradictory.”555 
 
 
The readmission agreements have many serious implications on asylum-seekers subject 
to return and pose a serious risk for their rights. Usually, returns based on readmission 
agreements should be initiated after a claim for protection is considered. However, in 
practice asylum-seekers and members of vulnerable groups whose claim for protection 
have yet to be determined have been subjected to return from EU territory556. In 
addition, some agreements provide for accelerated procedures for return at the border, 
which does not allow for thorough consideration of individual’s protection needs557. 
 
                                                          
554STATEWATCH statistics, for internal use, 22 January 2010 [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/jan/eu-readmission-agreements.pdf ; On 21 June 2012, Turkey and 
the European Union initialled a readmission agreement after seven years of negotiations. ECRE, 
Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey Initialled, Weekly Bulletin, 29 June 2012 [Online] 
http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/Readmission-Agreement-between-the?lang=en [Accessed 3 November 
2012]  
555 S. PEERS, Readmission Agreements and EC External Migration Law, Statewatch analysis 
no 17 [Online] http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-17-readmission.pdf [Accessed 22 October 2012] 
556 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Op. Cit., note 543, p.22. 
557 Id. 
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Given that human rights clauses in such agreements are very weak, there is a serious risk 
that both parties may not honour their obligation steaming from 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol or ECHR and simply use the agreement to enforce a 
flawed decision558. Many of the readmitting countries lack proper refugee determination 
system or have poor human rights record559. Moreover, there is a real risk of “chain 
refoulement”, i.e. asylum-seekers being returned back to their countries of origin 
without possibility to claim asylum in any of the countries through which they pass560.  
   
On the positive side, following the evaluation of readmission agreements, the EU 
Commission recommended that the future EU readmission policy include control 
mechanisms and/or guarantees safeguarding the fundamental rights of returnees all the 
time561. The Commission suggested inclusion of relevant NGOs and international 
organizations in the monitoring of the implementation of the readmission agreements 
jointly with the Joint Readmission Committee currently responsible for the 
monitoring562. Moreover, after entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon the Council may 
adopt readmission agreement only after obtaining the consent of EU Parliament563. Thus 
                                                          
558 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Readmission Agreements: a Mechanism for Returning Irregular Migrants, 
Resolution 1741 (2010), Para 3 [Online] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/jul/coe-parl-ass-
readmission-agreement.pdf [Accessed 12 November 2012] 
559 According to the HRW report on EU readmission agreement concluded with Ukraine, country’s asylum 
system is completely dysfunctional. It has been restructured eight times in ten years resulting in deep 
protection gaps.(p.31) Moreover, asylum-seekers pending decision are constantly harassed by Ukrainian 
police (p.35) and subjected to refoulement contrary to art.33 refugee Convention(p.49). The report has 
founded that many asylum-seekers detained for illegal entry or presence in Ukraine are abused and 
tortured during interrogation (p.50) including use of electric shock (p.58). Slovakia and Hungary have 
ignored claims for protection of asylum-seekers who passed through Ukraine and subjected them to a 
quick return to Ukraine (p.111; 116), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Op. Cit., note 543.   
560 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Op. Cit., note 558, para 4. 
561 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements Brussels, 23.2.2011, COM(2011) 76 final, para 
4.3. 
562 Id., para 4.1. 
563 TFEU, Op. Cit., note 174, art 218. 
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the Parliament will have a major role but only if it is provided with correct information 
during negotiations of the agreements564.  
 
B. Regional Protection Programs 
 
Other EU asylum policies such as Regional Protection Programs (RPP) are fairly new 
developments. It was at the Tampere summit when the EU recognized the need for 
comprehensive approach to migration, which includes the regions of transit and 
origin565. In 2003, building on the Tampere conclusions, the Commission highlighted 
the need to compliment the first phase of the establishment of the CEAS.  Additional 
policy objectives were identified such as “burden and responsibility sharing within the 
EU as well as with regions of origin enabling them to provide effective protection as 
soon as possible and as closely as possible to the needs of persons in need of 
international protection”566.  
 
Keeping refugees as close as possible to their region of origin was seen as a new and 
more convenient approach for controlling asylum flow to the EU. Such policy was 
supplemented with co-operation with regions of origin and transit and developmental aid 
                                                          
564EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Readmission Policy in the European Union, PE 425.632, September 
2010, p.8 [Online] 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/14957/EP_ReadmissionPolicy_en.pdf?sequence=4 [Accessed 
12 November 2012] 
565 EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Op. Cit., note 225, Para 11. 
566 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the Managed Entry in the EU of Persons In Need of International Protection and the 
Enhancement of the Protection Capacity of the Regions of Origin “Improving Access to Durable 
Solutions”, Brussels, 4.6.2004, COM(2004) 410 final, Para 4. 
140 
 
to address the root causes of the forced displacement567. In 2005, following the line of 
externalization of EU asylum set by the Hague Programme, the Commission forwarded 
a proposal for establishing of RPP in transit regions in border areas with the EU and in 
areas close to regions of origin of refugees. In those regions, the Commission was 
suggesting that the programs are oriented to capacity building and creating conditions to 
offer to the displaced one of the three durable solutions (repatriation, local integration or 
resettlement)568.  
 
The RPP were set to be financed through already existing programs such as 
AENEAS569. Thus, taking into consideration diverse factors such as the refugee situation 
in the specific geographic region; existing relationships and cooperation with EU; 
availability of funds, the Commission suggested to pilot two RPP: one in the transit 
region of Western Newly Independent States (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and the other 
in the region of origin of sub Saharan Africa (Great Lakes/East Africa)570. 
 
The RPP raise concerns in regards to the access of asylum-seekers to timely and quality 
protection. In a first place, there is a possibility for labelling third countries receiving aid 
through RPP for “safe havens” by EU member states571. This is real concern given the 
                                                          
567AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EU regional protection programs: Enhancing protection in the 
region or barring access to the EU territory? September 2005 [Online] 
http://www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/2005/05_09_22_protection_programs_EPC.pdf  [Accessed 15 
November 2012] 
568 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on regional protection programmes, COM/2005/0388 final, para 5. 
569 Id., Para 4. AENAS is a program offering technical and financial support to third countries in area of 
asylum. Regulation (EC) No. 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 
establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration 
and asylum (AENEAS).   
570Id., para 10  
571AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Op. Cit., note 567, p.3. 
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current tendency of outsourcing protection responsibilities related to asylum to countries 
outside EU most of which lack capacity to provide adequate refugee protection and 
respect for fundamental rights (e.g. member states have exercised returns of asylum-
seekers to Ukraine or Afghanistan contrary to NGOs’ reports for serious human rights 
violations572). As rightly concluded by State watch with RPPs the Commission 
“proposes financial and managerial assistance to states in refugees’ regions of origin to 
help them become “robust providers of effective protection ... [which in practice means] 
funding immigration controls and asylum systems in third countries on the basis of EU 
minimum standards”573. 
 
At the end of 2006, the AENAS programme has been substituted with a new thematic 
programme. In the field of asylum, the general objective of the new program is “to bring 
specific, complementary assistance to third countries to support them in their efforts to 
ensure better management of migratory flows in all their dimensions”574. In particularly 
the thematic programme should promote 1) capacity building in third countries to 
provide asylum and international protection; 2) support registration of refugees; 3) 
promote international standards for protection; 4) support in providing refugees with 
durable solutions575. However, the change of the programme does not address the 
concerns expressed above.   
 
                                                          
572 STATEWATCH, Killing me softly? “Improving access to durable solutions”: doublespeak and the 
dismantling of refugee protection in the EU, July 2004, [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jul/refugees-external-processing.pdf [Accessed 21 November 2012] 
573 Id., p.4. 
574 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, Thematic Programme for the Cooperation with Third Countries in the Areas of Migration 
and Asylum. COM(2006) 26 final, para 3.1. 
575 Id., para 3.2.5. 
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C. Processing Centres for Asylum seekers outside EU 
 
The ‘managed and orderly arrivals’ of asylum seekers has been for a long time a subject 
of discussions related to asylum in the EU. Some initiatives have generated wide 
debates, since they are incompatible with international and EU human rights rules576. In 
2003, for example, UK announced a new approach to asylum aiming to streamline the 
migratory flow to the EU and to reduce unfounded asylum claims. This new approach 
consisted of measures promoting the establishment of ‘regional protection areas’ close 
to the countries of origin and ‘transit processing centres’ in third countries where 
asylum seekers, already in the EU, would be transferred to have their asylum claims 
processed. Those whose claims are approved would be resettled in the EU on a 
responsibility-sharing basis. Those whose claims are rejected would be returned to their 
countries of origin or transit577. The proposal generated vigorous criticism. Amnesty 
International condemned the proposal by stating that “the real goal [of the proposal] 
appears to be to reduce the number of spontaneous arrivals in the UK and other EU 
states by denying access to territory and shifting asylum-seekers to zones outside the EU 
where refugee protection would be weak and unclear"578. The idea sparked many 
controversies and did not generate enough support on the EU level579. However, the 
                                                          
576 STATEWATCH, Asylum in the EU: the Beginning of the End? [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/mar/25asylum.htm [Accessed 3 December 2011]; 
STATEWATCH, UK Asylum Plan for "Safe Havens": Full-Text of Proposal and Reactions, [Online] 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/apr/10safe.htm [Accessed 3 December 2011]. 
577 Tony BLAIR, New International Approaches to Asylum Processing and Protection, [Letter] (Detailed 
proposal to the Greek Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 10 March 2003). 
578Alan TRAVIS, “EU Revives Blunkett's Asylum Camp Plan”, The Guardian, 2004 [Online] 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/sep/20/eu.immigration [Accessed 23 May 2011] 
579 The EU Council ordered to the Commission to further explore the possibilities mentioned in the 
proposal “in order to ensure more orderly and managed entry in the EU of persons in need of international 
protection and to examine ways and means to enhance the protection capacity of regions of origin”. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, 
Brussels. 1 October 2003, conclucion 26; However, the EU Commission in its latter communication 
highlighted only the possibilities for expanded resettlement to the EU and protected entry procedures as 
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German and Italian governments revived the proposal one year later by suggesting the 
construction of processing camps in Africa. As the German interior minister said, “the 
problems of Africa should be solved with the help of Europe in Africa; they cannot be 
solved in Europe”580. Austria supported the idea of reception camps as part of the EU 
approach towards the countries of transit and origin581.  
 
Due to many legal and practical challenges, the idea for extraterritorial processing of 
asylum applications is not pursued as of yet. The Stockholm Programme does not 
explore further the concept of outside processing centres, but neither does it rule out 
such a possibility582. While the extraterritorial centres for processing of asylum claims 
are not feasible in the short term, the persistent proposal of the idea within the EU’s 
asylum debate is worrisome. It clearly points to attempts of member states and the EU 
alike to circumvent legal obligations towards asylum seekers to third countries, many of 
which lack protection capacities or have troublesome human rights records583. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
mechanisms for improvement of protection in EU. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004Communication to 
the Council and the European Parliament, On the Managed Entry in the EU of Persons in Need of 
International Protection and Enhancement of the Protection Capacity of the Regions of Origin: Improving 
Access to Durable Solutions. COM(2004) 410 final. 
580 A. TRAVIS, Op. Cit., note 578. 
581 Tim KING & Weislaw HORABIK, “Asylum-Camp Plan ‘gathering momentum', say Austrians”, 
EuropeanVoice.com, 23 September 2004 [Online] 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/asylum-camp-plan-gathering-momentum-say-
austrians/50735.aspx [Accessed 23 August 2011];  
582 The EU Commission was invited by the Council “to finalise its study on the feasibility and legal and 
practical implications to establish joint processing of asylum applications” without specifying if such joint 
processing should take place in EU territory or outside. EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Op. Cit., note 287, Para 
6.2.1; In its action plan for implementing the Stockholm program, the Commission furthers the idea of 
procession centers inside EU territory. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s 
citizens; Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, Brussels 24.4.2010, 
Annex, p.55. 
583 E.g., Libya is not party to the 1951Refugee Convention. 
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Inevitably, this will lead to creation of detention centres584 outside the EU, where people 
will be stranded for an unspecified time merely for seeking asylum. To direct asylum 
seekers already at the EU’s doorstep to process claims outside the EU is at odds with 
international treaties for protection of refugees, and with European law585. 
D. Sea Operations in Territory of Third States 
 
As already mentioned, some joint sea operations coordinated by Frontex also have an 
external dimension. During such operations, surveillance and subsequent diversion of 
migrants is extended to the shores of third countries. The legal base is bilateral 
agreements concluded between the member state requesting the operation and the 
respective third country. In the context of joint operations in the Mediterranean, bilateral 
agreements have been concluded with some North African countries, enabling EU 
member states supported by Frontex to patrol the coastal areas of these countries with 
the objective of intercepting migrant boats while still in the country of departure. For 
operation HERA, for example, Spain has concluded bilateral agreement with Mauritania, 
Senegal and Cape Verde586. Such efforts to externalize border control by moving it 
farther from the EU’s physical frontiers is raising numerous controversies with regard to 
the legality of the actions undertaken by the member states in the territory of third 
                                                          
584 S. MORGADES, Op. Cit., note 544, p.26. 
585 See more on the subject Angus FRANCIS, “Bringing Protection Home : Healing the Schism between 
International Obligations and National Safeguards Created by Extraterritorial Processing”, (2008) 20 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 273; EUROPEAN NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETIES, 
Argumentation Tool for PERCO National Societies for Use in Discussions with Their Respective 
Governments Concerning Transit Processing Centres Outside the EU, General Meeting in Sofia 13th-14th 
October 2005. 
586 V. MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 451, 182. How the operation was carried see Dominic BAILEY, 
Stemming the immigration wave, BBC News online, 10 September 2006 [Online] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5331896.stm [Accessed 5 May 2011] 
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countries and the right of asylum seekers to access the territory they wish to claim 
protection.  
 
In first place, boats intercepted within the North African coastal line are presumed to 
carry irregular migrants. Thus, asylum seekers are placed in the irregular migrant group 
whose prevention of entering EU territory is the main objective of the border policies. 
However, labelling or categorising someone as irregular before she/he even enters the 
EU territory is erroneous587. The fact of entering irregularly is established only when a 
third country national physically enters state’s territory in violation of the entry rules 
established by the state. Even then, exemptions exist, for example asylum seekers (see 
SBC). Secondly, during sea operations in third countries, officials from those countries 
are deployed on board of intercepting vessels with the aim of delegating the 
responsibility for the intercepted migrants to the country in which territory the 
interception is taking place. Notwithstanding the place in which joint operations are 
carried out, whether at high sea or in the territorial waters of third states, member states 
are not released from responsibility for their conduct. Even in the territorial waters of 
another country, a state cannot outsource or contract out its international responsibilities 
to that country588. Moreover, each state is separately responsible for the committed 
                                                          
587 S. CARRERA, The EU Border Management Strategy : FRONTEX and the Challenges of Irregular 
Immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working Papers No 261, 2007, p.25 [Online]  
http://www.ceps.be/book/eu-border-management-strategy-frontex-and-challenges-irregular-immigration-
canary-islands [Accessed 3 December 2011] 
588 G. GOODWIN-GILL, “Extraterritorial Pocessing of Claims to Asylum or Protection: the Legal 
Responsibilities of States and International Organisations”, (2007) 9 UTS Law Review 26, p.34. 
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wrongful acts. The fact that many states are involved does not diminish in any 
circumstances the responsibility of each participating state589.  
 
The participation of Frontex in operations beyond EU borders is also contested590. 
Although the Agency can facilitate the operational cooperation with third countries 
through cooperational agreements, neither the Regulation nor the working agreements 
authorize Frontex to take part in such operations591. Moreover, it is doubtful that such 
authorisation is negotiated in the bilateral agreements concluded between the member 
states and the respective third countries592. According to Human Rights Watch, Frontex 
was involved in highly contestable pushbacks of migrant boats by Italy to Libya593. 
Recently, the ECtHR has declared the Italian pushbacks to be in violation of the 
ECHR594. Although the Agency had denied participation595, such activities raise 
questions as to Frontex’s ability to abide by its responsibilities in accordance with the 
EU law. As an EU Agency, Frontex has the responsibility not only to strictly obey EU 
                                                          
589 INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION & SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR J. CRAWFORD, 
Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Anual Report 2011, Ch. IV, p.314 cited in V. 
MORENO-LAX, Op. Cit., note 451, 203. 
590ECRE, Defending Refugees' Access to Protection in Europe, 2007, p.14 [Online]  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,4565c22514,46545e4c2,4766464e2,0,,,.html [Accessed 3 November 
2011] 
591Id., p.14-15. 
592Id. The agreements are not made public therefore it is difficult to make any conclusions. S. CARRERA, 
Op. Cit., note 587, p.22; The participation of other member States in that matter is also questionable given 
that they do not have concluded such agreement with the respective third state. E. PAPASTAVRIDIS, Op. 
Cit., note 462, p.90. 
593 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Op. Cit., note 534, p.37. 
594 Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy , Appl. No. 27765/09 ECHR (Grand Chamber) 23 February 
2012 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f4507942.html  [Accessed 20 December 2011] 
595 The Agency claimed that during that time it was involved in activities that were part of the joint 
operation NAUTILIUS which was undertaken in a different region. MIGRANTS AT SEA, Frontex Issues 
Response to HRW Report (Communiqués,) 2009 [Online] 
http://migrantsatsea.wordpress.com/2009/09/21/frontex-issues-response-to-hrw-report-communiques/ 
[Accessed 4 December 2011].  
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legislation, but at the same time to ensure the correct application of these laws by 
others596.  
CHAPTER VI: MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH EU LAW    
  
 
As it was demonstrated, member states, prompted mostly by political reasons, are 
developing policies and measures, which are in odds not only with the international 
human rights treaties but also with EU basic treaties. We have outlined above the 
international responsibility carried by states and international organizations regarding 
wrongful acts. In the international context, a myriad of bodies and institutional 
mechanisms rule over responsibility and corresponding compensation, depending on the 
act committed. However, they are not subject of the present paper. For our purposes, 
what appears to be a legitimate question is: What are the available tools at the EU level 
that prevent abuses of fundamental rights enshrined in the EU founding treaties, for 
short term political gain which is detrimental to the EU legitimacy and the individuals 
subjected to those policies?  In this chapter, we will briefly examine the existing 
mechanisms for enforcement in the case of non-compliance with the EU law by member 
states and the usefulness of those mechanisms to accomplish the goal of preventing 
abuses and harmonizing policies and practices across EU.        
 
                                                          
596 Miriam MIR, Managing the EU’s External Frontiers: Lessons to be Learned from FRONTEX’s Action 
in the Canary Islands, CHALLENGE project, 2007, p.5 [Online] 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1405.html [Accessed 5 December 2011]. 
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SECTION 1: Existing Mechanisms 
 
The supremacy of the European law limits the discretion of the member states when 
developing respective policies on national level. Each member state should implement 
EU law by ensuring its conformity to and correct application of the latter. Policies 
concerning third country nationals, for example, must contain necessary safeguards and 
conform to fundamental rights such as non-discrimination, right to dignity, non-
refoulement, which are proclaimed in the EU Charter and other relevant EU treaties. The 
legality and conformity of the measures developed within the scope of the EU law are 
subjected to the scrutiny of institutional monitoring mechanisms available under the EU 
founding treaties.  
A. Art.258 (TFEU) 
 
The EU Commission, as the ‘Guardian of the Treaties’597 is entrusted with the role “to 
promote the general interests of the Union ... ensure the application of the Treaties, and 
of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them ... [and] oversee the application 
of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union...”598. 
Thus, under art.258 TFEU599 the Commission can initiate an infringement procedure 
                                                          
597 Michael KAEDING D. & Friederike VOSKAMP, Better Implementation of EU Legislation is not just 
a Question of Taking Member States to Court, SOLVIT - Street-level EU Law Enforcement through an 
Effective free-of-charge out-of-court Dispute Settlement Mechanism for a Better Functioning of the Single 
Market , European Institute of Public Administration Working Paper 2011/W/01, p.3 [Online] 
http://www.eipa.eu/files/repository/product/20120228091739_Workingpaper2011_W_01.pdf  [Accessed 5 
December 2011]. 
598 TEU, Op. Cit., note 156, art.17(1). 
599 TEFU, Op. Cit., note 174, art.258, (ex Article 226 TEC). 
“If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under 
the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State 
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. 
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against a member state that fails to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, and if 
necessary may refer the matter to the ECJ.  
 
Two main stages can be distinguished in the procedure under art.258 TFEU. The first is 
the political stage, where the Commission and member state concerned try to resolve the 
issue at stake through informal negotiations. The Commission is afforded with wide 
discretion and room for political manoeuvring in order to bring the infringement to an 
end600. A decision to bring the case before the court is only a last resort in case the 
political dialogue fails601. Secondly, in the judicial stage, the Court will be the final 
instance to determine if there is an infringement and requires the member state to 
comply with the judgement. In case of non-compliance, the transgressor can be imposed 
with a lump sum or penalty payment602. It should be noted that the aim of the procedure 
under art.258 TFEU is not to seek remedies for the parties, which suffered damages 
from the violation, but simply to ensure that the violation had ceased603.  
 
Although this is somewhat a useful tool to enforce member states to comply with the 
rights and obligations they agreed upon when developing the EU law, two recent cases 
have revealed gaps in the fundamental rights protection in the EU and the partial 
                                                                                                                                                                           
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the 
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union”. 
600 M. KAEDING D. & F. VOSKAMP, Op. Cit., note 597, p.4. 
601 S. CARRERA & Anais F. ATGER, L’affaire des roms a challenge to the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, CEPS, 2010, p.15 [Online] http://www.ceps.eu/book/l%E2%80%99affaire-des-roms-
challenge-eu%E2%80%99s-area-freedom-security-and-justice [Accessed 5 Decemeber 2011]. 
602 TEFU, Op. Cit., note 174, art.260. 
603DAWSON, M. & MUIR, E., “Individual, Institutional and Collective Vigilance in Protecting 
Fundamental Rights in the EU: Lessons from the Roma”, (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review  751, 
758. 
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usefulness of the existing enforcement mechanisms604. As pointed out by Carrera such 
events are “testing the efficiency of Europe’s migration policies, but also the legitimacy 
of the political elements of European integration and the foundations of the EU’s Area 
of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ)”605. In the first case, the so called ‘les affiare 
the roms’, citizens of Romania and Bulgaria were subjected to discriminative measures 
by French authorities due to their ethnicity and were forcibly sent back to their countries 
of origin. Such actions were in violation of EU Charter and other fundamental EU 
legislation such as the Citizens Directive 2004/38606. The EU Commission, after a long 
period of silence, reacted weakly to the blatant French action against Roma, and after 
political negotiation, the Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental rights and citizenship, 
Viviane Reding, satisfied with French post-factum measures of correct transposition of 
EU legislation, announced not to pursue any enforcement action.  
 
This case demonstrates limited usefulness of the enforcement mechanism towards the 
persons directly affected by measures at variance with fundamental rights stipulated in 
the EU treaties. France has agreed to bring its national legislation to comply with the 
relevant EU law. However, the targeted Roma population had already suffered the 
consequences of the discriminative police actions and returned back forcibly or 
‘voluntarily’ to the countries of origin. In this context, there was no personal redress for 
the violation of victims’ basic rights. Secondly, the process is a politicised one that is 
                                                          
604 S. CARRERA, The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach to Migration, CEPS, 2011, p.6[Online] 
http://aei.pitt.edu/32071/1/No_41_Carrera_on_EU_Dialogue_with_SoMed_edited_final-1.pdf [Accessed 
3 January 2012]. 
605 Id., p.1. 
606 S. CARRERA & Anais F. ATGER, Op. Cit., note 601, pp.6-10. 
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“open to political manipulation and ‘horse-trading’”607. Thus, political negotiations may 
undermine the right of individuals to receive timely justice. A timely remedy is of 
utmost importance for asylum-seekers as they can be returned to places where their lives 
will be in danger.         
 
The second case, the so-called “Franco-Italian affair”, is related to migrants coming 
from North Africa due to the democratic uprising and the ensuing war in Libya. In this 
case, about two hundred migrants from Tunisia landed in Italy. The Italian government 
felt overwhelmed by the number of migrants and afforded the migrants with temporary 
residence permits and travel documents so they could move freely across the EU608. 
Some of the migrants traveled to France, but were faced with pushbacks by French 
border authorities after France temporary reintroduced border checks at its frontiers with 
Italy. Although both countries have acted mala fides when applying the EU law, there 
were no legal or other consequences apart from strong criticism from the EU 
Commission609. In the context of this case, again, individuals were subjected to unfair 
treatment without any judicial consequences, and political considerations have prevailed. 
Moreover, this case reveals the susceptibility of the EU’s governing bodies to political 
pressure from opportunistic governments that attempt to evade their obligations under 
EU law610, thus questioning the legitimacy not only of the EU Schengen acquis but of 
the EU as a whole.   
                                                          
607 M. DAWSON. & E. MUIR, Op. Cit., note 603, p.758. 
608The authorities have omitted to follow some important requirements in breach of SBC. Sergio 
CARRERA, Elspeth  GUILD, Massiomo MERLINO & Joanna PARKIN, A Race Against Solidarity: the 
Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian Affair, CEPS, 2011[Online] http://www.ceps.eu/book/race-
against-solidarity-schengen-regime-and-franco-italian-affair [Accessed 4 January 2012]. 
609 Id. 
610 S. CARRERA, Op. Cit., note 604, p8. 
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Secondly, this case has also revealed a gap in the way implementation of border policies 
is done611. No effective mechanism is in place to monitor either the application of the 
SBC by EU member states, or the general compliance of the member states with the EU 
border acquis612. The existing Schengen monitoring mechanism is virtually non-
functional, since such monitoring is carried by member states officials in the Schengen 
Evaluation Working Group within the Council.  In the context of the discussed border 
practices in this paper, the need for independent monitoring and evaluation is urgent613. 
 
B. Art.7 (TEU) 
 
Another venue for enforcing compliance with EU law is offered by article 7 TEU. This 
procedure is initiated to ensure the respect of the EU values by all member states614. On 
the initiative of the Commission, one third of the member states and the EU Parliament, 
the Council may decide to suspend some rights deriving from the application of the 
Treaties, including the right to vote of a member state found in serious and persistent 
                                                          
611 Id., Para 3.2. 
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613 Currently there is a proposal for revision of the existing Schengen monitoring mechanism. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2011b. Amended proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and 
the Council on the establishment of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of 
the Schengen acquis. COM(2011) 559 final; For general analysis see Yves PASCOUAU, The Schengen 
Evaluation Mechanism and the Legal Basis Problem: Breaking the Deadlock, European Policy Centre, 
2012 [Online] 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1408_the_schengen_evaluation_mechanism.pdf [Accessed 3 
February 2012]. 
614 Art. 2, TEU stipulates: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. 
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breach of art.2 TEU. So far, this procedure has never been used615. In the case of asylum 
seekers, it is less likely that art.7 TEU will provide any immediate or long term remedies 
and benefits. Considering the treatment of asylum seekers in most of EU countries and 
‘race to the bottom policies’ in the context of asylum, it is less likely that a member state 
will be subjected to such procedures616. 
 
C. Usefulness of the Existing Mechanisms: Need for Improvement 
 
The member states’ non-compliance with the EU law is not a recent phenomenon. 
Indeed, this problem is systematic and occurs on a regular basis and with ‘remarkable 
persistence’617. While non-compliance with legislation is a disturbing trend, it is more 
disturbing yet when it directly affects basic human rights of individuals in a negative 
way, which may lead to serious consequences such as death. To overcome this major 
backdrop of the EU legal structure, many academics have suggested solutions worth 
mentioning.  
 
In order to be more effective, institutional enforcement mechanisms, as suggested by 
Dawson and Muir, can be coupled with so-called ‘collective enforcement,’ where non-
governmental organizations and networks with interests of protecting vulnerable groups 
may intervene618. As several authors explain, such intervention can be a combination of 
non-judicial and judicial strategies. Awareness-raising and improving monitoring of 
                                                          
615 S. CARRERA & Anais F. ATGER, Op. Cit., note 601, p.17. 
616 M. DAWSON. & E. MUIR, Op. Cit., note 603, p.757.The authors have expressed the opinion in 
regards to the treatment of roma by EU member states. However, such statement holds through also for 
asylum seekers as our analysis demonstrates.  
617 Maria MENDRINOU, “Noncompliance and the European Commission's Role in Integration”, (1996) 3  
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fundamental rights violations may be deployed as part of the non-judicial approach. In 
terms of judicial involvement, the interested NGOs can engage on behalf, or support the 
individual claimants in litigation before the ECJ. Up until now, NGOs may take part in a 
process only as third parties. More prominent engagement of interested NGOs within the 
infringement proceedings against reluctant states would be beneficial not only for the 
groups whose rights are violated but would make such proceedings more visible and 
immune from political power struggles and pressure. Many NGOs have proved their 
indispensable worth as whistleblowers and true organisms for protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms, including those of asylum seekers.        
 
Yet other academics suggest avoiding the time-consuming judicial procedures and 
finding a cost-effective and fast way to receive a redress in case of violation of 
fundamental rights by a member state. Dr Michael Kaeding and Friederike Voskamp are 
in full support of settlements out-of-court, through the EU agencies with a mandate, to 
ensure the right transposition of the EU law into domestic legal order619. One such 
agency, according to the authors, is SOLVIT, which consists of a network between 
member states that works toward correct application of EU law. In case of infringement 
of EU law, SOLVIT, approached by a citizen or business, directly contacts the member 
state authority in violation and attempts to negotiate a settlement, to discontinue the 
infringement and to ensure the administrative body in violation adopts the correct 
policy620. Such an approach can also be used in case of asylum seekers and can offer a 
fast and inexpensive way to counter injustice. However, many of the infringements 
                                                          
619 M. KAEDING D. & F. VOSKAMP, Op. Cit., note 597. 
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towards asylum seekers are committed even before they reach EU boundaries. 
Moreover, many individuals seeking protection experience barriers such as language and 
lack of knowledge of the system and rights to which they are entitled, limiting the 
usefulness of such procedures. A need exists for complimentary mechanisms to be able 
to bring wrongdoings to an immediate end. In case of asylum-seekers, this is of utmost 
importance considering the gravity of the situations they face in countries of origin or 
transit if protection is not granted in Europe. All the outlined enforcement mechanisms, 
individually or in combination, are potentially beneficial to any individual subjected to 
incorrect behaviour by the state. However, none of them will matter, if there is 
unwillingness to act from the part of member states and EU institutions.  
 
D. ECJ and the Preliminary Rulings Procedure: Multifaceted Solution 
 
When there is reluctance to act, the courts, both national and ECJ, can be very effective 
and offer meaningful and timely redress for individuals involved. According to art.19 
TEU, the ECJ’s main responsibility is to “ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed”. Thus, ECJ is entrusted with jurisdiction 
to ensure the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. Such a task is 
accomplished through the preliminary rulings procedure (art.276 TFEU), through which 
national courts or tribunals may request interpretation by the ECJ of treaties and EU 
secondary legislative acts. ‘EU acts’, in the context of the procedure, is interpreted in 
broad terms to include secondary law instruments such as regulations, directives, and 
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recommendations621. Once such a ruling is issued, it is binding not only on the member 
state whose court has requested the interpretation but also on all member states622. 
Therefore, one of the main effects of the preliminary rulings procedure is the 
harmonization of the EU law across member states623.   
 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, art. 68(1) TEC significantly restricted the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction by allowing only the highest national courts to initiate a preliminary rulings 
procedure. This restriction has determined the scarce jurisprudence in the area of 
asylum, considering the fact that many asylum cases never reach the court of final 
instance. One of the reasons for this is that in many EU states the appeal in asylum 
procedures does not suspend a prior ruling, and therefore claimants are removed from 
the country of asylum. The Treaty of Lisbon abolished the restriction, enabling also 
lower courts and tribunals to ask ECJ for preliminary rulings, including on legislation 
related to asylum.  
 
In addition, if requested or on its own will, the Court may speed up the procedure in 
cases of urgent matters within the AFSJ, which includes asylum624. In the urgent 
procedure, a decision can be issued in as little as two months625. Moreover, pursuant to 
art.279 TFEU the Court can prescribe any necessary interim measures, including stay of 
                                                          
621 Art. 228 TFEU cited in Katherina PARASCHAS, The Role of the National Judge and the Preliminary 
Ruling Procedure, 2011 [Online Power Point] http://www.era-
comm.eu/oldoku/Adiskri/12_Jurisdictions/2011_03_Paraschas_EN.pdf [Accessed 4 June 2012] 
622 Hugo STOREY, Preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 2010, 
Para 12 [Online] http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/lisbon_sep_2010/storey.pdf  [Accessed 4 
December 2011]. 
623 Id., Para 13. 
624 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities of 19 June 1991, OJ L 176 of 
4.7.1991, p. 7, and OJ L 383 of 29.12.1992 (corrigenda), Para 104b [Online] 
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[Accessed 20 May 2012] 
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removal, in any case before it. Regarding asylum, the urgency of the ruling coupled with 
precise interim measures is crucial, since the removal or deportation of an asylum 
seeker, for example, requires immediate intervention. Therefore, this will reinforce “the 
judicial protection of individuals by providing them with faster justice”626. 
 
The importance of the preliminary rulings procedure was furthered with the entering into 
force of the EU Charter. As mentioned, the EU Charter has a statute of primary EU 
legislation and can be invoked directly in proceedings before national courts, thus 
offering protection against wrongdoings perpetrated by EU institutions and member 
states. Although it contains rights mirroring those in the ECHR, it also introduces 
additional rights such as in art.18 (the right to asylum). The ECJ, through preliminary 
rulings procedures, is the only court able to interpret the Charter’s rights. Therefore, the 
preliminary rulings procedure will be the primary source of building the EU acquis on 
asylum. Given the positive fundamental rights record of the Court and its willingness to 
strike the correct balance between state needs and asylum seekers rights (as 
demonstrated by Edjafari case), the ECJ jurisprudence would guarantee fair and uniform 
treatment of asylum seekers on a national level throughout the EU.   
 
Notably, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to rule over matters concerning breaches of 
national laws. In addition, the provisions of the EU Charter are binding to member states 
only in relation with the Union law. However, individual protection of fundamental 
rights in cases outside the legislative framework of EU law will be guaranteed by the 
ECHR. All member states are party to the Convention, and thus responsible for 
                                                          
626 Koen LENAERTS, “The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice”, (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255, 265. 
 
158 
 
violations of its provisions. Although some procedural hurdles overshadow the 
effectiveness of the procedure before ECtHR, the Court continues to play a significant 
role in rendering juridical redress to asylum seekers concerned in the process. Moreover, 
considering the limited juridical activity of the ECJ in the field of asylum up until 
recently, ECtHR was the only supranational judicial institution to provide standards of 
treatment to asylum seekers and guidance to national authorities in upholding the rights 
of those populations. The ECtHR jurisprudence influenced significantly the EU asylum 
acquis, albeit in an indirect manner627.  
 
It can be ascertained that the Treaty of Lisbon significantly empowered the judiciary to 
play an active role in shaping the EU asylum and border acquis. The active engagement 
on the part of the ECJ is a guarantee of the correct application of EU primary and 
secondary law by all member states. Independent judiciary rulings at the EU level will 
build immunity against narrow political interests, to prevail in a supranational and 
national context, when it concerns the application and interpretation of EU law. Not only 
is the position of ECJ thus strengthened, but the national courts and tribunals are thus 
given a main role in ensuring the correct application of the law. In the context of 
fundamental rights protection, the national courts are the main engine to advance the EU 
fundamental rights framework, and at the same time, guarantee to the concerned 
individuals timely and effective remedies for violation of EU rights, not only by member 
state but also by European Union institutions628. 
 
                                                          
627 Christian KAUNERT & Sarah LÉONARD, “The Development of the EU Asylum Policy: Venue-
Shopping in Perspective”, (2012) Journal of European Public Policy 1, 12. 
628 K. PARASCHAS, Op. Cit., note 621, p.5. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
Assuring access to protection of asylum-seekers is one of the most controversial and 
rigorously debated issues at national and EU level. Since asylum-seekers and refugees 
are losing their ‘political value’ increasingly, they are perceived as a burden and a social 
and security threat, which fuels the widespread anti-immigration political discourse. 
Thus, lacking the protection of their own country and having fewer rights than the 
citizens of the countries in which they seek protection, asylum-seekers and refugees are 
easy scapegoats to justify discriminative and xenophobic policies and practices across 
EU. In the context of EU asylum policy, member states, driven by narrow political 
interests and fear of floods of asylum-seekers that have never materialized, have 
managed to push their exclusionary national asylum agendas at the EU level. Many EU 
asylum policies have been developed based on the lowest common denominator and are 
at odds with the 1951 Refugee Convention and other international human rights 
instruments lacking basic protection guarantees.  
 
In area of border control, databases with diverse functionalities are increasingly used to 
control cross-border movements. Extensive personal data is stored and shared between 
agencies within and outside EU for law enforcement or other purposes different than 
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initially declared. Increasingly, information gathered through the databases for the 
purpose of criminal investigation of asylum-seekers and refugees will be used for 
refusing visa and asylum applications, deportation and removal of asylum-seekers from 
the EU territory, and/or refusal of admission at the external borders629. In the context of 
SIS, asylum seekers are even further exposed to disproportionate denial of entry. Under 
article 96, issuing an alert bans the non-EU national in question from entering the whole 
Schengen zone which is problematic because of the lack of harmonised criteria for 
refusing entry, as mentioned above. Despite the adverse implications of such decisions, 
third country nationals outside the EU are deprived from seeking legal remedies against 
refusal of entry. Therefore, asylum seekers are main targets of policies resulting in final 
ban in territories where they might have found safety.   
 
Moreover, while new proposals for even more highly sophisticated digital systems for 
border control, such as the entry/exit system, are being put forward at an accelerated 
pace, very little attention is given to the protection of the data and of the rights of 
individuals whose digital information is stored in the databases. The use of biometric 
identifiers increases the risk of misidentification that may have serious consequence on 
asylum-seekers such as return to country where torture or other ill-treatment may occur.  
 
The joint operations in high sea and at the shores of third countries coordinated by 
Frontex are aiming at deterring migrants, including asylum-seekers, to reach EU shores. 
When dealing with situations of distress, some states are disputing who is to assume 
rescue and disembarkation responsibility for the people on board, thus putting at risk the 
                                                          
629 B. HAYES, Op. Cit., note 354, p.4. 
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lives of the migrants630. EU states, such as Italy, have undertaken actions that are even 
more controversial by blatantly pushing back vessels carrying migrants and possibly 
asylum seekers to Libya contrary to obligations arising from human rights treaties, 
including ECHR631. Such actions clearly speak of the aggressive policies states are ready 
to undertake in order to avoid protection responsibilities. The joint sea operations 
conducted in third countries are particularly demonstrative of the unwillingness of 
member states to assume responsibilities at any cost, including torture and possible ill-
treatment of asylum-seekers in third countries.   
 
In the context of external asylum dimension of the EU policy, some measures clearly 
aim at contracting out protection responsibilities to third states. Suggestions such as 
creation of asylum processing centres outside EU territory have not materialized as of 
the present. However, other policies such as RPP and readmission agreements are 
pursued intensively, thus, ‘passing the [refugee protection] buck’632 further and further 
from EU borders. Moreover, the discourse within which such policies are debated is 
worrisome. Many member states are openly advocating for closed borders to asylum-
seekers and also for outsourcing protection to countries that have questionable human 
rights records and in many cases lack the policies and legal structure to support asylum 
system in line with the international law.  
 
                                                          
630 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Italy/Malta: don’t play with human lives, 7 May 2009, [Online] 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/italymalta-don%E2%80%99t-play-human-lives-
20090507 [Accessed 3 December 2011]. 
631 Id. Also see UNHCR, UNHCR deeply concerned over returns from Italy to Libya, 2009 [Online] 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a02d4546.html [Accessed 4 December 2011]. 
632 Sandra LAVENEX, “"Passing the Buck" : European Union Refugee Policies towards Central and 
Eastern Europe” (1998) 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 126, 134. 
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However, as it was argued in the paper, the right to asylum is not devoid of legal power. 
Countries, including EU member states and institutions, are bound under the 
international law, if not to grant asylum, then at least to secure access to their territory to 
asylum seekers, and in a case-by-case basis to determine their need for protection. The 
non-refoulement principle, as part of the international customary law, limits state 
sovereignty over the control of its borders and maintains state responsibility for violating 
the principle extraterritorially, that is, everywhere the state exercises effective control 
over a person. This includes the high seas, third countries, and international zones in 
airports, etc. To deny responsibilities towards asylum seekers for political convenience 
is in violation of basic human rights laws and standards.  
 
Even though irregular migration poses significant challenges to member states, this 
should not be used as justification to avoid responsibilities towards people with 
protection needs. Commonly approved rules exist within the international law to 
guarantee the rights of those populations. Efforts to misinterpret the rules because of 
political interests are undoubtedly undermining the international human rights regime 
and may have dire consequences for the people they are meant to protect. Interception 
activities at high sea affect the lives of many people, asylum-seekers or other migrants 
alike, and therefore need to be driven with a human rights based approach where the life 
of each individual is placed before any political interest. The high seas are not excluded 
from the applicability of the international law and Community law, and states are 
responsible for bona fide implementation of the law. Otherwise, unnecessary loss of life 
will continue. 
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In such climate of hostility towards people in need of protection, the EASO can play 
indispensable role for setting higher standards of protection. The Office would advance 
the harmonization of refugee determination practices in different member states by 
harmonizing the information on countries of origin and transit of asylum-seekers and 
improving cooperation by offering practical assistance in training asylum officials and 
developing uniform refugee determination and other guidelines.  By working closely 
with UNHCR, civil society NGOs and European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA) the EASO will ensure that protection standards set by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and other relevant human rights treaties are met. However, in view of the 
significant gaps in refugee protection among EU member states, the EASO will not be 
able to make considerable improvements given its non-decisional role with no real 
power to influence member state decisions. Therefore, in order to advance the 
development of the CEAS the Office should be given more decision-making authority 
and discretion in influencing asylum-related decisions of member states. The EASO has 
the potential to become an Agency with decision-making power on individual asylum 
claims and authority able to balance the responsibility-sharing for asylum-seekers 
among EU member states.  
 
Frontex is becoming a more significant actor in the EU border control management. The 
agency cannot be exempt from responsibility for wrongdoing committed during joint 
operations at high sea. The recently amended Frontex Regulation will improve 
accountability and transparency in every aspect of Agency’s activities. This will ensure 
more respect for the international and EU law and more confidence in EU institutions.  
In addition, the implementation of the EU border guard teams is a step in the right 
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direction towards more comprehensive approach to the EU border control activities. 
However, the agency must cooperate more closely with EASO, FRA, UNHCR and civil 
society NGOs in order to ensure the needs of asylum-seekers are met according to 
international and EU protection standards. In addition, there is an urgent need for more 
effective monitoring mechanism with participation of the above-mentioned organization 
to guarantee transparency of the Agency’s operations and day-to-day activities.  
 
The outlined enforcement mechanisms in this paper, individually or in combination, can 
be beneficial to any individual subjected to incorrect behaviour by the state. Evidently, 
the EU faces a huge challenge to ensure compliance with EU legislation, the rule of law, 
and fundamental rights. Some member states led by opportunistic politicians are 
unwilling to assume responsibilities and to follow the rules that they agreed upon at the 
EU level. The European Commission, as a guardian of the Treaties, is the main player to 
ensure member states fully comply with EU values and laws. The Commission must 
demonstrate strong leadership in enforcing EU rules by reacting more vigorously to any 
infringement and by pursuing any available channels to ensure EU laws are followed 
without exception. The preliminary rulings procedure and the ECJ’s case law will prove 
most useful for harmonising EU asylum legislation and in providing individuals with 
effective remedies in case of violation of their fundamental rights. In case of asylum- 
seekers, this is of utmost importance considering the gravity of their situation if asylum-
seekers do not receive protection in Europe.  
 
In conclusion, in the age of globalization and intensive trade across countries and 
continents, borders are losing their traditional value. Conversely, while the world is 
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becoming more borderless, asylum-seekers and refugees are subjected to even more 
closed borders. In the context of EU, it can be concluded that member states are 
avoiding international responsibilities out of pure convenience: the fewer people 
crossing their borders looking for protection, the fewer resources are allocated to 
accommodate their needs; fewer people with different cultural background who may 
pose a threat to the nation’s unity633.  
 
In the current security discourse, the ‘balance metaphor’ implying that a balance should 
be struck between the security requirements and human rights obligations, is often 
invoked by the States to justify the reduction of rights accorded to asylum seekers. 
However, in state practices such balanced approach has actually “favoured the 
development of a conception of security equal to coercion, surveillance, control and a 
whole series of practices of violence and exclusion”634including measures that lack 
accountability and judicial oversight, thus posing threat to the fundamental human 
rights635. 
 
As pointed by Henkin, human rights are not a compromise between the exclusive power 
of the state and competing humanitarian impulse636. When it comes to the protection of 
human rights, the question of balance or compromise does not stand637. Human rights 
                                                          
633 J. Hathaway, Op. Cit., note 194, p.137. 
634 Didier BIGO, Sergio CARRERA & Elspeth GUILD, The CHALLENGE Project: Final Policy 
Recommendations on the Changing  Landscape of European Liberty and Security. CEPS Challenge 
Research Paper No. 16, 2009, p.3 [Online] Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/12224/1/1905.pdf [Accessed 23 
May 2011] 
635 Id. 
636 L. HENKIN, Op. Cit., note 81, 118. 
637 D. BIGO, S. CARRERA & E. GUILD, Op. Cit., note 634, p.4 point that in the context of the EU Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice “[s]ecurity only comes from the respect and protection of human rights 
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obligations of states towards asylum seekers are not a matter of choice but must be 
firmly upheld. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the other human rights instruments 
offer only the basic legal framework for protection opening the door for limitless 
possibilities. The right to asylum needs to be understood as a basic human right. 
Otherwise, the right is meaningless. In this context UNHCR stressed that: 
“[I]nternational protection can only be provided if individuals seeking 
protection have access to the territory of States where their claims can be 
assessed properly. The best quality asylum system will be of little use if it is 
not accessible”638. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and fundamental freedoms through the rule of law, and liberty should be placed as the starting principle on 
which the EU’s AFSJ should be rooted and developed”. D. BIGO, S. CARRERA & E. GUILD, Op. Cit., 
note 634, p.4. 
638 UNHCR, Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on the Future Common European 
Asylum System, 2007, p.46 [Online] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46e159f82.html [Accessed 4 
December 2011]. 
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